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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in international relations have seen dramatic increases in the 
number and activities of human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This 
has inspired research that seeks to explain processes of human rights socialisation, 
particularly in crisis zones. In this context, NGO advocacy is often welcomed as being 
inherently beneficial for adherence to human rights principles. Such a position, 
however, fails to account for the critiques offered by theorists who suggest that the 
wielding of any power to affect change can have negative as well as positive 
outcomes, and the critiques of realist international relations theorists who assert the 
dangers of unqualified promotion of normative concerns in the face of power 
interests. In this context, this thesis offers a critical evaluation of the contributions of 
NGO advocacy in human rights socialisation. 
 
Two models of human rights socialisation – the spiral and boomerang models – are 
utilised in examining human rights advocacy in West Papua, a province of Indonesia. 
The West Papuan case study indicates that detrimental outcomes can result from the 
failure of human rights advocates to account for political interests and state 
sovereignty in their strategies of human rights promotion. Human rights campaigns 
framed in terms of people’s rights to physical security and subsistence, instead of 
more political rights, such as the right to self-determination, are likely to be more 
positive for human rights adherence. This points to the desirability of a hierarchy of 
rights principles in human rights advocacy and suggests, for the socialisation models 
used, a need for clearer distinctions between the human rights principles prescribed 
for advocacy.     
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
On July 6th, 1998, at around 5:00am, Indonesian troops encircled a group of about 
200 independence protestors on the island of Biak in the Indonesian province of 
West Papua (Rutherford 1999, p. 39).1 For a number of days, Indonesian authorities 
had demanded that the group remove the Papuan peoples’ Morning Star flag that they 
were flying above a 35-metre-tall water tower (Human Rights Watch 2000a). 
However, failing in their attempts, the authorities promptly directed the troops to open 
fire on the crowd (Human Rights Watch 2000a). With gunfire coming from four sides, 
as many as 100 people were killed in the massacre that followed, according to 
Indonesia’s national human rights commission, KOMNAS HAM (see Kivimäki 2006, 
p. 16).2 “Bloody Biak”, as the incident came to be known, was a dark day in Papuan 
history. Yet similar events reoccur with appalling regularity in the region. Such 
tragedy draws one to ask: How might such events be avoided? Why would the raising 
of a flag evoke such a violent response? And what can outsiders do to help? 
 
In response to these queries, NGOs as well as other political actors make efforts to 
prevent governments from disregarding the principles of human rights.3 Such NGOs 
have undertaken diverse strategies and have enjoyed varying degrees of success. Yet 
with these activities come potential risks. In often intensely charged political 
environments, misguided policies may be worse than simply ineffective in upholding 
                                                
1 Over the course of its history, West Papua has been known by a number of different names. Recently, 
these have included Dutch New Guinea, West Irian, Irian Jaya, Papua and West Papua. At the time of 
writing, its official name is “Papua”. However, current literature on the region widely refers to it as 
“West Papua”, distinguishing it from the neighbouring Papua New Guinea. In this light, the remainder 
of this text will refer to the region as “West Papua”, unless directly quoting another source where one 
of its other names is used. 
2 Three weeks after the incident, 33 bodies washed ashore on Biak. Although where these bodies came 
from remains unclear (see Human Rights Watch 2000a), two explanations have been given for their 
appearance. The Indonesian authorities claimed that they were victims of a tsunami that hit Aitepe, 
Papua New Guinea on July 16th. Evidence to this effect was produced by the military and the police. 
However, several local reports claimed that some of the bodies had their hands tied behind their backs, 
which may indicate a link to the events of July 6th. The bodies were buried without autopsies (Human 
Rights Watch 2000a).   
3 Rather than attempting to address the issue in this introductory chapter, the definition of major terms 
in this work – such as “human rights” and “NGOs” – will be left to the relevant chapters that follow. 
Taking this approach will help to preserve the clarity of theoretical arguments. 
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human rights – they may also undermine the rights they seek to reinforce. Thus, 
NGOs might inadvertently contribute to an increase in human rights abuses. This 
potential will be the primary concern of this thesis.  
 
Specifically, the research undertaken will critically evaluate how the activities of 
NGOs in international politics both contribute to and inhibit the promotion of human 
rights principles. Additionally, it is hoped that understanding the politics of human 
rights advocacy may also give valuable insights into the role of human rights in 
international relations more generally. As prefigured in the example above, the human 
rights situation in West Papua will provide the basis for an analysis of these serious 
and difficult issues. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Questions about the effectiveness of human rights advocacy necessarily connect with 
disputes about the nature of political power in international relations. Without 
possessing some power value, it is difficult to see how the principles of human rights 
can have any relevance in the modern international system.  
 
Several theorists maintain that human rights principles possess significant power and 
assert validity of the human rights discourse. One such person is Richard Falk. At the 
end of the 20th century, he proposed that, due to developments in international law and 
the victories achieved by several human rights movements, the rise of “human rights 
could no longer be dismissed by cynics as little more than a collection of empty and 
unenforceable moralisms” (Falk 2000, p. 4). In his statement, Falk asserts two 
fundamental qualities of human rights principles: That they are enforceable, thus they 
have the ability to affect political processes and that they have a positive normative 
value and are, therefore, not “empty”. Falk’s statement is one example of a 
perspective that views the human rights paradigm as an authentic bastion of power in 
modern international relations – otherwise known as “soft power” (Sikkink 2002; 
Thakur 1997, p. 263). 
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Critics have challenged this position by pointing to the potential risks associated with 
an unqualified promotion of human rights principles. Realists in international relations 
believe that political decision-making is primarily concerned with issues of power and 
that national interests “trump” other normative concerns (Morgenthau 1967, pp. 5-8). 
Of these theorists, some view the disregarding of “reality” as creating a dangerous 
potential for greater human suffering (see Forde 1992, p. 67). But perhaps an even 
deeper and more pressing criticism is that human rights advocacy has the potential to 
produce both positive and negative consequences (Fisher 1997, p. 442). The words of 
Milton Friedman (1962, p. 3) may be apt to this point: “the power to do good is also 
the power to do harm” (see Fisher 1997, p. 442). Such criticisms suggest that 
prudence is desirable when promoting adherence to human rights principles.  
 
In the research undertaken here, a critical approach to the human rights paradigm will 
be taken that accounts for these two warnings against its unqualified promotion. 
While it can be assumed, as it will be here, that authentic human rights principles bear 
many positive qualities and that their achievement is desirable to a large extent, a 
critical approach remains necessary when enquiring into the effects of promoting 
human rights principles. 
 
Rationale 
 
Associated with the rise of the human rights paradigm in international relations has 
been a parallel increase in the number and activity of human rights NGOs (see Fisher 
1997, p. 440; Sikkink & Smith 2002; Jackie Smith, Pagnucco & Lopez 1998; 
Wiseberg & Scoble 1981). Their enhanced salience on the international scene, some 
scholars propose, is an example of soft power in international relations and has 
improved the potential of NGOs to affect international decision-making (see Call 
2002; Ishay 2004; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a; Risse, 
Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Thakur 1997; Thomas 2001 ; 2002). 
 
Diverse methods have been identified by which human rights NGOs promote human 
rights and exert influence in international politics. Some commentators have revealed 
NGO contributions to the establishment of human rights norms in the United Nations 
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(UN) and other public forums (Cook 1996; Gaer 1996, p. 52; Ishay 2004, pp. 214-
215). NGOs are also seen by some as key contributors to the monitoring of 
agreements, routinely supplying crucial information and providing testimonies against 
norm violating governments at the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) and at 
other international forums (see Donnelly 1986, pp. 609-610; Heyns & Viljoen 2001; 
Klotz 2002, p. 52; Riker 2002, p. 189; Thakur 1997). Yet another means by which 
NGOs contribute to the adherence to human rights is through their practical 
involvement in areas of health care and education. Humanitarian work is often 
fundamental to the achievement of basic subsistence and cannot be separated from a 
framework of international human rights promotion (see Gordenker & Weiss 1996, 
pp. 37-38; van Tuijl 1999, p. 499). Perhaps most critical to the power influences of 
NGOs are their contributions to the overall enforcement of human rights principles 
(see Gaer 1996, p. 56; Klotz 2002, p. 52). It is this last form of influence that will be 
of primary concern throughout this thesis.   
 
As a part of the literature exploring enforcement, processes of socialisation are 
frequently recognised as being a key mediating mechanism (Keck & Sikkink 1998; 
Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). Models explaining 
this influence are proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
(1999) (see also Armbruster-Sandoval 2003; Fleay 2006; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 
2002a, p. 19). Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang theory” suggests that when NGOs are 
unable to influence policy through domestic political structures, they frequently seek 
support from outside to exert greater pressure (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 12-13). 
Expanding on a proposal by Brysk (1993) that NGOs affect change “from above and 
from below” – through both domestic and international channels of influence – Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) “spiral model” takes a more multidimensional approach. It 
proposes a five-stage model explaining the influence of NGOs at both the domestic 
and international levels of politics. These two models are useful in exploring the 
mechanisms of dialogue that NGOs employ when they attempt to create momentum 
around an issue in order to effect change.  
 
An important strategy for the socialisation of human rights is the way in which NGOs 
frame issues in order to make campaigns more appealing to international actors and 
the public (see John L Campbell 1998, pp. 380-381; Joachim 2003; Keck & Sikkink 
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1998, p. 2; Snow et al. 1986). Human rights campaign “frames”, in other words, are 
seen as important vehicles of influence. Scholars recognise the need for NGOs to be 
politically expedient when choosing a frame (Joachim 2003, p. 251; Keck & Sikkink 
1998, p. 19), as well as pursuing those frames that are most emotive and easily 
assignable to responsible parties (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 19). However, the models 
of socialisation discussed here often give insufficient attention to the process of 
framing. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) spiral model is particularly silent about the 
issue, while Keck and Sikkink (1998) emphasise only the most beneficial campaign 
frames in their boomerang model.    
 
Due to the scant attention given to this issue, little research has been undertaken into 
the relative effects of different campaign frames on the processes of human rights 
socialisation. In particular, critical assessment of how human rights frames may 
negatively affect processes of socialisation is almost entirely absent in the literature on 
socialisation and NGOs. Many discussions, therefore, neglect the distinctly negative 
outcomes that may eventuate from failed campaigns to promote human rights. Where 
NGO deficiencies are discussed, some only entertain this with regard to their failure 
to affect particular political processes through misdirected or ill-timed strategies 
(Baehr 1999, pp. 125-126). Perhaps more forcefully, others question the positive 
influence of NGOs from a more ideational point of view and explore whether the 
advent of NGO politics has been a positive democratising factor in international 
relations (see Chandler 2003; Fisher 1997). A wide-ranging approach to NGO 
activities is offered by Fisher (1997, p. 443), who recognises that the empowerment of 
NGOs to enter into and influence political events, particularly within the development 
discourse, is “not without risks”. Significantly, through his analysis of the NGO 
discourse, Fisher moves beyond a theoretical study of NGO influence to explore the 
practical shortcomings that their influence may have.  
 
Greater knowledge in this area could lead to a number of benefits. Endeavouring to 
identify the potentially negative implications of human rights campaigning, in 
addition to its positive aspects, may clarify how NGOs could avoid inadvertently 
contributing to the regression of socialisation models, which potentially bring relapses 
into greater violence. It may also sharpen both the descriptive and prescriptive 
elements of the models of human rights socialisation. Finally, critically analysing the 
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work of NGOs in the human rights field may give a clearer picture of where NGOs 
could concentrate their resources in working to affect government policy.  
 
The Use of West Papua as a Case Study 
 
West Papua has been chosen as a fitting and interesting case for study due to the 
challenges posed by persistent and seemingly intractable human rights abuses as well 
as the presence of a diverse set of NGOs with equally diverse strategies. Widespread 
human rights abuses have been documented in the region for several decades (see, for 
example, Australian Council for Overseas Aid 1995; Budiardjo & Liong 1988; 
Human Rights Watch 2007a). These have occurred due to conflicts between the 
Indonesian authorities and the local population, but have mainly been attributable to 
the Indonesian military. From within this environment, the upsurge in NGO presence 
that accompanied the establishment of Indonesian democracy in 1998 offers an 
opportunity to study NGO activities from the time that NGOs were at an embryonic 
stage of development through to their fully developed activism (see Bonay & 
McGrory 2004). This has corresponded with greater involvement from human rights 
NGOs on an international level, as can be seen in the constant stream of reports that 
have been published on West Papua during Indonesia’s democratic era by NGOs such 
as Human Rights Watch (2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2007a; 2007b), the International Crisis 
Group (2001; 2002; 2006) and the Robert F Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human 
Rights (RFK Memorial).4 These conditions contribute to the value of West Papua as a 
case for the critical evaluation of human rights promotion. 
 
Methodology 
 
Like much of the literature on NGOs and human rights socialisation (see, for example, 
Jetschke 1999; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2002), this research will use a 
qualitative method to analyse and critique the use of framing and the dominant models 
of human rights socialisation. Use of the West Papuan case study in this instance 
                                                
4 For a number of years RFK Memorial published monthly reports on human rights conditions in West 
Papua. A selection of these are referenced in this thesis. 
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provides insight into the shortcomings of existing socialisation models and in the 
exploration of the causal mechanisms of human rights promotion (see George & 
Bennett 2005, pp. 20-22). The deep situational understandings that qualitative case 
studies offer can lend themselves to a greater appreciation of the nuances of variables 
that affect human rights promotion (George & Bennett 2005, pp. 19-20). Thus, case 
studies can “allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a 
smaller number of cases” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 19). Situations often diverge 
from the predictions given by models. Close consideration of events may highlight the 
failings of models and allow for an evolution in the understanding of causal 
mechanisms that explain a phenomenon (George & Bennett 2005, p. 21). This 
methodological principle will guide this research in its critical analysis of NGO 
performance within socialisation models. 
 
A major difficulty associated with research into West Papua arises from the multitude 
of NGOs that have been established in the region since 1998. According to Bonay and 
McGrory (2004, p. 448), in 2002 there were some 140 NGOs operating just within 
West Papua itself, not including international NGOs. These included 72 
“peacebuilding” NGOs. It would, therefore, be impossible for this study to give a 
comprehensive overview of all human rights NGOs involved in West Papua, much 
less the perspectives held by each. For this reason, only a sample of NGOs will be 
given primary attention. Some attention, although limited, will be given to other 
NGOs. Attempts are made to minimise any imbalances this might cause by selecting a 
diverse group of NGOs that are noted for their activity and influence in the overall 
Papuan human rights discourse. 
 
To build an adequate picture of NGO and government interactions, information will 
be drawn from a wide range of sources. Primary material, in the form of NGO and 
media reports, UN submissions and debates as well as interviews of NGO 
representatives, will provide the foundation for assessing the positions of NGOs, 
governments and other relevant actors. Existing literature often provides valuable 
insight into the positions of various actors. That which is worthy of special note is the 
work done by the East-West Center in Washington D.C. (see Chauvel & Bhakti 2004; 
Kivimäki 2006; McGibbon 2004). This literature will supplement these sources and 
will be used to inform a chapter on the historical background of West Papua. 
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Examination of the positions of NGOs, governments and other prominent actors will 
follow from the information gathered and will be analysed in the context of the two 
socialisation models – the boomerang and spiral models – outlined in chapter three of 
this thesis. 
 
Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis includes seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapter two 
outlines the theoretical debates surrounding human rights principles in international 
politics. Discussion in the first part of the chapter examines debates between the 
realist and liberal traditions of international thought over the efficacy of human rights, 
before relating the theories to the advocacy of different principles of rights. Extending 
from this discussion, the second half of the chapter focuses on the substance and 
categorisation of human rights principles for the purposes of advocacy. 
 
Chapter three discusses the role of NGOs in international relations. The beginning of 
the chapter addresses the definition and theoretical functions of human rights NGOs 
as custodians of international civil society. Discussion of both theoretical and 
practical aspects of NGO work follows. Functions of NGOs are divided between their 
attempts to help establish human rights norms and their work to promote adherence to 
those norms. Substantial attention is given to the models of socialisation, which 
attempt to describe how NGOs are able to influence government policy, and the 
“framing” processes they undertake. 
 
Chapter four introduces the case study that will be the attention of the second part of 
the thesis. This introduction consists of a brief description of West Papua’s historical 
background and covers the period from the 1960s to the present. The chapter serves as 
the foundation for understanding the situation and grievances of affected parties in 
West Papua. 
 
Chapter five describes the NGOs that are involved in the West Papuan human rights 
“cause”. Domestic and international NGOs are both included, with special attention 
given to NGOs that are more important for the later application of the theoretical 
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models. An examination of the positions held by NGOs on self-determination rights 
and their advocacy follows this. 
 
In chapter six, the two theoretical models, namely the spiral and boomerang models, 
are applied to the case of human rights advocacy in West Papua. This begins with the 
application of the spiral model, before moving onto an assessment of conditions that 
are consistent with the boomerang effect. After the application of each model, there 
will be a short discussion of results. Finally, the chapter concludes with a short 
exploration of how strategies of human rights advocacy may be improved in the 
region.  
   
The concluding chapter explores the implications of the findings of the previous 
chapter. These are examined in relation to two areas: the socialisation models utilised 
in the previous chapter and the promotion of human rights in international society. 
Possible areas of future research are also suggested near the end of the chapter, before 
we reflect on what these findings might entail for other regions of the world. 
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Chapter 2 
Human Rights and International Relations: Theoretical and 
Practical Debates 
 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw one of the most intriguing and 
unprecedented developments in the history of international relations, as political 
change on a global scale greeted demands for human rights. Almost all UN member 
states accepted, to some degree, the standards of human rights (see Howard & 
Donnelly 1997, p. 268). Most obviously, the establishment of an array of human 
rights covenants and mechanisms in international law seemed to signify the rise of 
human rights as a concept integral to the conduct of the international community. The 
1966 signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
solidified the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) into 
positive law and seemed to bolster the principles of human rights even further. Those 
aggrieved by violations of human rights could invoke these, and a vast array of other 
international instruments,5 in appealing for the redress of human rights injustices 
through the United Nations Human Rights Committee, governments or through other 
avenues. It is the arrival of such an elaborate human rights regime on the international 
landscape that draws attention to the core concerns of how effective human rights 
promotion is able to be and how efficacy might be achieved. These concerns will be 
the focus of this chapter and will form a theoretical basis for further examination of 
the processes of human rights promotion and socialisation in later chapters. 
  
At the outset of this chapter, realist and liberal perspectives will be presented to show 
the contrasting views on the space that is available for the effective promotion of any 
                                                
5 Eldridge (2002) highlights some agreements that have been critical to the development of human 
rights. Important agreements include the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatments or Punishments, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
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rights in the international system. This discussion will be directed towards giving a 
better understanding of varying influences of power. Disagreements amongst theorists 
centre on the processes of international decision-making and whether normative ideals 
can influence policy in the face of traditional inter-governmental power concerns. 
Following this, a liberal perspective will be presented that incorporates realist 
concerns into the promotion of normative ideals. The way in which classical liberal 
theorists have included concerns for state sovereignty will be used to demonstrate that 
this “realistic liberalism” is an authentic form of liberalism that may be a beneficial 
theoretical outlook for the effective promotion of human rights principles. Ideas 
presented in this debate will also be foundational for a definition and categorisation of 
human rights principles.   
 
Assumptions presented in realistic liberalism imply that not all rights are equal; 
neither in their inherent normative value, nor in the effects that they have on political 
perceptions. Categorising rights principles in a way that reflects these two dimensions 
allows for a much clearer exposition of the complexities of human rights promotion. 
For this reason, the latter part of this chapter presents two categorisations of human 
rights. The first distinguishes rights on the basis of how normatively basic they are to 
the promotion of other rights. The second distinguishes the degree to which rights are 
politically sensitive or challenging. Considering both of these qualities of rights 
principles will inform a suggested hierarchy of human rights principles, which 
indicates which human rights principles might best lend themselves to promotion in 
the international sphere.  
 
The Space for Rights in International Politics 
 
Along with the inscription of human rights into international law, a vast theoretical 
debate has arisen over the efficacy of human rights. This debate is commonly played 
out between two theoretical extremes – realism and liberalism (Drost 1965, p. 12).6 
When it comes to the consideration of human rights principles, these two groups 
differ in their response to the question of whether human rights principles have a 
                                                
6 These are not the only two perspectives that can be held on the issue; however, they are possibly the 
most influential in colouring present thinking. 
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significant influence on decision-making in the political sphere. The realist tradition 
holds that human rights concerns are spurious in the context of political decision-
making, or at least subservient to concerns of power and survival (Donnelly 2000, pp. 
9-11), whereas liberalism postulates that human rights principles can and do make 
significant contributions in the field of politics (see Falk 2000, p. 4). 
 
Contentions between those advocating realism and those advocating liberalism 
include a number of matters relating to human persons and the way they relate to one 
another. The theoretical debate encompasses issues of human nature and human 
morality as well as the nature of political relations and structures at the international 
level.7 Differing perceptions of these issues lead to conflicting prescriptions for 
promoters of norms who are hopeful of influencing concrete political outcomes. 
Although these differences are invariably present, both schools of thought retain 
scope to recognise the legitimate concerns of the other. 
 
Realists’ views on Normative Concerns in International Politics 
 
Throughout recent centuries, scepticism toward the effectiveness of norms on political 
decision-making has been championed by realist theorists. In this mould classical 
theorists have been placed, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, as well 
as modern theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and E. H. Carr 
(Donnelly 2000). While these vary in their portrayal of realism,8 at its most basic level 
realism suggests that “theory does not create practice, but practice [creates] theory” 
(Carr 1946, p. 63). As a result of this outlook, two major objections are given against 
the suggestion that normative concerns have a substantive influence on decision-
                                                
7 The theoretical debate is paralleled by another which is concerned with which view, realist or liberal, 
is supported by empirical research. Katsumata (2004), Finnemore and Sikkink, (1998), Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink (1999), Risse (1999) and Heynes and Viljoen (2001) all find support for the liberal position 
that human rights treaties and legal mechanisms are an important development in international relations 
as they are an effective progression towards the universal recognition of human dignity. Meanwhile, a 
number of writers (for instance see Keith, 1999; Trifunovska, 2002; Harris-Short, 2003) believe that 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the realist interpretation of human rights policy is more 
representative of reality. 
8 Donnelly (2000, p. 6) observes that realism is a “distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of 
analysis”. Nevertheless, one of the most common distinctions made within the realist tradition is 
between classical realism, that emphasises the limitations of human nature, and neo-realism, which 
emphasises amongst other things the structural limitations of the international system (Donnelly 1992). 
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making in the political sphere: The realist tradition suggests that normative concerns, 
including those that herald human rights principles, are nullified by the egoism 
inherent in human nature and by the contingencies of the political realm (Donnelly 
2000, pp. 9-11). 
 
A negative view of human nature has traditionally informed the realist view of the 
potential “morality” of political systems. Classically, Machiavelli helped to set this 
tone when he claimed “all men are wicked and… they always give vent to malignity 
that is in their minds when opportunity offers” (Machiavelli 1950, pp. 216-217). Some 
more modern theorists have continued in this vein and painted human nature as 
“constant, egoistic, and therefore inevitably inclined toward evil” (Donnelly 1992, p. 
86). Others have not been so inclined to make such bold and broad statements – 
Hobbes, for instance, rejected the view that humans are inherently evil (Hobbes 1983, 
pp. 32-33).9 Yet, as a tradition, realism maintains a “primary emphasis” on the 
“egoistic passions” of human nature (see Donnelly 2000, p. 6). These qualities are of 
great importance to the practice of politics because the laws that govern political 
behaviour are derived from human nature, hence there is unfortunately the “tragic 
presence of evil in all political action” (Morgenthau 1947, p. 173; 1967, p. 4). The 
effects of this situation on political interaction are often facilitated by structural 
considerations and characteristics of states that push self-interest to the fore in 
political decision-making (Donnelly 2000, pp. 47-49; see also Morgenthau 1967, pp. 
75-78).  
 
Rather than dwelling only on the characteristics of human nature, neo-realists 
emphasise the structural aspects of international politics to counter arguments 
favouring normative concerns in the political realm (Donnelly 1992, p. 88). Political 
contingencies, the second of the two major objections, place the need for power at the 
                                                
9 While Hobbes believed that “all men in the state of nature have a desire, and will to hurt” (Hobbes 
1983, p.46) , he also denounced the suggestion that humans were naturally evil when he stated:  
 
The dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some 
coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other, and as by natural right he may, 
so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, toward the preservation 
of himself…. Some object that this principle being admitted, it would need [to] follow, not 
only that all men were wicked… but also wicked by nature…. But this, that men are evil by 
nature, follows not from this principle (Hobbes 1983, pp. 32-33). 
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top of state priorities in their international dealings (Morgenthau 1967, pp. 75-76). 
Morgenthau (1967, pp. 75-76) contends that either the desire for prestige or, more 
commonly, the necessity of a state to avoid annihilation – an ever present threat in the 
international system – ensure that state power is the most important foreign policy 
objective. These difficult circumstances are exacerbated by the anarchical nature of 
international politics (Donnelly 1992, p. 88). Without an overarching authority to 
check the pursuit of power, the international system is in a perpetual state of war, 
which cannot be changed (Krasner 1992, p. 50; Roy 1993, p. 452). This lack of 
changeability reinforces the prioritisation of self-interests over normative policy 
goals. 
 
In circumstances such as these, realists argue there is simply no room for the 
implementation of principled policy that is based on an ideal of human rights. Human 
rights principles, and other normative concerns, are pushed aside by either the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms to guarantee those ideals or are left subordinate to more 
pressing foreign policy concerns (Morgenthau 1979, pp. 6-7). This makes a wide-
ranging international human rights regime implausible (Donnelly 1992, p. 88).  
 
Despite this outlook, however, it does not follow by any means that all realists believe 
the international system is devoid of morality or that the realist outlook does not offer 
ethical policy prescriptions. Many realists challenge charges that realism represents 
“wicked cynicism” (Drost 1965, p. 12) or that, by its nature, it is “dystopian” (Forde 
1992, p. 68). Often, these return to the essential claims that good political theory must 
be based on political realities and not merely on what people wish them to be (Carr 
1946, p. 63). As a result, warnings are raised about the blind pursuit of moral action 
which, if not checked, can lead to greater evil and more violence than a strictly realist 
approach (Forde 1992, p. 67).  
 
While the importance of self-interest is unquestionably present and raison d’etat 
persists for many (if not most) realists justifying the state as the highest ethical good 
in its own right (Donnelly 1992, p. 98), for other realists morality persists at a more 
discrete level. These have responded to claims of dystopianism through recognition of 
the authentic restrictions that morality places on the realist “ideology”. Carr (1946, p. 
93) comes to the conclusion that “any sound political thought must be based on 
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elements of both utopia and reality”. Morgenthau (1967, p. 224) discusses these 
restrictions by stating:  
 
[A] discussion of international morality must guard against the two extremes of either 
overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics or underestimating it by 
denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything but considerations of 
material power.  
 
Expressed in another way, morality is seen as a force that, while being subordinate to 
pragmatic interests, may place bounds on the excesses of some policymakers. 
Nevertheless, it remains a central tenet of realism that it takes on an opposite and 
complimentary function to “remind us of the limits of rational and moral reform” 
(Donnelly 1992, p. 106). 
 
Important implications can be drawn from this and applied to human rights in 
international politics. As the normative justifications for human rights are largely left 
aside (apart from the possibility that they are a secondary rationale for decision-
making and mitigate the harshest limitations of the realist perspective), realism simply 
suggests that states will, and should, be sceptical of voices advocating the pursuit of 
normative concerns “for humanity’s sake” (see Forde 1992, p. 67). In the practical 
reality of politics, these voices are likely to be ignored. When they are seemingly 
heard, however, it is likely to be for purely instrumental reasons – that is, when it 
serves the power interests of the state to pursue a human rights policy (Donnelly 1992, 
p. 96). Finally, realists warn that care should be taken in the advocacy of human 
rights. As in the case of conventional international politics, if this advice is not 
heeded, the outcome could be greater or prolonged human suffering (see Forde 1992, 
p. 67). 
 
Liberals’ views on Normative Concerns in International Politics 
 
Liberalism deviates from realism in that it emphasizes normative concerns over more 
pragmatic principles (Donaldson 1992, p. 144). In its most basic form, it claims “the  
way the world ought to be cannot be derived from the way it is” (Mapel & Nardin 
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1992, p. 309). These premises, insofar as they give rise to the liberal confidence in a 
more idealistic state of politics, are the converse of those of the realist outlook. For 
liberals, humanity’s ability to act on ethical principles in the political realm rests on a 
belief that human nature holds a great capacity for moral behaviour and a belief that 
the practical situations faced in the international setting are not as discouraging or 
unchangeable as realists assert.  
 
Arguments for these two assertions can be demonstrated by utilizing the theories of 
18th century political theorists Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. Each has 
contributed to alternative understandings of human nature and the international 
political system. Rousseau, constructing his own conception of the state of nature,10 
contested many of the dominant realist notions and offered a more positive view of 
humanity’s moral capacity (see Rousseau 1993).11 Perturbed by the apparent state of 
perpetual war in international relations, Kant wrote his famous essay Toward 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (hereafter referred to as Perpetual Peace) a 
few decades later outlining how a worldwide perpetual peace might be achieved (Kant 
1970, pp. 93-130). This was an expansion of his earlier pronunciation that “moral 
practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: There is to be no war” (Kant 
1991, p. 160) giving much insight into how space for ethical norms may be fostered in 
the international system through the prohibition of war. By inference, Kant’s 
arguments on the norms of peace in international politics are relevant to other ethical 
values such as the principles of human rights. 
 
The Moral Capacity of Humanity 
 
In the face of a negative emphasis on human nature from realists, liberal thinkers seek 
to establish humanity’s capacity to act morally in order to establish human rights 
norms on a universal scale. One can phrase this simply by asking the question: Does 
humanity have an intrinsic capacity for benevolence? Although realists may answer 
negatively, liberals are more inclined to recognise humanity’s ability to reach beyond 
                                                
10 “State of nature” was a term made famous by Hobbes, which describes a hypothetical anarchy in 
which human lived before the advent of government or society.  
11 Rousseau’s political theory includes elements of both liberalism and realism. Here the more liberal 
aspects of his outlook will be discussed. 
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self-interest (see Rousseau 1993, p. 71; 75). In A Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality, Rousseau claimed that, in a state of nature, individual humans do not do ill 
because of the “peacefulness of their passions, and their ignorance of vice”. They are, 
in short, “naturally peaceful and shy” (extract from Rousseau cited in Reichberg, Syse 
& Begby 2006, p. 483). Yet, while there is no moral or immoral behaviour in this 
state of nature and it appears that humans are incapable of performing either “virtuous 
or vicious” acts, there still remains a natural preponderance toward both self 
preservation and compassion (Rousseau 1993, p. 71; 75). In this way, compassionate 
empathy toward fellow humans limits the self-interest realists assert. Empathy itself, 
according to Rousseau, is natural (Rousseau 1993, pp. 74-75). 
 
Perhaps more importantly, a further feature that distinguishes liberal thinking on 
human nature from the view of realism is the proposition that human nature is 
dynamic and evolving (John T. Scott & Zaretsky 2003, p. 607). This was an idea 
espoused by Rousseau, who termed this dynamic capability “perfectibility” (Rousseau 
1993, p. 60). Unlike other species, Rousseau claimed, humans have the faculty of self-
improvement. In man it gives rise to “his discoveries and his errors, his vices and his 
virtues” (Rousseau 1993, p. 60). Beyond the mere instinctual compulsion toward 
compassion, humans possess the ability to act morally (and immorally) based on the 
perfectibility of their nature. In this context, moral and immoral conduct is an 
extension of human nature and gives another reason to answer affirmatively the 
question of whether humanity has an intrinsic capacity for benevolence. This also 
suggests a hope that the ability to choose to respect rights might develop as human 
society develops. Through this discourse, an argument is given for the capacity of 
humans to follow normative concerns, and a foundation is set for the realisation of 
human rights principles in domestic and international political spheres. 
 
While Rousseau believed the features of the domestic sphere that elicited the 
construction of a society could not be attached to states in the international system, his 
argument remains relevant to international relations.12 Other liberal theorists, such as 
Kant, disagreed with Rousseau’s assessment and maintained that positive change is 
                                                
12 Despite his apparent optimism for the development of moral political systems in the domestic sphere, 
Rousseau was not so optimistic in the international system. He harboured great pessimism about the 
establishment of a meaningful international society (see Mapel 1992, p. 189; Tuck 1999, pp. 204-207). 
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possible, even inevitable, in the international system (see Huntley 1996, p. 51; Kant 
1970, pp. 108-114).13 Some argue that Rousseau’s descriptions of the domestic setting 
could easily be used in the international system. Bottici (2003), for instance, claims 
that the analogy between the domestic sphere and the international sphere can be 
extended either partially or fully. Such a transposition is possible because, although 
the constitutions of states may not be directly analogous to individuals, there remain 
important parallels, both between states and individuals in each sphere and between 
the relationships that exist between each set of actors (Bottici 2003, p. 395). The use 
of such an analogy suggests, at the least, that the international system might 
encompass normative concerns through the establishment of a society of states; that 
the moral possibilities inherent in human beings could give rise to “morality” among 
states. 
 
Constructing Space for Norms in International Relations: The Kantian Perspective  
 
For Kant, the establishment of any sort of societal order in the international system, 
parallel to that of domestic society, must derive from the applications of principles of 
a priori reasoning – from rational reflection (Donaldson 1992 p. 141). Confidence 
about the eventual realisation of a society of states is thus derived from the rationality 
of human beings and humanity’s recognition that each state has to leave the state of 
nature and “unite itself with all others” (Kant 1991, p. 124). This, Kant proposed, is 
an  unfailing duty of international actors  in order to escape perpetual war (see Kant 
1991, p. 151; Laberge 1998, p. 83; Tuck 1999, pp. 207-208). In Perpetual Peace, 
Kant sought to explore the ramifications of this and to reconcile moral principles with 
the international landscape. Among these principles, one might easily include 
principles of human rights.   
 
Central to Kant’s theoretical construction of perpetual peace is the call on states to 
institute more positive relationships between governments and people at the levels of 
“civil right of individuals within a nation”, “international right of states in their 
                                                
13 Although Kant himself rejected the idea that Rousseau’s vision of domestic society could be 
transposed onto states in the international system, the establishment of an international society 
remained an important aspiration for him.   
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relationships with one another” and “cosmopolitan right in so far as individuals and 
states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as 
citizens of a universal state of mankind” (Kant 1970, p. 98). Each definitive article in 
Perpetual Peace is geared toward the achievement of these levels of right. Although it 
may seem tautological to speak of “right” as constitutive of the space for human rights 
in the international system, the “rights” that are spoken of by Kant can be understood 
as correctly constituted relationships of government. Within the formulation of 
international liberalism that Kant presents, each one of these instances of right are 
vital for upholding normative ideals. Nevertheless, the most important area where 
Kant’s theory deviates from the theory of realism is in the potential for order between 
states in the international system. While Kant suggests both civil right and 
cosmopolitan right are necessary for the maintenance of peace,14 it is international 
right that directly contrasts with the necessarily anarchical state system envisaged in 
realism.  
 
                                                
14 The first step that Kant claims is required for the abandonment of the international anarchy, is 
summarised by the title of the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace: “The Civil Constitution of 
Every State shall be Republican” (Kant 1970, p. 99). This concerns civil right and is the basis from 
which other articles proceed. It is also a condition that makes the achievement of peace and 
international law easier. For Kant, the right to republican government accords with civil and political 
rights in which people are able to give free and equal consent to a common legislative authority (Kant 
1970, p. 99). This is done not only as an end in itself, but also to establish the conditions under which 
international peace might be viable. Kant contends that for people participating in representative 
government “it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an 
enterprise [as declaring war]” (Kant 1970, p. 100). In this way, upholding the civil right is argued to be 
beneficial to the realisation of international right. Representative government should be distinguished 
from democratic government. It can be argued, as Kant (1970, pp. 100-101) does in Perpetual Peace, 
that governments classed as “democratic” can nevertheless fall into unrepresentative or tyrannical ways 
if they are only ruled by majority concern. Also, a government can be representative or republican (in 
the Kantian usage of term) without being democratic.  
 
The third definitive article of Perpetual Peace focuses on the cosmopolitan right. The validity of the 
cosmopolitan right is not only derived from its emphasis on the individual as a primary unit of concern, 
which is the emphasis of Kant’s philosophy as seen in the categorical imperative (Laberge 1998, p. 82), 
but also because of its necessity for upholding the other instances of right.  The recognition of “the 
original and communal ownership of the earth and its resources by all persons” (Donaldson 1992, p. 
145), indicates the collective responsibility for the rights of what Kant (1970, p. 107) calls a “universal 
community”. The suggestion that if a right is violated in one part of the world it is felt everywhere 
indicates the impact that ignoring cosmopolitan right might have on civil relations, the relations of 
states and the attainment of perpetual peace (Kant1970, pp. 107-108). In Kant’s words: 
 
The idea of a cosmopolitan right is… a necessary complement to the unwritten code of 
political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under 
this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual 
peace (Kant 1970, p. 108).  
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Kant’s idea of international right rests on the establishment of a “Federation of Free 
States”, which he advocates in the second definitive article of Perpetual Peace (Kant 
1970, pp. 102-105). Although to Kant states are not under the same obligation to leave 
the state of nature as are individuals, “for as states, they already have a lawful 
constitution, and have thus outgrown the coercive right of others” (Kant 1970, p. 104), 
there still exists an imperative to leave the state of nature – which is a “condition of 
war” (Kant 1991, p. 151) – in order to create a federation of states. This justification 
comes from the challenge that war should be completely abandoned (Kant 1991, p. 
160). Thus, in order to ensure international right, a federation of free-states is 
proposed by Kant that would gradually expand to encompass all states (Kant 1970, p. 
104). The normative achievement of this society of states creates room for other 
normative considerations, including that of human rights. In Kant’s words, “the 
problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution depends upon the problem 
of a lawful external relationship of the states and cannot be solved without the latter” 
(cited in Huntley 1996, p. 49).   
 
Liberalism thus presents a vision of the political realm that, in many ways, is opposed 
to that which is offered by realism. It promotes ways in which normative concerns can 
be achieved in a world that is characterised by insecurity. To do this, it offers 
alternative views of the potential of human nature and of political interactions that are 
distinct from those of realism. These colour a more idealistic approach to politics. 
This has importance for the human rights discourse because it seeks to demonstrate 
that the principles of human rights have a true potential to influence real world 
situations. Yet, when it comes to human rights principles in real world settings, the 
way that liberalism accounts for realist concerns may exert a great influence on 
human rights promotion.  
 
Realistic Liberalism and the Promotion of Human Rights Principles 
 
Finding middle ground between the theoretical perspectives of liberalism and realism 
has importance for the enhancement of strategies of human rights promotion. 
Suggestions to this end operate at two levels – one practical, the other theoretical. The 
first level influences directly how human rights advocates might approach advocacy. 
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The ramifications of this will become more directly relevant in later chapters; 
however, some attention to this is necessary here. Due to the nature of their work, 
human rights advocates implicitly recognise the value of the liberal outlook – the act 
of promoting rights in the first instance is an act of asserting the ability of normative 
ideals to affect the political climate – yet their work often also brings the advocacy of 
normative ideals into conflict with traditional power concerns. Correctly 
understanding the place of realist power concerns within a generally liberal 
perspective allows for a better identification of the approach that NGOs may take in 
promoting human rights in a political landscape often characterised by realism. An 
understanding of how realist principles are acknowledged in the liberal tradition will 
become important in later chapters when the specific strategies undertaken by NGOs 
to promote human rights principles are discussed in the chapters that follow. 
 
The second level, which is more relevant to the present discussion, is theoretical. 
Theoretical implications arise for human rights because the way that realism is 
accounted for in liberal theory can paint a particular approach to the way that realism 
is approached in the human rights schema. By crossing the liberal–realist divide 
through a form of realistic liberalism, insights can be drawn for the categorisation and 
definition of human rights principles that could later have ramifications for the 
processes of advocacy. Distinctions that can be made between the politicisation of 
each human rights principle (discussed below) will correspond to the concerns raised 
by the realist tradition. Accordingly, it is the latent presence of realism in the liberal 
tradition that opens up greater opportunities for discerning distinctions between 
different sets of rights in political advocacy. Therefore, having discussed the elements 
within realism that acknowledge the value of liberal theory, deeper attention will now 
be given to the value given to realism within the liberal tradition. Within liberalism, 
many theorists recognise the shortcomings of having a theoretical outlook narrowly 
focused on normative concerns.   
 
Establishing Realism within the Liberal Tradition: the Place of State Sovereignty 
 
As has been discussed above, realism contains many assumptions and emphasises 
many problematic aspects of the international system. Among these, state sovereignty 
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carries significant weight as a concept that protects the state from violence and 
illegitimate outside intervention (Vincent 1974, p. 14), as well as assuming legitimate 
authority (Morris 1998, p. 175). Sovereignty has been defined by F.H. Hinsley (1966, 
p. 26) as “the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political 
community… and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”. Alternatively, a 
definition of sovereignty may also include reference to a territory over which 
sovereignty is exercised. In this regard, it can be thought of as “the ultimate source of 
political authority within a realm” (Morris 1998, p. 172). As with the other 
assumptions associated with realism discussed earlier, a purely realist perspective on 
the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty may hold that human 
rights activism in the face of state sovereignty will create conflict and potential for 
harsher “imperialism” leading to greater human suffering (Falk 1981, p. 2). In light of 
this, realists may believe that promoters of human rights “should cease and desist 
from these misguided efforts to induce governments to promote human rights as a 
matter of foreign policy” (Falk 1981, p. 2).  
 
Liberal theorists often also affirm the place of state sovereignty and advocate its 
recognition when pursuing normative principles. Indeed, recognition of the value of 
realism is not difficult to find within the liberal tradition, with theorists such as Kant 
(1970, p. 96), Rousseau (see Reichberg, Syse & Begby 2006, p. 482; Tuck 1999, pp. 
206-207) and John Stuart Mill (1861) all giving ascendancy to power concerns and 
state sovereignty over normative ideals at times. In doing so, these theorists appear 
cautious in approaching issues of self-determination and civil and political liberties 
because of the conflict that may be encountered with state sovereignty. 
  
Sovereignty was crucial to Kant’s liberal perspective and problems were envisaged if 
the norm of state sovereignty was ignored (Kant 1970, p. 96). His civil and 
cosmopolitan rights were both given limits of his formulation of international right. 
This is seen in the principle of non-interference, discussed in the fifth preliminary 
article of Perpetual Peace, which holds that: “No state shall forcibly interfere in the 
constitution and government of another state” (Kant 1970, p. 96). While this principle 
is based partially on respect for the integrity of society within a state and its members, 
and is thus based on civil right, it also shows a wide respect for the state’s own 
sovereignty, due to how a state’s integrity affects the security and the rights of other 
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states. Even where rights are being violated, Kant believes intervention, in most cases, 
would not be justified:  
 
[A]s long as internal conflict is not yet decided, the interference of external powers 
would be a violation of the rights of an independent people which is merely 
struggling with its internal ills. Such interference would be an active offence and 
would make the autonomy of all other states insecure (Kant 1970, p. 96). 
 
In this way, the individual, as a unit of concern, does not automatically take 
precedence over the state. Kant (1970, p. 105) reaffirms the principle of sovereignty 
when he comments later in his essay that “the concept of international right becomes 
meaningless if interpreted as a right to go to war”. Thus, even when giving an 
approach to political rights orientated toward the individual, Kant finds it prudent to 
insert realist, state-centred principles of rights.  
 
Likewise, another liberal theorist, John Stuart Mill, treated the ideas of self-
determination and civil and political liberties with what some may view as astonishing 
pragmatism about the state. While Mill argued that self-determination, in the form of 
representative government, is the “ideally best” form of government (Mill 1861, p. 
45), he also proposed that there are many situations where it is not “practicable or 
eligible in all states of civilization” (Mill 1861, p. 54). When confronted with the 
proposition of international intervention as a means of coercing governments into 
giving political rights to a repressed people, Mill placed, as a general rule, the 
prerogative on the repressed populous to struggle for their own rights of self-
government (Mill 1984, p. 122). Mill believed that if a people attained outside help, 
they simply might be unable to maintain the political environment in which to enjoy 
political rights. Those who were previously in power or other powerful actors would, 
he believed, be able to overthrow the newly self-determined government. Hence,  
 
If a people… does not value [liberty] sufficiently to fight for it, and maintain it 
against any force which can be mustered within the country, even by those who have 
the command of the public revenue, it is only a question in how few years or months 
that people will be enslaved (Mill 1984, p. 122). 
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By consigning a repressed people to their own struggle for self-determination without 
outside help, Mill takes a strictly realistic, even Darwinian, approach to the problem 
of self-determination – only those who are strongest in society can achieve their self-
determination. Primarily, Mill was speaking of political rights from a realist 
viewpoint, and affirming the basic idea of territorial sovereignty. His discussion of it 
in this context illustrates an opposition to implementing impractical ideals.  
 
Self-determination rights, therefore, present a unique set of problems in the face of 
state sovereignty. As described by Kingsbury, a major problem associated with 
political rights is that of solving “how the principle of self-determination can be 
reconciled with the concern of states to maintain their territorial integrity and with the 
concern of the international community not to risk unlimited fragmentation of existing 
states” (cited in Keal 2003, p. 129). In other words, there remains a fear that if the 
principle of self-determination were applied universally, it would lead to the 
fragmentation of the international system into possibly thousands of tiny states. This 
is especially true if the right to self-determination is viewed as a synonym of the 
“right” to independence (Heintze 2003).   
 
Exposing the issue of self-determination to the light of Rousseau’s comments on 
international relations illuminates the dangers that it presents to the international 
system in this regard. As Rousseau became dejected at the prospect that states in the 
international system would be unable to escape the state of war, he came to recognise 
how having many independent self-determined polities would exacerbate the problem 
of war (see Tuck 1999, p. 206). Although he did not directly address the issue or its 
solutions, a series of rhetorical questions posed in Émile illustrates his concern over 
the issue. He asked, “whether, in fine, it would not be better to have no civil society 
than to have several… Is it not this partial and incomplete association which is the 
cause of tyranny and war? And are not tyranny and war the two worst scourges of 
mankind?” (cited in Tuck 1999, p. 206). In these questions lie hints of Rousseau’s 
own position: having a multitude of societal “associations” would inevitably lead to 
the most undesirable outcome, a descent into war. 
 
At a theoretical level, it is the incorporation of realist principles in the liberal tradition 
that points to the need for distinctions between different rights – especially between 
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those that are more political and those that are less political. In the preceding 
discussion, the checks placed on the unrestricted promotion of human rights in the 
liberal tradition originate in the need for prudence in the face of power politics and 
often directly draw upon the concept of state sovereignty. With these reservations in 
mind, bringing such ideas into the definition and categorisation of human rights 
principles may help to enhance the strategies of advocates who promote human rights 
principles.    
 
Defining and Categorising Human Rights 
 
Conceptualising the principles of human rights in a way that both encompasses the 
essence of human rights norms and accounts for difficulties the of “the real world” is 
no easy task. Definitions must include all the principles that are necessary for the 
dignity of the human person, but must not overstep their mandate. Conceptualisations 
of principles must, in other words, only include entitlements, or “rights one has simply 
because one is a human being” (Donnelly 1989, p. 9). The importance of an accurate 
conceptualisation is underlined when the practical difficulties of pursuing the 
implementation of human rights principles are considered.  
 
Accounting for both realist and liberal concerns in conceptualising a schema of 
human rights principles requires consideration of the normative and political 
dimensions of each principle. These are likely to vary in their normative or political 
values (see Baehr & Castermans-Holleman 2004, pp. 8-9; Shue 1996, pp. 19-20). 
Consequently, two different categorisations of rights will be considered here: one 
categorisation that distinguishes between basic and non-basic rights, reflecting their 
normative dimension, and one categorisation that accounts for the different political 
costs associated with each rights principle, reflecting their political dimension. 
Considering these two categorisations will lead to the identification of which rights 
are best and which are least suited, both normatively and politically, to be promoted 
on the international stage.   
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Identifying Basic Rights 
 
Many argue that while there are many rights inherent to human beings, some rights 
deserve to be identified as more basic than others and categorised as such (Baehr & 
Castermans-Holleman 2004, pp. 8-9; Matthews & Pratt 1985, p. 160; Shue 1996, p. 
19).15 Basic rights can be identified as being “essential to the enjoyment of all other 
rights” (Shue 1996, p. 19). Matthews and Pratt (1985, p. 160) argue that some rights 
are basic because without these rights “no other rights are meaningful” and because 
they receive “near-universal acknowledgement”. They identify four rights. These are 
“the rights to freedom from detention without trial, to freedom from torture, to 
freedom from extra-judicial execution and to subsistence” (Matthews & Pratt 1985, p. 
160). Others have deduced these basic rights as a response to the governmental abuses 
that have been well-documented throughout the 20th century, such as “the practices of 
killing, disappearances, physical and psychological torture, arbitrary detention, and 
exile” (Reiter, Zunzunegui & Quiroga 1986, p. 628). Thus, many have asserted the 
existence of the basic rights to life, protection against disappearance, protection 
against torture and protection against arbitrary arrest or detention (see Donnelly 1989, 
pp. 37-45)   
 
Reflecting on an address made in 1977 by the US Secretary of State, Shue (1996) 
identified three basic rights: the right to physical security,16 the right to subsistence, 
and the right to liberty. This categorisation of rights has received support in recent 
                                                
15 Other conceptualisations of rights are clearly possible. Legal positivism suggests that rights should 
be defined by the legal instruments that establishes rule in a society (Campbell 2006, pp. 14-15). At the 
international level, this gives greater authority to the covenants and declarations of human rights 
legislation. Consequently, a categorisation of rights which reflects this outlook is likely to retain 
distinctions between rights that are civil and political in nature and those that are economic, social and 
cultural in nature. As the content of rights should be defined purely by the content of international and 
domestic law, there remains the obvious problem of which is more legitimate when domestic and 
international law concerning rights contradict one another (Campbell 2006, p. 15). Donnelly (1989, pp. 
34-36) offers another conceptualisation. He suggests that many aspects of the UN’s dichotomy could 
be “transcended” by a re-categorisation of rights into five groups. These groups are:  
 
(1) subsistence and personal rights, which provide minimum protections but alone fall far 
short of protecting human dignity; (2) legal rights, which protect the individual in dealings 
with the state; (3) civil, social and cultural rights, which ensure active membership in society; 
(4) economic rights, which give one power over the nature and circumstances of one’s labor; 
and (5) political rights, which empower one to act to influence the fundamental rules and 
structure of society (Donnelly 1989, p. 36, my emphasis). 
16 Physical security rights are synonymous with Donnelly’s “personal rights” (see Donnelly 1989, p. 
36). 
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years from scholars such as Milner, Poe and Leblang (1999) and will be adopted here. 
When coming to define each right, Shue offers a much more precise definition than 
the scholars in the above discussion. This is particularly true of the rights to physical 
security and subsistence. As a category of rights, he defines the right to physical 
security as a “right that is basic not to be subjected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape, 
or assault” (Shue 1996, p. 20). The right to subsistence is similarly exact. This refers 
to the rights to “unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, 
adequate shelter, and minimal preventive health care” (Shue 1996, p. 23).  
 
The definition of liberties, however, presents a separate problem. While it may be 
easy to identify instances of grave violations of basic rights when it comes to 
subsistence and physical security, there are any number of “liberties” that could also 
be considered rights. Not all of these are necessary for the enjoyment of physical 
security and subsistence and so not all can be considered basic (Shue 1996, p. 70). 
Among the liberties that he considers basic, Shue places the right to the liberty of 
participation in many areas of society including in economic and political life (Shue 
1996, p. 71-78) and the freedom of physical movement (Shue 1996, p. 78-82).  
 
Due to the difficulty of encapsulating which of a multitude of possible liberties are 
basic, Shue does not provide an exhaustive list. In order to narrow the classification of 
basic liberties, therefore, a definition of civil and political liberties offered by 
Freedom House, an NGO concerned with such liberties, proves more useful:  
 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process…. Civil 
liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from 
the state (Freedom House 2005). 
 
Combining the three-fold categorisation of basic human rights proposed by Shue with 
this more limited interpretation of civil and political rights provides an understanding 
of rights that other categorisations do not. First, Shue’s categorisation of basic rights 
goes far beyond that of many other human rights theorists (see, for example, Ajami 
1978; Matthews & Pratt 1985; Reiter, Zunzunegui & Quiroga 1986). While Matthews 
and Pratt (1985) do not directly address issues of civil and political rights, and Reiter, 
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Zunzunegui and Quiroga (1986) neglect issues of subsistence, Shue addresses both of 
these issues. Shue’s three-fold categorisation also offers a parsimonious expression of 
a wide range of rights that are acknowledged in international law, making these more 
assessable and easily testable for academic purposes. Meanwhile, narrowing what is 
included in “liberties” complements this by allowing for a definition of liberty that is 
more easily identifiable.    
 
The Right to Self-determination 
 
One right that is a notable exclusion from the list given above is the right to self-
determination. As a right that is heavily influential in many political disputes and 
much conflict in the world, and as is also seen in the discussion of realistic liberalism 
given above, self-determination represents one of the greatest rights dilemmas on the 
contemporary political landscape (Falk 2000, p. 97). Although the “principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples” is set out as a rights principle in articles 1 
and 55 of the UN Charter, the status and content of self-determination as a right have 
been much debated (Brown 2002; Falk 2000, pp. 97-125; Hawkes 2001; Heintze 
2003; Margalit & Raz 1995; Dan Smith 2000; van den Broek 2003). 17  
 
Just what the right to self-determination entails, or should entail, remains unclear 
(Keal 2003, pp. 142-144). Even when taking the simplest approach to the right, by 
examining the phrase “self-determination”, two disputes are immediately apparent: 
What is meant by the term “self”? And, what is meant by the term “determination”? 
(see Beitz 1979, p. 95). The precise definition of the “self” concerned – the possessor 
of the right – has generated much conjecture. The “self” could refer to a particular 
tribal, ethnic, linguistic, religious or geographical group (Margalit & Raz 1995, p. 81), 
yet competing claims of self-determination are left unresolved as no overarching test 
is available to distinguish which groups are worthy recipients and which are not. 
Some believe that because of the arbitrariness of this “self”, the right to self-
determination should be bestowed sparingly and only given to those who face an 
“unacceptable risk of high cost to [their] important moral goods” (Dan Smith 2000, p. 
499).  
                                                
17 The same right is alluded to in the common article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
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“Determination” is no less debatable. As an idea it is directly associated with popular 
government, but the question remains as to how “popular” governance may be 
objectively determined (Brown 2002, p. 78). It may be necessary that determination is 
democratic in nature and, therefore, places checks and balances on government to act 
in accordance with interests a governed people. Even if we accept that self-
determination is necessarily democratic (an idea that many would vehemently 
oppose), the problem returns to the question of what constitutes the “self” that has the 
right to participate in an election process. Brown, using the dispute over Northern 
Ireland as an example of this, (2002, pp. 78-79) comments:  
 
Who ought to decide the future of Northern Ireland – the people who live in the 
province, the population of Ireland as a whole, or of the UK, or of the EU, or 
wherever? There is no democratic answer to this question because democracy can 
only come into play once it has been answered. 
 
Considering the wide potential for varying interpretations, a valuable framework of 
possible definitions of self-determination rights is given by Falk (2000, p. 100). He 
divides the right into three “orders” of self-determination. First-order self-
determination is defined as “the struggle of people to overcome alien rule, and to 
achieve independence within internationally agreed boundaries”. Second-order self-
determination refers to a “distinct” people achieving autonomy or independence 
within a part of a state or federation. Finally, third-order self-determination refers to a 
portion of a state seeking to secede from an existing state. Falk’s explanation provides 
a valuable exploration of what “self-determination” might mean to a people. Each of 
these meanings offers alternative pathways around problems associated with self-
determination as a human right.  
 
Relating Self-determination to Basic Human Rights 
 
The definitions of rights given above provide evidence of major distinctions between 
the right to self-determination and basic human rights. Of the constituent 
characteristics of basic rights given by Shue and Matthews and Pratt – that basic 
rights receive “near-universal acknowledgement” (Matthews & Pratt 1985, p. 160) 
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and are “essential to the enjoyment of all other rights” (Shue 1996, p. 19) – neither are 
clearly demonstrated in the right to self-determination. Acknowledgement of the right 
to self-determination falls short of that of other rights as there is no universally 
recognised set of principles that define the appropriate behaviour of government. As 
Falk (2000, p. 111) observes, the “character and scope of the right is more unsettled 
than ever”. Principles that are defined in international law are limited to the 
declaration that by virtue of the right to self-determination, “peoples” may “freely 
determine their own political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development” (common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR). Beyond 
this, as discussed above, it is not clear who may be classified as “peoples” or how 
they may practically and rightfully determine their status or pursue their development. 
In this way, near universal acknowledgement is lacking. 
 
With the lack of consensus surrounding the right to self-determination, comes an 
inability to demonstrate that the right is essential to the enjoyment of other rights. 
Without knowing what groups enjoy the protection of the right to self-determination, 
nor the scope of the right, its necessity to other rights is almost impossible to 
demonstrate definitively. A restricted view of the right, for instance, may hold that 
self-determination rights refer to a reasonable standard of participation of a certain 
group in the decision-making institutions of an existing state (Hawkes 2001, p. 153). 
If this is the case, one must wonder whether the rights protected by the right to self-
determination might be equally well protected by the right to civil and political 
liberties.  
 
The importance of maintaining distinctions between basic rights and self-
determination rights becomes striking when one considers the ramifications for 
advocating such rights in the midst of political realities. Recognising a hierarchy of 
basic rights and non-basic rights allows for the correct identification of which rights 
should be emphasised in order to achieve the best results in the advocacy of human 
rights principles more generally. Governments are likely to react differently to the 
advocacy of basic rights rather than to other, perhaps more contentious, rights (Baehr 
& Castermans-Holleman 2004, p. 9). Enquiring into the effectiveness of NGOs’ 
promotion of human rights principles must consider the relationship between the 
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rights that can be promoted and the potential government reactions to the advocacy of 
different categories of rights.  
 
An Alternative Categorisation of Rights: Political and Non-Political Rights 
 
Categorising human rights in a way that reflects their normative value is not the only 
way of representing them. As discussed earlier, realities faced in the promotion of 
human rights principles may necessitate another categorisation of rights in addition to 
the basic–non-basic divide. For this categorisation, rights will be defined in terms of 
their varying degrees of political sensitivity, between political and non-political 
rights. Political rights give a dimension to the definition of human rights principles 
that represents the realist concerns associated with each right. More political rights 
may be seen as being more difficult to advocate in the traditional political realm 
because of the threats that their advocacy generate for states. Political rights will refer 
to the rights to self-determination and civil and political liberties, as opposed to non-
political rights which include the rights to subsistence and physical security.  
 
Self-determination is inherently political in nature. This is reflected in the writing of 
Margalit and Raz (1995, p. 80), who suggest, “the idea of national self-government… 
speaks of groups determining the character of the social and economic environment, 
their fortunes, the course of their development, and the fortunes of their members by 
their own interest”. When the assertion of the claim to self-determination comes into 
conflict with the will of the governing authorities, it has a great potential to spark 
grave conflict, with the most extreme forms of conflict occurring when independence 
is asserted as synonymous with self-determination.  
 
Such an assertion is at times diametrically opposed to the status quo of state 
sovereignty. Events that have arisen from secessionist claims of the Basques, the 
Kurds, the Kosovar Albanians and the Chechens, for example, confirm this (Forsythe 
2000, p. 226). These conflicts indicate that many states may be reluctant to strictly 
adhere to or define the right because, at one level, it acts as a counter claim to the 
norm of state sovereignty and, at another level, many states are directly threatened by 
secessionist movements. Because claims often find opposition from those who want 
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to protect the status quo, governmental policy can be used as a means of combating 
claims to self-determination rights (Eldridge 1995, pp. 28-29). 
 
When it comes to the practical advocacy of the principles of human rights, civil and 
political liberties, like self-determination, prove particularly challenging to the state. 
With the continuing danger of conflict between the state and individuals, liberal 
conceptions of political and civil rights give priority to the individual (Howard & 
Donnelly 1997, p. 270). Governments, whose citizens enjoy those liberties less, often 
greet moves to attain greater respect for civil and political liberties with scepticism 
internationally and with crackdowns on opponents domestically (Baehr 1999, p. 16; 
Sullivan 1999). These governments are often hostile to the promotion of civil and 
political rights and, alternatively, may promote a greater recognition and achievement 
of subsistence rights as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of more controversial liberties 
(see Mahbubani 1999). This is a view implicated in the words of the UN ambassador 
of Singapore who remarked at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna: “Only those who have forgotten the pangs of hunger will think of consoling 
the hungry by telling them that they should be free before they can eat” (cited Baehr 
1999, p. 16).  
 
Effectively, what government apprehension toward both sets of rights suggests is that, 
in addition to the normative hierarchy that exists between basic rights and non-basic 
rights, there is a hierarchy with regard to which rights are politically sensitive. 
Hostility toward civil and political rights corresponds with hostility toward self-
determination rights because both reactions are borne out of threats to the political 
status quo. Recognising that some rights are more politicised in this way allows space 
for greater care to be taken in advocating such rights or, as may be more appropriate, 
that these rights may not always be advocated. Claiming civil and political rights as 
basic human rights therefore creates peculiar dilemmas when it comes to human rights 
advocacy. The potential for such advocacy to create intense political outrage which 
could incite political repression is juxtaposed with the normative, and perhaps moral, 
compulsion to advocate civil and political liberties as rights that are basic for the 
enjoyment of other rights.  
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Conceptualising a Hierarchy of Human Rights Principles  
 
The two categorisations outlined, denoting the basic and political dimensions of rights 
principles, are largely consistent with one another. When both are considered, it is 
possible to conceptualise an overall hierarchy of rights that may be used in human 
rights promotion. In such a hierarchy, rights principles that are both basic and non-
political may be more effective than other rights principles and therefore take 
precedence in advocacy. Subsistence and physical security are not only among the 
most important rights principles that need to be advocated, but also seem the least 
likely to incur the wrath of governments when advocated. Following these, the 
advocacy of civil and political liberties are also important, but nevertheless should be 
treated with great caution. While they can be considered basic rights, these liberties 
have a greater degree of threat associated with them because their implementation 
may at times incur heavy political costs to those who hold power. Finally, self-
determination rights should be advocated least among these rights as they are not 
classed as basic and they are considered more politically costly. This is especially true 
when self-determination is conceptualised as being synonymous with independence. 
This hierarchy of rights is presented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Two-Dimensional Hierarchy of Human Rights Principles 
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Although this is obviously not an exhaustive list of human rights principles, those 
principles included represent a useful array for further study into the processes of 
human rights advocacy. In later chapters, this hierarchy will be tested through 
observing the methods utilised by NGOs in advocacy. The two dimensions of the 
hierarchy, and the assumptions of realistic liberalism that inform it, will form an 
underlying basis for contrasting NGO strategies that emphasis the advocacy of self-
determination rights against those that emphasise the rights to subsistence and 
physical security in the case study used – the advocacy of human rights for the people 
of West Papua. However, in order to approach the study of this case adequately, it is 
necessary to understand the processes through which NGOs seek to achieve their goal 
of affecting changes in human rights conditions. This enquiry will be the subject of 
chapter three. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Investigating the strengths and weaknesses of the competing perspectives of realism 
and liberalism may have many important implications for the theory and practice of 
human rights advocacy. Taking the position of many liberal theorists who marry 
aspects of the two traditions, it is possible to account more adequately for realist ideas 
and formulate a form of realistic liberalism. In doing so, it is suggested that using 
cosmopolitan concepts of citizenship, that negate the importance of states, may be 
unrealistic and, therefore, counterproductive for the advocacy of human rights. 
Importantly, once such an outlook is taken for the definition and categorisation of 
human rights principles, it is possible to conceptualise a hierarchy of human rights 
principles that includes both political and normative dimensions. This hierarchy could 
be beneficial for the promotion and socialisation of human rights principles. 
 
Moving beyond the conceptual elements of human rights principles, the next chapter 
will set the debate over the effectiveness of human rights promotion in the context of 
the activities of NGOs. Discussions will focus on the processes and methods used by 
NGOs in human rights promotion and will set a foundation for the later discussion of 
theoretical models of human rights socialisation. Examining these more tangible 
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aspects of international politics will indicate more clearly how realism may contribute 
to the theory and practice of human rights promotion in international politics. 
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Chapter 3 
Human Rights NGOs in International Politics 
 
NGOs committed to the promotion of human rights principles have a large and 
growing presence in the international system. Their active participation in 
international affairs, some claim, may be one of the most important shifts in modern 
global governance (see Jackie Smith, Pagnucco & Lopez 1998). Most fundamentally 
for liberal theorists, their growth represents a rise of “global civil society” and 
challenges traditional notions of governance within and between states (Chandler 
2003, p. 340). From this perspective, activities of non-governmental actors represent 
an alternative locality of power – based on values and information (Klotz 2002, p. 52) 
– which challenges traditional realist notions of decision-making based purely on self 
interest (Thakur 1997, p. 263). The growing prominence of NGOs, therefore, offers a 
valuable vehicle through which to evaluate the claims of liberalism as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This can be done by examining the impact of normative human 
rights concerns on processes of international decision-making.  
 
Of major concern in this chapter are the mechanisms through which NGOs exert this 
influence on political decisions. After discussing the broad place of NGOs in the 
modern international system, focus will turn to the theories of NGO influence. The 
discussion of these will most importantly highlight the ways in which NGOs help to 
monitor and enforce norms through processes of socialisation. Specifically, the latter 
part of this chapter will introduce two theories of human rights socialisation – the 
spiral and boomerang models (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). 
Following this discussion, the strategies of campaign “framing” will be explored (see 
Joachim 2003). This is the process by which NGOs frame issues to change 
government and public perceptions. Research on socialisation suggests that the way 
that NGOs frame issues while lobbying governments and the public is central to their 
success (Joachim 2003; Keck & Sikkink 1998, pp. 26-28; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 
2002a; Thomas 2001). These also suggest a link between the practices of advocacy 
and the establishment of a hierarchy of rights in international human rights promotion.  
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The Place of Non-Governmental Actors in the International Arena 
 
What are NGOs and Advocacy Networks? 
 
There are a large number of non-governmental actors active in the modern 
international system. Transnational corporations, aid agencies, religious groups, 
militia and terrorist organisations, as well as organisations involved in many kinds of 
advocacy work all represent a significant dimension in the international sphere. All of 
these can, in some sense, be considered “non-governmental organisations”. 
Nonetheless, when enquiring about the role of human rights NGOs, it is fitting to 
define these more narrowly. A narrow definition must reflect those organisations that 
are involved in promoting a specific social cause. Importantly, the definition of NGOs 
must lend itself to the study of NGOs involved in the promotion of human rights. For 
this reason, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink’s (2002a, p. 6) definition of NGOs will be 
adopted, which regards NGOs as “private, voluntary, non-profit groups whose 
primary aim is to influence publicly some form of social change”.  
 
This definition has a number of benefits. While being narrow in the context of overall 
actors involved in the international system, it also includes a wide variety of actors, 
both in terms of worldview, level of power and connections with other actors 
(Hawthorn 2001, p. 276). As Fisher (1997, p. 447) observes:  
 
[T]hey include, but are not limited to, charitable, religious, research, human rights, 
and environmental organizations and from loosely organized groups with a few 
unpaid staff members to organizations with multimillion dollar budgets employing 
hundreds. 
 
This definition is suited to the research at hand because it includes many actors that 
are able to contribute to the implementation of human rights principles. Also, with 
regard to the human rights situation in the West Papua, a wide definition will be more 
suitable to encompass the actors and issues that are involved (environmental concerns 
and church based NGOs, for instance, are crucial in the West Papuan case). Other 
definitions of NGOs are clearly possible, yet are less applicable. They can be defined 
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as “a private citizens’ organisation, separate from government but active on social 
issues, not profit making, and with transnational scope” (Gordenker & Weiss 1996, p. 
20). However, this excludes organisations that have in some way complex 
relationships with governments, and limits who (private citizens) may establish an 
NGO.   
 
A further issue that needs to be noted here is the use of the term “human rights” when 
speaking about NGOs. In a similar fashion to the term “NGO”, when one considers 
the diverse range of rights addressed in international law, the term “human rights 
NGO” can also feasibly be used for any number of nongovernmental actors. It may, 
for instance, include NGOs whose works centres solely on development. 
Development NGOs, it can be argued, can be classified as human rights organisations 
because their work, when effective, helps to alleviate breaches of subsistence rights. 
However, there are drawbacks to the inclusion of such NGOs. Fisher (1997, p. 442) 
highlights that the development practice that one person sees as beneficial, another 
person may see as a violation of rights. This clearly presents a problem when 
attempting to construct a viable notion of what constitutes a human rights NGO – 
what is seen as a human rights NGO to one person may not be to another. While 
recognising this problem, the term ‘human rights NGO’ here will include NGOs that 
advocate a wide range of human rights and will indicate NGOs that promote18 non-
violently a set of rights that are enshrined in international law. 
  
When operating together to affect a particular issue or set of issues, NGOs regularly 
cooperate with one another and with other actors, to form transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs). These networks are characterised by concern for principled ideas 
and a desire to influence behaviour or policy of international actors (Keck & Sikkink 
1998, p. 1). The networks are also voluntary in nature, allowing members to exchange 
information and services reciprocally (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 10). They may 
include “international and regional organizations, international nongovernmental 
organizations, domestic nongovernmental organizations, private agencies and 
foundations, church groups both domestic and international, and agents of state 
                                                
18 Promoting is often done through advocacy in the national, regional or international arena. They may 
also include concrete operations on the part of NGOs to put infrastructure in place to protect human 
rights on the ground in the places where they are under threat (van Tuijl, 1999).  
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governments” (Burgerman 1998, p. 908). TANs, as distinct from NGOs, include 
groups that are more closely, and sometimes directly, affiliated with government and 
business.  
 
Of the many aspects of international politics, one that characterises the modern era is 
the substantial growth in the number of NGOs active at the international level (Fisher 
1997, p. 440; Sikkink & Smith 2002; Jackie Smith, Pagnucco & Lopez 1998; 
Wiseberg & Scoble 1981). The diversity and number of NGOs is vast, cutting across 
traditional boundaries that divide humanity and appealing to different nationalities, 
cultures, and classes (Shepherd 1981, p. 215). However, human rights NGOs have 
always enjoyed a large representation amongst the myriad of causes advocated at this 
level. Between 1953 and 1993, NGOs committed to human rights have increased 
almost six-fold, consistently accounting for approximately one-quarter of NGOs 
active in the international system (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 11; Sikkink & Smith 
2002, p. 30). These NGOs have also been given greater prominence in human rights 
policy debates (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a). At the 
UN’s 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna, 248 NGOs had consultative status, 
while NGO reports indicate that between 1,400 and 1,500 NGOs attended (Clark, 
Friedman & Hochstetler 1998, p. 9). Today there are over 3000 NGOs with 
consultative status at the UN. 
 
NGOs and Global Civil Society 
 
Having considered the definition and place of NGOs in the modern international 
system, it is helpful to locate these within the schema of global civil society. 
Consideration needs to turn to whether NGOs are an authentic manifestation of 
international civil society or legitimate as representative forces. Legitimacy, in terms 
of representation and democracy, is a significant characteristic of the human rights 
NGO movement because it directly affects the respect of civil and political rights in 
the international setting (Chandler 2003, pp. 339-340). Without sufficient authority to 
act in the way they do, NGOs open themselves to well founded criticism.  In such a 
situation, human rights NGOs are in danger of hypocrisy and may even be in danger 
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of attempting to impose a privatized vision of international society that is as 
illegitimate as that of any political despotism (see Fisher 1997, p. 442).   
 
The role of NGOs within global civil society is hotly disputed. Some argue that non-
governmental actors play a critical role in the political world and in the 
democratisation of the international realm (see for instance Clark, Friedman & 
Hochstetler 1998; Gordenker & Weiss 1996, pp. 43-44; Sikkink 2002). At the very 
least, non-governmental actors give some an avenue to express their views in either a 
domestic or an international setting. However, one may go beyond this minimal view 
and claim that NGOs give meaningful expression to those who may otherwise be 
disenfranchised. Cosmopolitanism, in its most extreme form, denies the place of the 
state-based approach to democracy or representation, requiring a transnational 
approach to the challenge of political representation (Chandler 2003, p. 340). 
“Because the global citizen cannot directly hold policy-makers to account, the role of 
civil society interlocutors becomes central to give content to claims of democracy” 
(Chandler 2003, p. 340). From this perspective – providing individuals access to 
global political decisions – NGOs offer an avenue for internationalised representation 
for those disenfranchised by the governance of nation-states. NGOs are, in other 
words, direct manifestations of democratic global civil society (see Clark, Friedman 
& Hochstetler 1998) and their flexibility, dynamism and principled approach provides 
a stark contrast to government institutions (Fisher 1997, p. 444).  
 
In response to these suggestions, others claim a less idealised view of the 
organisations. Variations in power and the ability to lobby amongst NGOs may be 
distinctly unrepresentative of society as a whole (Sikkink 2002, p. 307). Rather than 
being a manifestation of civil society in a democratic sense, as a space where citizens 
collectively can directly influence the political decisions and processes, NGOs may 
act as articulations of specific parts of civil society. The rise of international NGOs 
cannot automatically be seen as representative of the rise of international democracy; 
NGOs cannot be viewed as pure and authentic bastions of democracy in the 
international sphere (Chandler 2003, p. 340). More constructively, NGOs can be 
viewed as beneficial and necessary in providing a plurality of opinions and voices in a 
“liberal” state system. In this way, their role is to raise awareness, rather than to 
represent (Chandler 2003, p. 340). They can be channels by which sectors of civil 
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society are enabled to express their views and help to shape society as a whole. 
Hence, while they do not represent a democratic process, they can act in ways that 
enhance democratic processes (Hawthorn 2001, pp. 285-286). 
 
The sense of bounded legitimacy that NGOs attain from the latter view corresponds 
more easily with the liberal outlook discussed in the previous chapter. In contrast, the 
extremes of the cosmopolitan outlook fail to include adequately the power processes 
of the state system, while theoretically failing to support the assertion that civil 
society actors possess greater legitimacy than state actors. An NGO’s entitlement to 
act in the international setting is limited by the bounds of the state system and its 
political nuances. Nevertheless, the reality of political regimes which utilise methods 
of repression to silence segments of societies under their control induces many NGOs 
to make use of this entitlement in order to articulate the views of peoples whose 
voices are suppressed.  
 
Activating an NGO Campaign on Human Rights 
 
Advocates of human rights are often required to undertake creative strategies to 
overcome adverse conditions and obstacles from governments. The nature of the work 
they undertake often directly challenges government policies and ethos. Authoritarian 
regimes, particularly, are often characterised by disregard for NGO movements, 
which are seen to be “undermining the authority [of the state] and/or discrediting the 
government” (Riker 2002, p. 194).19 In more severe circumstances of repression, 
NGOs must consider a wide variety of methods to affect their political environment 
                                                
19 The problems authoritarian regimes present to the work of human rights NGOs are numerous and, at 
times, particularly pointed. Eldridge (1995, p. 29) suggests that many of the tensions between NGOs 
and authoritarian governments derive from varying visions of government – one pluralist, the other 
corporatist. Between these conflicting views, “[o]ne is a system of political representation in which the 
state seeks to include or involve various societal groups in policy-making, while, conversely, the other 
is characterised by political exclusion” (MacIntyre cited in Eldridge 1995, p. 29). Although 
authoritarian regimes are by no means the only ones that place restrictions or create challenges for 
human rights NGOs, they are often among the worst perpetrators in trying to evade human rights 
criticism by hampering the work of human rights NGOs or persecuting their workers. Examples of 
states “cracking-down” on NGOs are not difficult to find. Difficulties are regularly faced by NGOs 
working in Myanmar, Zimbabwe, China and a host of other countries (Amnesty International 2007). In 
authoritarian countries such as these, civil society, and by association NGOs, are often seen as 
threatening to the regime in power (Hawthorn 2001, p. 282). Consequently, freedoms will only be 
allocated “if they [the government] believe that the alternatives will, for them, be worse” (Hawthorn 
2001, p.282). 
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and creating political space for their work. Those that seek solutions to political 
problems from within the state often do so by working with the state to enhance 
society, often in areas of welfare concerns or development (see Eldridge 1995, p. 29; 
Friedlander 1981; Madon 1999, pp. 255-256; Shepherd 1981, p. 214).20 Others, 
however, seek to challenge the status quo, centred purely around power politics, 
through the creation of alliances with other actors that aim to exert new forms of 
pressure on the Government and to create a new political dimension (Thakur 1997, p. 
263). This may be especially true in cases of more severe repression, where human 
rights abuses are widespread 
   
Networking: An NGO Response to Repression 
 
When space for human rights advocacy is denied domestically, local NGOs often seek 
to join or establish larger campaigns of domestic and international actors in order to 
utilize TANs of likeminded actors (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Being involved in a TAN 
brings numerous benefits, but also costs, for NGOs. Yet ultimately a TAN offers a 
means of strengthening the voice of NGOs to challenge state actors. To do this, the 
effective exchange of information and the maintenance of good relationships are both 
essential. 
 
Within networks, important relationships form between actors and organisations both 
inside and outside the states that are the target of a human rights campaign. The 
network provides an opportunity for symbiotic relationships to form between 
organisations who have shared goals, but who have different means and resources at 
their disposal. Smaller domestic actors, situated where human rights abuses occur, and 
                                                
20 Government attacks against NGOs may lead many to seek a reacquisition of political space by 
undertaking activities that directly build up relations with the Government. To establish better 
relationships with government domestically, NGOs at times involve themselves in community 
activities that reduce poverty or build up domestic infrastructure (Eldridge 1995, p. 29). Although close 
state-NGO relations can taint the working of NGOs (Friedlander 1981; Shepherd 1981, p. 214), mutual 
benefits can also result from this relationship (Madon 1999, pp. 255-256). NGOs and government can 
benefit from greater freedom and trust in this relationship, through stability and greater potential for 
mutual support (Hawthorn 2001, p. 282). Nevertheless, the unstable nature of this relationship should 
be recognised and, for this reason, it cannot be assumed that an NGO-friendly climate will develop 
within the country or that the space that NGOs enjoy in many liberal-democracies will eventuate 
(Eldridge 1995, p. 29). Alternatively, the nature of other NGOs, or the brutality of a given situation, 
may lead them to maintain outspokenness in their human rights demands or to seek alternative means 
of promoting their message.   
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larger international actors both benefit greatly from international contacts. With the 
differences in capacities and power, NGOs and other actors offer diverse skills to 
others in the network. Domestic actors are given access to material resources, 
expertise, skills training and greater access to powerful international institutions 
through their international counterparts, while international actors gain vital 
information about local conditions, aiding them with lobbying and education 
(Burgerman 1998, p. 910; Call 2002, p. 124). 
 
The diversity of actors and relationships that exist within TANs necessitate a good 
exchange of information. Actors may range from those based in institutions such as 
the UN High Commissioner to “grassroots” activists (Burgerman 1998, p. 908). 
Actors as distinct as these rely on information flows that are accurate and sufficiently 
dense to create momentum in campaigns (Burgerman 1998, p. 909). Particularly in 
the case of human rights networks, it is critical that they can quickly and efficiently 
gather and exchange information (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 10). Effective information 
processing enhances the ability of networks to find common ways of approaching and 
articulating issues in forums, whether those are in the public media, in international 
political forums or elsewhere. 
 
It is important to note that there are also risks associated with being a part of these 
networks. Associating in networks can mean less control over the sources of funding 
and a greater danger that funding will be manipulated in a way that adversely affects 
credibility of an individual organisation (Fisher 1997, p. 454). Connections may also 
redirect accountability – for example it may make an NGO accountable to agencies of 
government – and thus compromise the position of the NGO to speak out on 
controversial issues (Fisher 1997, p. 454). Even if this does not occur in reality, the 
perception that an NGO’s position is compromised may itself be damaging to the 
organisation. 
 
However, as is testified by the tremendous increase in human rights NGOs in recent 
years (Sikkink & Smith 2002; Jackie Smith, Pagnucco & Lopez 1998), the enhanced 
capacity to affect political decisions appears to outweigh the problems associated with 
being in such networks. As activist coalitions, TANs offer NGOs an opportunity, 
through greater resources, to influence the progression of policy discourses against 
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states accused of human rights violations or against specific cases of human rights 
abuse. Substantive campaigns raised by NGOs place alternative considerations into 
the minds of decision-makers through the exercise of normative authority, lobbying 
and the carrying of ideas (Donnelly 1986, pp. 610, 614; Sikkink 1993, p. 141). These 
means, in some way, explain the “surprising influence over states” that NGOs may 
possess (Thomas 2002, p. 72). 
 
The empowerment of NGOs may also effect power relations between international 
civil society and government. Precisely what nature this power relationship takes is 
contestable. In these networks, some theorists propose, “international coalition-
forming ability becomes more important than power resources”, thus posing “a 
challenge to the realist paradigm in international relations” (Thakur 1997, p. 263). 
Contrasting with this outlook on international society, as has been discussed, others 
maintain that although non-state actors can effect actual policy decisions by 
promoting normative concerns, the continuing primacy of states as actors in 
international relations restricts this influence (Thomas 2001, pp. 216-217). Testing the 
parameters of these restrictions and what these mean for the promotion of normative 
ideals in international relations can only be done through utilizing a framework of 
human rights promotion. Therefore, the process that NGOs undertake to elicit policy 
changes from governments requires a more in-depth discussion.  
 
Mechanisms of NGO Influence 
  
Just how NGOs are able to influence international politics rests on assumptions about 
the nature of relationships within the international realm. These assumptions build 
upon a liberal outlook toward normative influences in international relations and 
assert that  the “soft power” of NGOs can have influence over traditional state power 
(see Thakur 1997, p. 263). In contrast to the adversarial terms of pure realism, liberal 
thought must be open to a non-zero–sums conception of political relationships. Thus, 
while realists may paint international relations in terms of “competition” between 
states in a perpetual state of war, liberal thinkers may be led to assert the social nature 
of international politics (Huntley 1996, p. 57).  
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State sociality is essential for the promotion of human rights principles by allowing 
processes of socialisation among states and other international actors to occur. 
Socialisation “brings members of a group into conformity with its norms” through 
dual processes of praise for conformist behaviour and ridicule for that which is 
considered deviant (Waltz 1979, pp. 75-76). Contemporary liberal theorists propose 
that, in addition to states, non-governmental actors can greatly influence the processes 
of socialisation through changing government perceptions (Joachim 2003; Keck & 
Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a; Thomas 2001). There are a number 
of means by which NGOs contribute to the socialisation of human rights principles 
and bring about change in specific societies.  
 
NGOs commonly focus on the establishment and strengthening of international 
norms, as well as the monitoring and reporting of rights violations in order to achieve 
socialisation (Gaer 1996, p. 56; Klotz 2002, p. 52). A further set of activities to add to 
these are attempts to meet directly the humanitarian needs of impoverished peoples. 
Of these, it is through their roles of establishing human rights norms, monitoring 
conditions and lobbying governments, as distinct from supplying subsistence needs, 
that NGOs primarily fulfil their “mandate” of expressing the plurality of concerns 
present in global civil society. By these methods human rights NGOs contribute to the 
socialisation of human rights and for this reason these roles will be the prime focus of 
the discussion of human rights here. It is reasonable to assume that activities to meet 
subsistence needs are no less important than other NGO activities – obviously, the 
provision of services such as “education, health, clean water or disaster relief” (van 
Tuijl 1999) are crucial for the achievement of even the most basic human rights 
standards (see Gordenker & Weiss 1996; van Tuijl 1999).21 
                                                
21 This “operational” aspect of NGO work is distinct from that which involves political advocacy or 
public education; activities directly seek to provide services to those in need (Gordenker & Weiss 
1996, pp. 37-38; van Tuijl 1999, p. 499). These services, which vary widely, are often provided by 
NGOs that are distinct from advocacy or educational NGOs (van Tuijl 1999, p. 499). They “typically 
provide social services such as education, health, clean water or disaster relief” (van Tuijl 1999, p. 
499), while advocacy NGOs work primarily at the centres of power. Despite this, many NGOs do 
include both advocacy and operational branches and therefore act as both advocates and practitioners 
(van Tuijl 1999, p. 500). In western countries, NGOs are frequently expected to perform both 
operational and educational roles for the public (Gordenker & Weiss 1996, p. 38). In countries where 
government provision of social services is insufficient to provide for the needs of the public, 
operational NGOs are required to adopt roles that in other countries may be expected of government 
(van Tuijl 1999, p.508). This can be empowering for those NGOs, but can also endanger the integrity 
and independence of the organisations (Gordenker & Weiss 1996, p. 37). In some cases governments 
may effectively use NGOs as contractors, often leading to the criticism that they are becoming the 
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To explore how NGOs impact the socialisation of human rights norms within the 
state-centred international system, a number of theories will be utilised. Much 
attention will be given to the theories of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999), whose spiral 
model seeks to explain mechanisms of lobbying in the domestic and the international 
spheres, and Keck and Sikkink (1998). Both are considered complimentary to one 
another and emphasise the creation of political space through the effective “framing” 
of ideas and messages used in NGO campaigning (Joachim 2003; Keck & Sikkink 
1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a; Risse & Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2001). 
However, before attending to these processes, it is important to understand the role of 
NGOs in establishing the norms that later can be utilised in human rights 
campaigning.   
 
Establishing Human Rights Norms 
 
Of NGO contributions to the socialisation of human rights principles, their input into 
the establishment of norms, as represented by international law, is the most easily 
discernable. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest this has been crucial to the 
widespread practical acceptance of human rights principles in the international 
community. They propose a three-stage process of how norms come to be widely 
recognised in international politics. The first stage of this process explores the initial 
emergence of norms. In the most minimal sense, standardized international norms are 
a necessary condition that enables the socialisation process to begin. Socialisation 
“presupposes an international society with specific collective understandings about 
specific behavior of its members” (Risse 1999, p. 529). Developing these 
understandings often involves the input and lobbying of “transnational moral 
entrepreneurs” – actors who seek the international community’s recognition of strong 
principled ideas that they hold (Burgerman 1998, p. 907). This step provides the 
foundation for the socialisation of human rights principles. Later, in Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s model, a “norm cascade” occurs. This happens when a large number of 
                                                                                                                                       
extensions of government (Gordenker & Weiss 1996, p.37; van Tuijl 1999, p. 507). The obvious 
danger of this is the loss of esteem and trust in the perception of the public, which itself inhibits the 
working of the organisation by evaporating its support base. Nevertheless, in many places operational 
NGOs do provide indispensable services in the human rights field. These NGOs perhaps illustrate the 
necessity of non-state actors to focus on both the needs and the entitlements of populations in order for 
a comprehensive system of rights to become the basis of societies internationally.  
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states adopt the norms. It is suggested that emulation, praise and ridicule all play 
important roles in reaching this stage. Finally, internationalisation of a norm occurs 
when a norm is “taken for granted” and is widely conformed to without challenges.  
 
Evidence that NGOs help to establish human rights norms as “transnational moral 
entrepreneurs” – the first step of Finnemore and Sikkink’s model – is well 
documented. The contribution made by NGOs in the establishment of the UN, as well 
as their role in ensuring human rights principles were included in the UN’s mandate, 
is recognised by a number of scholars (Alger 2002, p. 93; Burgerman 1998, pp. 906-
907; Gaer 1996, pp. 51-53; Gordenker & Weiss 1996, p. 43; Ishay 2004, pp. 214-
215). Before the San Francisco conference, disillusionment at the prospect of 
domination by the major powers brought many NGOs, as well as small and medium 
sized states, to demand that the UN charter include reference to human rights (Ishay 
2004, pp. 214-215). In the US, a few key organisations  – including the American 
Jewish Committee, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the American 
Association for the UN and the Carnegie Endowment – were critical in persuading an 
initially reluctant administration to advocate a human rights position for the new 
organisation (Gaer 1996, p. 52). The argument made by these groups was voiced by 
Joseph Proskauer of the American Jewish Committee: 
 
I said that the voice of America was speaking in this room as it had never spoken 
before in any international gathering; that that voice was saying to the American 
delegation: “If you make a fight for these human rights proposals and win, there will 
be glory for all. If you make a fight for it and lose, we will back you up to the limit. If 
you fail to make a fight for it, you will have lost the support of American opinion – 
and justly lost it. In that event, you will never get the Charter ratified” (cited in Gaer 
1996, p. 52). 
 
After these arguments were made, the US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius 
reversed his position and advocated a pro-human rights position on the world stage. 
With the agreement of the other major powers, the principles of human rights became 
foundational to the UN, which thus determined “to reaffirm the faith in fundamental 
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human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person” (Preamble to the UN 
Charter).22 
 
The historical role of NGOs in placing human rights norms on the international 
agenda and establishing conventions to act as guidelines for the international 
community has been a crucial first step for placing human rights concerns on the 
policy agenda of states. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim this can lead to norms 
becoming entrenched in international relations over time. Establishing norms is also 
necessary, but not sufficient, for the effectiveness of many of the other strategies 
undertaken by the NGO organisations in the promotion of human rights – particularly 
in their efforts to strengthen existing norms or to monitor and report abuses. After the 
establishment of human rights norms that outline the substance of human rights and 
behaviour that is “acceptable” in international society, the monitoring and 
enforcement of norms becomes the next aspect of socialisation (Thakur 1997, pp. 
253-254). 
 
Monitoring and Enforcing Human Rights Principles 
 
Processes of monitoring and enforcing human rights conditions are distinct from one 
another, yet intimately connected in the context of human rights socialisation. Ever 
increasing linkages between NGOs and powerful states in the international system 
mean NGOs are often asked to provide consultation services to the international 
community, particularly through the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) (Donnelly 1986, p. 610; Riker 2002, p. 189; Thakur 1997). In this role, 
                                                
22 A number of observers also point to the ongoing involvement of NGOs in the UN as evidence of 
their successes in influencing the building of international norms. While some go as far as to claim that 
NGOs are “omnipresent in the policy and administration of the UN organizations” (Gordenker & 
Weiss 1996, p. 43), much evidence corroborates their influence in the establishment of human rights 
covenants (Cook 1996, Gaer 1996, p. 51). One notable example of this was Amnesty International’s 
involvement in the realisation of a convention concerning torture (Cook 1996). In 1972, Amnesty 
International undertook a campaign calling on the UN to condemn torture. During this campaign there 
was increased reporting of cases of torture throughout the world and the collecting of a petition of over 
a million signatures. In 1973, when the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning torture, 
several governments made reference to Amnesty International’s efforts (Cook 1996, p. 189). 
Representatives of the NGO also attended the drafting sessions for the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, leading to the strengthening of many of 
aspects of the final text (Cook 1996, p. 191).  
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NGO monitoring and reporting of human rights conditions in specific countries 
enhances the UNHRC’s independence from state ideologies and allows a greater 
intensity of UNHRC questioning of specific regimes (Donnelly 1986, p. 610). When 
it comes to the enforcement of norms, however, the UNHRC remains notoriously 
ineffective, as are other international systems (Donnelly 1986, p. 614; Thakur 1997). 
With the ever present rationalisation that state sovereignty takes precedence over 
normative human rights concerns, enforcement via the UNHRC “rarely goes beyond 
information exchange and voluntarily accepted international assistance for the 
national implementation of international norms” (Donnelly 1986, p. 614).  
 
In this context, NGOs primarily influence the enforcement of rights principles through 
their abilities to enhance the normative strength of policy arguments and to affect 
processes of international socialisation. Two complimentary theories attempt to 
explain these processes. Taking a broad perspective, the spiral model (Risse, Ropp & 
Sikkink 1999) seeks to explain the phases of reform states undertake before becoming 
fully “socialised” into adherence to the principles of human rights. The phases in the 
spiral model include both domestic and international processes. The boomerang 
theory, proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), explores how NGOs affect the 
behaviour of norm-violating states by seeking the help of international actors and 
networks. These two models share essential prescriptions about how groups can bring 
about change in the international system. Both models emphasise the creation of 
political space and the “framing” of ideas so that they are accessible to the desired 
audience. They can both also be regarded as “models of the interaction between 
domestic opportunity structures and international opportunity structures” (Khagram, 
Riker & Sikkink 2002a, p. 19).  
 
These require a set of necessary international conditions that make the socialisation 
processes possible. Burgerman (1998, p. 907) lists “three necessary but not sufficient 
conditions” for the effectiveness of NGOs in the socialisation process. First, there 
must be a structural context that is conducive to change in a particular case. This 
means no major states can be strongly opposed to a particular human rights effort and 
that there are also “points of leverage” that activists can target in any instance. 
Second, the ruling elements of a state implicated in abuses must be sensitive to their 
international reputation. Finally, local activist networks must be present in the country 
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or countries involved. These must be organised and “capable of forming links to the 
international networks” (Burgerman 1998, p. 907). Only under these three conditions, 
it is claimed, will NGOs be able to influence the socialisation of human rights norms. 
 
The Spiral Model 
 
The spiral model was developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) to explain the 
process of change governments undertake when coming to adhere to human rights 
norms and the strategies NGOs employ to affect this behaviour. Although it can also 
be viewed as a means of opening up domestic regimes (Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 
2002a, p. 19), the inclusion of domestic as well as international forms of activism 
means the spiral model has a greater scope than the boomerang theory, discussed 
below. It also purports to explain the process of socialisation that the governments 
themselves undergo when pressure is placed on them.  
 
The effectiveness of NGOs, the model proposes, is often dependent on simultaneous 
pressure being exerted on rights violating governments “from above and below” 
(Brysk 1993; Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 5). Forces acting from above represent 
pressures placed on governments from regional and international political levels, 
while forces acting from below, utilising community pressure through “grassroots” 
communications, come from the domestic level (Madon 1999, p. 252; Riker 2002, p. 
190). The interactions between these two levels reinforce each other. International 
alliances enlarge political space for NGOs working domestically by altering the 
discourse, drawing governments into unwanted arguments (Risse 1999, p. 552). 
International donor agencies may attempt to increase the costs of violating norms by 
making aid contingent on adherence to norms. Efforts during the late-1980s and 
1990s, particularly by the World Bank, to promote democracy through making credit 
contingent on a adherence to principles of “good governance” is an example of this 
(Riker 2002, p. 189).23 Groups acting “from below” can engage in “social and 
                                                
23 The World Bank has received much criticism for promoting this contingency, as the use of the “good 
governance agenda” is seen to also create a threat to democracy by giving too much influence to the 
World Bank and associated organisations (Wood, 2005).  
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economic development activities… to improve the capacities of local communities to 
solve their own problems” (Riker 2002, p. 184). 
 
As pressure escalates, targeted governments begin to undergo changes in discourse 
and policy. This five-stage “spiral” describes how states progress from at first being 
oppressive and averse to international human rights standards, to habitually acting in a 
human rights “friendly” way. If no factors interfere in the progress of a state up the 
spiral, the five phases experienced are: 1) Repression and activation of network; 2) 
Denial; 3) Tactical concessions; 4) Prescriptive Status; 5) Rule-consistent behaviour. 
This presumes that the socialisation of norms in international politics is an 
incremental process that can happen over a number of years or decades. As such, one 
generation of government may adopt norms while later generations internalise them 
(Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 10). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the first phase of the spiral is characterised by repression and the 
initial activation of the advocacy network (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 22). Significant 
human rights abuses may drive international or domestic NGOs to form a TAN. 
However, this can only happen once there is sufficient information gathered about the 
repression to place it on the international agenda. The ability for informed local 
activists to link with allies in other parts of the world is crucial (Burgerman 1998, p. 
910). Without this occurring, further pressure cannot be brought on the government. 
Risse and Sikkink (1999, p. 22) highlight that this placement on the international 
agenda often results from a particularly brutal human rights violation.  
 
The second phase of the model occurs once a network of NGOs becomes active. With 
an audience in the international community, activists are able to place further pressure 
on the regime through discursive activities. These are processes of argumentation, 
moral persuasion and “shaming” the government (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 23) and 
are likely to lead to the targeted government denying the legitimacy of the claims 
(Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp. 22-25). Activists frequently lobby Western governments 
to adopt a “human rights-friendly” position, as these are seen as more influential on 
the world stage. The denial stage can be particularly dangerous for the domestic 
opposition; the government whose human rights record is criticised may step up the 
persecution of, or attempt to buy off, the opposition. 
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Tactical concessions are indicative of the third phase of the model and, although they 
are usually superficial changes or one-off gestures, they constitute the first signs that 
transnational pressure is influencing the policy of the state. These occur when the 
“norm violating state seeks cosmetic changes to pacify international criticisms” (Risse 
& Sikkink 1999, p. 25). Successes encourage and strengthen the network and are 
often accompanied by the targeted states recognition of the validity of international 
norms (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 26). Phase three of the model represents a critical 
point in the spiral. It is precarious because at this point it is easy for the repressive 
state to regress back into past behaviour and arguments if opposition groups are 
blocked or lack leverage. However, if international pressure can be maintained, the 
government’s recognition of human rights may become increasingly significant and 
the relationship between NGOs and the government will become more of a dialogue 
over human rights, not merely arguments (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 28). 
 
Phase four, prescriptive status, is reached when the validity of norms is not 
questioned. Risse and Sikkink (1999, p. 29) insist that a number of steps are 
undertaken at this stage that show that prescriptive status is reached. Governments 
ratify relevant human rights protocols and institute them in domestic law and 
constitution. There is a working mechanism through which citizens can make 
complaints about human rights violations. Finally, at this stage, governments 
“acknowledge the validity of human rights norms irrespective of the (domestic or 
international) audience, no longer denounce criticism as “interference in internal 
affairs,” and engage in a dialogue with their critics” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 29). 
Dialogue is a key to this phase, as the arguments presented by the governments, 
matched by their actions, indicate that phase four has been successfully reached. 
Violations may still occur during this phase if government is not fully in control of the 
state. 
 
Rule-consistent behaviour is the final phase of the spiral and is reached when respect 
for human rights principles becomes habitual and enforced (Risse & Sikkink 1999, 
pp. 31-35). Thus, “sustainable change in human rights conditions will only be 
achieved at this stage of the process when national governments are continuously 
pushed to live up to their claims and when the pressure ‘from below’ and ‘from 
above’ continues” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 33). Once this is achieved the spiral has 
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been completed, and the target state has been socialised to respect human rights 
norms.  
 
The modes of interaction between the repressive state and non-governmental actors 
change as these phases are worked through (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 34). Outlooks 
consistent with realism prevail in the early stages of the spiral. Instrumental 
rationality, where actions are undertaken to optimise self-interest, is prevalent 
amongst both the government and opposition when faced with questions of human 
rights (Risse 1999, p. 530). Governments respond to human rights only when it is in 
the national interest to do so. Opposition groups often only join a human rights 
movement because it provides them leverage on the international stage for other 
concerns (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 26). In the latter stages of the model, when norms 
are beginning to be widely recognised, forms of “institutionalisation” and 
“habitualisation” take hold (Risse 1999, p. 530). Institutional mechanisms reinforce 
the notion that norms are assumed to be relevant through a “logic of appropriateness” 
(Risse 1999, p. 530).  
 
It is the middle phases of the model that are pivotal to the eventual adherence to 
human rights principles. Socialisation processes include moral consciousness raising, 
argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion  (Risse 1999, p. 530). Arguments about the 
truth and legitimacy of human rights claims ensue. Often this leads to a dialogue 
between actors holding varying perspectives on abuses. Thus, the spiral model 
prescribes that  
 
The successful implementation of international human rights norms in domestic 
practices depends on arguing and moral persuasion at various crucial steps of the 
socialization process, particularly when transnational advocacy networks mobilize 
the international community against a norm-violating state (Risse 1999, p. 531). 
 
Other contextual factors influence the process of socialisation. Jetschke (1999), for 
example, observes that nationalism was important in a states progress through the 
stages of the spiral model. Using the Philippines and Indonesia in a comparative 
analysis, Jetschke notes distinct differences between the countries. Indonesia’s 
relative lack of progress in the area of human rights was largely attributed to the 
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presence of a more paternalistic nationalism, which does not have a strong democratic 
tradition (Jetschke 1999, pp. 136-137).  
 
The Boomerang Theory 
 
The boomerang theory, developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), compliments the 
spiral model. It explains more deeply the internationalisation of NGO campaigns and 
the interactions that occur at the international level between NGOs and other actors. 
The core assertion of the theory is that when actors seeking some kind of social 
change find their means of activism are blocked they will seek international means for 
affecting change. In this case, Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 12) assert, “the 
international arena may be the only means that domestic activists have to gain 
attention to their issues”. Thus, international networks become vitally important in 
enhancing the work of domestic NGOs through allowing an avenue for human rights 
NGOs to bypass non-responsive governments.   
 
Tactics employed by NGOs at the international level are directed toward influencing 
international procedures, discourse and policy by opening political space (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998, p. 3). Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 16) identify four such tactics that 
affect this end in the public and governmental domains: 1) Information politics; 2) 
Symbolic politics; 3) Leverage politics and; 4) Accountability politics. The use of 
information politics is the ability to “generate politically usable information and move 
it to where it will have the most impact” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 16). Reliable 
information is one aspect of NGO work which enhances their perceived credibility 
and is used to persuade the public and policy makers to take a sympathetic view on 
the issues in question (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 19). Associated with this is the use of 
symbolic politics. This uses “symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of the 
situation for an audience that is frequently far away” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 16). 
Leverage politics consists of convincing powerful actors on the international stage – 
such as governments, international financial institutions or transnational corporations 
– to take up a normative issue. If NGOs can successfully solicit the help of these 
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actors they may gain material and moral power24 that far exceeds their own 
capabilities (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 23). Finally, accountability politics refers to the 
ability of NGOs to hold governments to account for their discursive positions: “Once 
a government has publicly committed itself to a principle… networks can use those 
positions, and their command of information, to expose the distance between 
discourse and practice” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 24). 
 
The success of campaigns to create momentum around an issue that eventually 
changes government policy, according to the boomerang model, is dependent on two 
further conditions. Some issues are more suited to international campaigns than others 
as they can be framed in ways that “resonate with policy makers and publics” (Keck 
& Sikkink 1998, p. 27). Issue characteristics that involve the direct bodily harm of 
“vulnerable individuals” or involve the legal equality of opportunity, Keck and 
Sikkink (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 27) suggest, are more amenable to international 
campaigning. This is especially true when responsibility for negative conditions is 
readily attributable to a particular party through a short chain of causes (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998, pp. 27-28).  
 
These conditions emphasise the indispensability of normative strength in the 
effectiveness of the boomerang effect. Like the processes of the spiral model, the 
boomerang effect rests on “arguing and moral persuasion” (Risse 1999, p. 531) to 
broaden the influence of normative principles on policy outcomes. Socialising human 
rights principles may thus authentically contribute to the practical influence of 
normative ideals in the international system. At the heart of this influence is the way 
that ideals are promoted and “framed” in order to gain space (Joachim 2003, pp. 250-
251; Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 19). The achievement of effective framing is especially 
crucial in overcoming the traditionally realist considerations of state interests.  
 
 
 
                                                
24 Material power here refers to the linking of an issue to money or goods that are desirable to the target 
country (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p. 23). Moral power “involves what some commentators have called 
the “mobilization of shame,” where the behaviour of target actors is held up to the light of international 
scrutiny” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p. 23) 
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Campaign Framing and the Creation of Political Space  
 
As a means of influencing human rights socialisation, the two models discussed above 
each stress the creation of political space through the effective presentation of ideas 
and discourses (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 19; Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 13). This 
process, known as “framing”, is defined by Keck and Sikkink as the process that 
makes issues “comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage 
action, and to ‘fit’ with favorable institutional venues” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, pp. 2-
3). Further to this description, frames are also designed to convince targeted actors 
that “certain policy proposals constitute plausible and acceptable solutions to pressing 
problems” (John L Campbell 1998, p. 380). Framing is recognised by many scholars 
as being crucial to influence government and public perceptions (Armbruster-
Sandoval 2003; John L Campbell 1998; Clark, Friedman & Hochstetler 1998; 
Joachim 2003; Keck & Sikkink 1998, pp. 2-3; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a, pp. 
12-13; Thomas 2001).25  
 
Wisely choosing the frames that are used in a human rights campaign may be crucial 
in determining its success. Which frames are chosen for any campaign rests not only 
on the internal qualities of the activist network but also on the external circumstances 
– the “political opportunity structures” – that shape the opportunities they receive 
(Joachim 2003, pp. 251-252; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a, pp. 17-19). Joachim 
(2003, pp. 251-252) lists three features of political opportunity structures: access to 
spaces of political dialogue and policy making;26 influential allies which NGOs and 
                                                
25 A number of international actors, other than NGOs, use framing to change public perceptions of 
human rights. Often this creates a contest to sway public opinion when governments also frame their 
own policy ideas or international agreements to their own advantage. After the Helsinki Agreement in 
1975, which detailed the primacy of sovereignty between the Eastern and Western blocs, the 
limitations of force, and human rights expectations for both sides, Soviet officials and dissident groups 
alike actively attempted to frame the agreement in public forums to emphasise one side of the 
agreement over the other (Thomas 2001, see chapters 3 and 4, pp. 91-156). The relative successes and 
failures of each side in this instance illustrate a further point: that the affect of framing may change 
over time. The Soviet regime gained major successes in swaying public opinion both in the East and 
the West to believe that the Helsinki Agreement was beneficial to the regime. However, as time passed, 
lobbying and networking by activist groups within and outside the Soviet Union led to increased 
pressure on the Soviet regime through the concretising of the place of human rights in the United 
State’s foreign policy (Thomas 2001, p. 156). Thomas (2001, p. 192) views this build up of political 
pressure in favour of human rights, and the subsequent opening of political space, as a significant 
contribution to the eventual collapse of the communist bloc.  
26 Many international forums allow TANs to influence procedures and debates. At the UN World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, hundreds of NGOs were given accreditation as 
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others in the advocacy network gain;27 and changes in political alignments and 
conflicts which create further openings for effective lobbying. Also important to the 
opportunities NGOs receive are pre-existing norms that are recognised by the 
international community (Thomas 2001, p. 217). These norms “enable transnational 
networks to mobilize and achieve influence beyond their command of traditional 
power resources” (Thomas 2002, p. 72). All of these should be considered in the 
selection of frames and NGOs should be strategic when considering their 
presentation, being mindful of which frames will be best received within the 
opportunity structures that are presented to them (Joachim 2003, p. 252).   
 
As Keck and Sikkink’s (1998, p. 3) definition of frames suggests, the need to fit 
“favourable institutional venues” may require a more conservative frame for political 
elites. The contingencies of opportunity structures suggest that, in addition to the 
characteristics of an issue, frames may benefit a campaign if they are given a 
conservative interpretation. “Conservative” frames can be thought of as those that are 
based on or refer to existing international norms and that seek to minimise the most 
controversial aspects of an issue in order to mitigate the negative consequences of 
competing political interests that may overwhelm the political access that NGOs are 
able to open (see Thomas 2001, p. 217).  
 
These two aspects of conservative frames are consistent with the dimensions of 
human rights principles presented in the hierarchy of rights examined in the previous 
chapter. Primary international human rights covenants, such as the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, give explicit definition to the basic rights to physical security and the right 
to subsistence, making them more entrenched in international law and more widely 
recognised as human rights norms. Meanwhile, the second dimension of the hierarchy 
of rights – the political sensitivety of each right – is essentially a measure of the 
political controversies associated with rights. The close association between the 
hierarchy of rights and conservative human rights frames further suggests the possible 
value of incorporating the hierarchy into the practices of human rights advocacy. 
                                                                                                                                       
observers and allowed to make presentations to the drafting committee for the final agreement (Clark, 
Friedman & Hochstetler 1998, pp. 17-18). Although NGOs were excluded from the actual drafting 
sessions, the presence of NGOs represented a significant procedural input in international debates, 
either through lobbying governments directly or through networking with other NGOs (Clark, 
Friedman &Hochstetler 1998, pp. 12-19).  
27 These are present in the “leverage politics” of the boomerang theory. 
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Similarly, it also indicates that the hierarchy may be a viable means of achieving a 
helpful form of “realistic liberalism” in the pursuit of human rights principles. 
 
Frames are effective because they widen both the political and societal space around 
the campaign. Space for political and societal dialogue exists in a number of areas or, 
to give an alternative expression to the idea, may have many dimensions. The 
principles and ideology of the NGOs, financial resources, organisational capabilities 
and resources and the ability to participate in policy debates and forums are all 
constitutions of political space (Riker, from an unpublished paper cited in Eldridge 
1995, pp. 27-28). Included in the idea of political spaces are the political opportunity 
structures that NGOs both act through and seek to exploit. Thus, the relationship 
between frames and political opportunity structures are multidirectional; frames 
influence opportunity structures just as opportunity structures influence frames (see 
Joachim 2003; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a, p. 17). Even advocacy networks 
themselves can be seen as spaces where social cultural and political meanings are 
discussed (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 3).  
 
Whatever its dimensions, the primary importance of political space – in the context of 
human rights campaigning – is its ability to enhance NGO influence on the 
socialisation of human rights norms. It is only through existing political space that 
NGOs are given “venues to present their issues, and seek points of leverage at which 
to apply pressure” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 200). In this way, socialisation is 
therefore enhanced by the strategic use of frames that enable the opening of political 
space. As such, framing is critical in promoting liberal normative ideals that may 
influence policy decisions along with realist considerations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The above discussion gives an overview of the current theories of NGO influence in 
international relations, particularly on human rights issues. For many theorists, 
processes of socialisation are seen as key to NGO success in human rights related 
actions. The spiral and boomerang models describe how these processes may work. 
Specific NGO strategies, such as the way that campaigns are framed, are also seen as 
59 
 
important determinant factors for the success of socialisation. However, these 
strategies create room for both beneficial and detrimental outcomes in the face of 
Realist political considerations. It is this potential that reinforces the need for a 
cautious approach to human rights campaigning.     
 
In the following chapters, claims concerning the efficacy of human rights norms will 
be investigated by applying the spiral model and the boomerang effect to the 
campaign that surrounds the human rights situation in West Papua, a province of 
Indonesia. West Papua presents a valuable opportunity for such a test because the 
strong claims for self-determination rights in the region – usually in the form of 
independence – are regularly paired with claims for more basic human rights. 
Discussions will give special attention to the perceptions and frames used by the 
NGOs involved in the West Papuan campaign and how the presentation of these have 
shaped events, domestically and internationally.  
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Chapter 4 
Case Study: West Papua 
 
Located at the eastern tip of the Indonesian archipelago, West Papua is a land in 
which human rights have been under continual threat for a number of decades.28 The 
complexities of West Papuan politics and history veil any easy answers to questions 
about whether the rights of its people can be realised in a practical sense. Rather, 
issues connected with the annexation of the territory by Indonesia in 1962 have 
proved to be greatly challenging to their attainment. The denial of self-determination, 
the exploitation of natural resources, the displacement of tribes from traditional lands 
and an influx of transmigrants from other provinces of Indonesia have all contributed 
to societal tensions that have often spilt over into human rights crises. One of the 
greatest hindrances to human rights in the region has been the ongoing conflict 
between the Indonesian military and West Papua’s separatist movement. In the same 
way as many other areas of the world, this conflict has gravely affected the civilian 
population, resulting in much death and suffering.  
 
This chapter is intended to give a brief background to the major disputes and issues 
facing the region. Analysing the historical and contemporary human rights issues in 
West Papua will first create a picture of the human rights environment that has faced 
NGOs, human rights advocates and the general population of West Papua over the 
decades of Indonesian rule. This will lead into a more specific study of NGO 
involvement in West Papua in the next chapter. Later, the historical background given 
here will also serve as a context from which to assess the theoretical mechanisms of 
NGO influences (as discussed in chapter three).  
 
 
 
                                                
28 A map of West Papua is provided in the preliminary of this thesis. 
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West Papua: Background 
 
Throughout its modern history, a number of international actors have had interests in 
West Papua. Frequently, this has bred conflict that has repeatedly endangered the 
rights of its local people. It is because of these recurrent human rights injustices and 
the continuing threat of violence that many people have chosen to participate in 
human rights NGOs. As we have seen in the previous chapter, NGOs attempt to 
influence these forces by affecting processes of socialisation. For this reason, a brief 
synopsis of West Papua’s history will be valuable in illustrating the human rights 
context that has bred the modern NGO movement.    
 
After Indonesia was granted independence in 1949, the Netherlands took the decision 
to retain authority over West Papua, then called Dutch New Guinea. As it was home 
to a Melanesian Papuan people, the Dutch administration viewed its people as distinct 
in character from the people of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago and who, like 
the neighbouring Papua New Guinea, deserved independence (Cozens 2005, p. 488). 
However, Indonesia was of a different mind. In its view, its sovereignty extended to 
all of the territory that was held by the Dutch prior to 1949. These two conflicting 
views came to a head in the early 1960s, when President Sukarno of Indonesia began 
to press his claim over the territory more strongly.   
 
The Indonesian military entered West Papua at this time and assumed control of the 
territory. Soon afterward, in 1962, the “New York Agreement” was reached between 
the Netherlands, Indonesia and the United States. This agreement ensured Indonesia’s 
possession of the territory and also offered the Papuan people an act of self-
determination to decide whether they desired to remain an Indonesian province. 
Having been released from Dutch colonial control, the newly renamed Irian Jaya was 
eventually fully handed over to the Indonesian authorities in 1969 after an “Act of 
Free Choice” by the Papuan people, under the auspices of the UN.  
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The Act of Free Choice 
 
The Act of Free Choice, undertaken in 1969, is often cited as one of the most 
disruptive events in Papuan history (Bonay & McGrory 2004; Cozens 2005; King 
2004; Leadbeater 2005; Tebay 2005; Webster 2001/2002). Many commentators argue 
that the ramifications of the events surrounding the Act have been great in terms of 
undermining a wide variety of human rights, not only that of self-determination.  
 
Criticisms of Indonesia’s handling of events began with complaints against the 
procedure that was used for the Act. Unlike in other parts of the world, no general 
plebiscite was ever held. To the contrary, critics point out that in order to ensure that 
the interests of Indonesia would be protected in the face of a hostile population29 the 
occupying Indonesian forces handpicked 1025 Papuans to decide the political fate of 
the province. Indonesia argued the West Papuans were too “backward” to use the 
“one man, one vote” system (Elmslie 2003, p. 6), instead preferring the Indonesian 
musjawarah system, which saw representatives vote on behalf of the people. To the 
great disgust of many onlookers, the head UN observer Ortiz Sanz endorsed this, 
while claims of clear violations of civil and political rights continued to be made by 
other observers (see Leadbeater 2005, p. 495; Saltford 2003, p. 161).  This led to 
criticism that the vote lacked transparency, with some going as far to denounce it as 
farcical (Tapol 1999).  
 
A description of events was given at the time by Hugh Lunn, one of the few outside 
journalists to witness the events. It appeared in a Sydney Morning Herald editorial:  
 
 The Indonesia govt [sic] has assembled its thousand stooges whose farcical 
‘consultations’ will decide the political future of their 800,000 disenfranchised 
countrymen; they have been told that only one decision – union with Indonesia – will 
be tolerated and that any other will be regarded as treason, and active dissidents are 
being harried by troops and planes and imprisoned… or driven into exile (quoted in 
Leadbeater 2005, p. 495). 
 
                                                
29 Communications to the US State Department, dated July 9th 1969, reveal that Frank Galbraith, the 
US Ambassador to Jakarta, estimated that between 85 and 90 per cent of Papuans were “in sympathy 
with the Free West Papua cause or at least intensely disliked Indonesians” (Galbraith 1969). 
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While this group voted for incorporation, evidence now shows that it was done under 
duress (Bonay & McGrory 2004; Cozens 2005; King 2004, p. 27; Leadbeater 2005; 
Tebay 2005; Webster 2001/2002). Much of this evidence supports claims that clear 
threats were made by the military. At least one Indonesian officer has quoted at the 
time as saying “I will shoot dead anyone who is against us” (Webster 2001/2002, p. 
529). Far from being the isolated opinion of an individual officer, the violence was 
recognised as being condoned by the wider Indonesian regime. Declassified 
documents illustrate that powerful actors recognised this at the time of the “Act of 
Free Choice”. One telegram, dated June 9th 1969, from the US Embassy in Jakarta 
observed: 
 
The Act of Free Choice (AFC) in West Irian is unfolding like a Greek tragedy, the 
conclusion preordained. The main protagonist, the GOI [Government of Indonesia], 
cannot and will not permit any resolution other than the continued inclusion of West 
Irian in Indonesia. Dissident activity is likely to increase but the Indonesian armed 
forces will be able to contain and, if necessary, suppress it (US Embassy in Jakarta 
1969). 
 
As this telegram indicates, there were serious international reservations about the 
validity of the vote, despite official recognition of the Act of Free Choice. These 
reservations were made public by many states in the UN General Assembly. Most 
notably, many African nations were highly critical of the unfolding events (Saltford 
2003, pp. 172-175). This was confirmed by comments made by Chakravathy 
Narasimhan, a retired undersecretary-general of the UN who handled the vote. He 
claimed the vote “was a whitewash”, and that “[t]he mood in the United Nations was 
to get rid of the problem as quickly as possible” (Elmslie 2003, p. 8).  
 
International acceptance of these events was also seen as a violation of existing 
international law. Memories of what many claim was effectively international 
collusion in the annexation of West Papua has led a number of NGOs to make efforts 
to have the Act of Free Choice revisited by the UN (see Tapol 1999). Saltford (2003, 
pp. 179-180), in exploring this issue, argues that the West Papuan’s right to self-
determination as an independent territory was comparable to that of other former 
colonies in the third world that were being granted independence at this time. The 
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UN’s recognition of West Papua as a non-self-governing territory in 1960 and the 
right to a legitimate act of self-determination stipulated in the New York agreement is 
given as evidence for this interpretation (Saltford 2003, pp. 179-180). Thus, it is 
argued that in “turning a blind-eye” to events that contradicted these recognitions, the 
UN became party to violations against the rights of the Papuan people.    
 
Human Rights between 1969 and 1998 
 
The human rights situation in West Papua further deteriorated in the decades that 
followed the Act of Free Choice. Violations of physical security rights, subsistence 
rights and civil and political liberties, conveyed through regular arbitrary killings, 
torture and disappearances, left an indelible mark. These fuelled a persistent 
resentment toward Indonesia amongst the Papuan population and, many believe, 
reinforced calls for Papuan independence (Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 
2000a, p. 3). Providing additional weight to grievances, a number of initiatives 
instigated by the Indonesian government also severely distressed the Papuan people. 
Exploitation of West Papua’s natural resources, the displacement of tribes and 
substantial transmigration of peoples from other parts of Indonesia were among the 
most provocative issues during this time, often triggering bloody conflicts with the 
local Papuan resistance movement, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua 
Organisation – OPM).  
 
Control of Natural Resources 
 
Historically, disputes over West Papua’s vast natural resources have been at the heart 
of the human rights issues experienced. Natural resources have had the dubious effect 
of attracting large amounts of interest from international actors. In recent times, the 
logging industry and companies seeking to extract West Papua’s oil and natural gas 
reserves have come under increased scrutiny (Elmslie 2002, pp. 85-90; 2003, p. 3; 
Indonesian Human Rights Committee 2006, pp. 6-7; Suter 1997, p. 24; Wing & King 
2005, pp. 3-5). However, the gold and copper mining that international mining 
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company Freeport30 has undertaken for the last four decades is most frequently 
recognised as being among the most exploitative operations in West Papua (see 
Cozens 2005, pp. 489-490; Elmslie 2002, pp. 90-93; Leith 2002; Rumbiak 2003a, pp. 
vii-viii; Suter 1997, p. 23; Tebay 2005, pp. 12-15; Webster 2001/2002, p. 522). These 
operations have generated great wealth for the company and for the Indonesian 
government, yet have left the Papuan people largely impoverished, with many being 
forced to leave their traditional tribal lands.  
 
Large scale extraction of West Papua’s natural resources began in 1967, when the 
Indonesian Government granted approval for Freeport to begin operations at the 
Ertsberg copper mine, discovered some decades earlier. As a result of the agreement 
between the Indonesian government and Freeport, very favourable conditions were 
granted to the mining corporation, with little regard to the inhabitants of the lands 
affected by the project. For example, Freeport was not required to pay any 
compensation to traditional landowners and had no environmental restrictions 
(Cozens 2005, p. 489; Leith 2002, p. 73).  
 
Even greater mining interest was sparked in 1988, when a new mineral reserve was 
discovered close to the Ertsberg site. What became known as the Grasberg mine was 
approximately thirty-three times larger than Ertsberg (Elmslie 2003, p. 13). Mineral 
reserves were so vast at the new site that more than double the ore was recovered 
from Gratsberg in 1999 alone than was produced from Ertsberg during its entire life 
(Leith 2002, p. 76). Gold deposits in the mine are the largest in the world (91.4 
tonnes) and, when its substantial silver and copper reserves are considered,31 the total 
worth of Grasberg is estimated to be between US$54 billion and US$80 billion (Leith 
2002, p. 76).  
 
Such wealth has contributed significantly to Indonesia’s economy over the last four 
decades. Freeport is one of the largest private employers in Indonesia and between the 
time it began its operations and 1999, the company claimed to have contributed US$ 
                                                
30 Originally, the Freeport Corporation was known as Freeport Sulphur and became known by a 
number of other names over the course of its history. More recently, these names have included 
Freeport MacMoRan Incorporated and PT Freeport, as it is currently known. To avoid confusion it will 
be referred to as “Freeport” for the remainder of this paper.     
31 Elmslie (2003, pp. 91-93) claims that there are an estimated 15 billion pounds of copper and 37 
million ounces of silver in the mine. 
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10.2 billion to Indonesia (Leith 2002, p. 84). It also helps to make West Papua one of 
three provinces that make up the majority of Indonesia’s export earnings (Webster 
2001/2002). More recently, in 2005 it contributed US$1.2 billion to Indonesia in 
taxes, royalties, fees and other payments (Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. 
2005, p. 4). These large payments have been very important for Indonesia and crucial 
to West Papua’s economy. They are responsible for 2.4 per cent of Indonesia’s gross 
domestic product (GDP), 58 per cent of West Papua’s GDP and in Mimika, the 
district that hosts the Freeport mine, 99 per cent of GDP (Freeport McMoRan Copper 
and Gold Inc. 2005, p. 5).  
 
Despite the large wealth generated from the mine, few economic benefits have 
materialised for local Papuans in the decades of its use – much less than might be 
expected considering the scale of operations (Bohane 2003; Leith 2002, p. 84). For 
West Papua, total revenue from natural resources in 2003 came to just 331.2 billion 
Rp (approximately US$39 million using 2003 exchange rates), 7 per cent of the 
regional budget (World Bank 2005, pp. 25-26). The high rates of poverty that have 
resulted from this have led former governor Bas Suebu to describe Indonesia as a 
village where “the people in the house called Irian Jaya feed those in the other houses 
but are themselves starving” (cited in Webster 2001/2002, p. 524). 
 
Economic hardships experienced by people living in the Mimika district seem even 
more perverse. A study released by the World Bank in 2005 revealed that despite 
having a per capita GDP almost twenty times greater32 than that of West Papua’s 
capital district, Jayapura, Mimika experienced a significantly higher rate of poverty. 
Mimika’s poverty rate sat at 30.57 per cent, compared with the 22.85 per cent 
experienced in Jayapura (World Bank 2005, p. 12). Economic inconsistencies of the 
period are also reflected in the demographics of those employed by Freeport. Only a 
fraction of Freeport’s workforce in West Papua has been of Papuan descent, to the 
extent that in 1997 Papuans made up less than five per cent of Freeport’s employees 
in West Papua (Suter 1997, p. 24). 
 
                                                
32 Per capita GDP was 7,494,066 Rp in Jayapura district, compared with 147,810,103 Rp in Mimika 
district (World Bank 2005, p. 12).  
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Tribal Maltreatment and Displacement 
 
Throughout the period of mining operations in Mimika, consultation with local tribes 
has been minimal. Yet, at the same time, mining activities have caused significant 
disruption to their lives, as well as causing “environmental havoc in the region” 
(Elmslie 2002, p. 94). Those affected by the Freeport mines have received little 
compensation for the troubles they have encountered (Suter 1997, pp. 23-24). One 
significant attempt to address this, however, was made in 1974 when Freeport met 
with elders from the Amungme tribe to come to a settlement over mining operations. 
As a result, the “January Agreement” was signed between the two parties. In it, 
Freeport agreed to provide increased educational, residential and medical facilities for 
the use of the mine. Although the attempt to achieve an agreement seemed affable, the 
actual benefits of the agreement for the Amungme people have come into question 
(Elmslie 2002, p. 94). 
 
Perceptions that Freeport failed to give adequate treatment to the Amungme people 
were also illustrated in 1996 when Tom Beanal, an Amungme tribal leader, filed a 
civil lawsuit against Freeport in the Eastern District Court of Louisiana for US $6 
billion (Tom Beanal vs Freeport McMoRan, Inc. 1996). The case alleged numerous 
human rights and environmental violations at and around the Grasberg mine. Human 
rights abuses cited in this case included instances of torture, murder, unlawful 
surveillance and unlawful detentions. Although the complaint was eventually 
dismissed by the court, the case itself signified the depth of anger and discontent felt 
by many Amungme.  
 
The most noticeable complaint of those affected by mining operations has been the 
forced displacement of tribal peoples by the Indonesian government. Gross violations 
of subsistence rights endured by the Amungme people in particular indicate the 
suffering that has resulted from their displacement. When operations at the Grasberg 
and Ertsberg mines led to the forced displacement of the Amungme and Kamoro 
tribes, many were moved to the lowlands and, as a result, suffered severely from 
diseases like malaria (Elmslie 2003, p. 13). Suter (1997, p. 23) estimates that between 
1972 and 1997, some 3000 to 5000 of the Amungme people alone were displaced. 
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Further to this, their lack of exposure to tropical diseases in the highlands made them 
particularly susceptible after the move; highlanders never developed immunity to 
malaria and other diseases not found in their traditional lands. As a result, OPM 
commander Titus Murip claims one-third of the Amungme people died of malaria 
within two years of being moved to the lowlands (Bohane 2003, p. 100).  
 
Resentment over the presence of the copper and gold mine has bred much conflict 
within the region between the Papuan people on one side and the Indonesian military 
and Freeport on the other. The link between Freeport and the Indonesian military is 
well-documented, with the military being hired to protect mining activities 
(Australian Council for Overseas Aid 1995; Elmslie 2002, p. 139; Leith 2002, pp. 83-
86; Watson 2005, p. 482). Immense economic and bureaucratic leverage enhanced 
this relationship, which some believe creates potential for the area to become 
Freeport’s “own fiefdom, with Jakarta supplying military to protect it” (Leith 2002, p. 
85). Resistance to this situation on the part of the Papuan people has come in many 
guises, including protests and armed resistance. This resentment continues in the 
current political environment and is described in the words of one student involved in 
demonstrations against Freeport at Abepura in March 2006:  
 
Freeport mine is and [has] been the cause of human rights abuse, destruction of the 
environment and is part of the problem; and [in] the first place, we are the 
landowners and were not involved in the start of the Agreement [to allow mining 
operations]. The Indonesians and America signed the Agreement without consulting 
the landowners (quoted in Chesterfield 2006, p. 9).  
 
Transmigration and Papuan Culture 
 
Jakarta’s policy of transmigration – the organised relocation of people from other 
parts of Indonesia to West Papua – has compounded difficulties faced by tribal 
displacement. Since the beginnings of the Indonesian state, transmigration has been 
an important part of Indonesian policy aimed at unifying diverse regions. However, it 
was in 1977 that West Papua became one of the principle targets for the policy 
69 
 
(Webster 2001/2002, p. 521).33 The transmigration policy has generated major human 
rights impacts in the region. These have included the introduction of discrimination 
against ethnic Papuans in many areas of everyday life – most evidently in the 
employment opportunities they receive; the exposing of inter-ethnic rivalries 
(underscoring the need to recognise both the rights ethnic Papuans and other 
ethnicities); and increasing difficulties associated with the mixing of value systems.  
 
The demographic changes in West Papua, resulting partially from this influx of 
settlers, have transformed the face of Papuan society. In 1960, West Papua had an 
estimated population of 736,700, most of whom were ethnic Papuans. Only some 
18,600 (2.5 per cent) of these were of Indonesian, Javanese, or Chinese ethnicity 
(Chauvel 2003, p. 10). By 2000, when the first census was taken under Indonesian 
rule, the non-Papuan population had grown to 772,684, 35 per cent of the total 
population - estimated to be 2,233,530 (Chauvel 2003, p. 10). This increase was 
largely due to the arrival of transmigrants from other parts of Indonesia, mostly from 
Java. The effect of this on human rights in West Papua has been extensive. As with 
the mining activities in the region, many Papuans have been removed from traditional 
tribal lands to make way for transmigration camps (Elmslie 2002, p. 74).  
 
It can also be argued that the destruction of cultural rights has been advanced by 
transmigration. While contact with Indonesians has in some ways helped to define 
specific aspects of Papuan culture (Chauvel 2003, p. 14; King 2004, p. 30), varied 
forms of Papuan cultural identity and expression have come under greater threat. 
Attempts to assimilate Papuan cultural life into an Indonesian “way” can be seen in 
Indonesia’s responses to many of Papua’s expressions of culture. In the words of 
Benny Giay, a Papuan academic, the Indonesian government “have tried as best they 
could to make Papuans talk, think, look and behave like Javanese (or Sumatrans)” 
(cited in Chauvel 2003, p. 15).  
 
Those who have attempted to reclaim the cultural heritage of Papuans have found 
themselves under greater threats from Indonesia. The most well known example of 
                                                
33 Although figures show a significant number of transmigrants, some observers, such as Elmslie 
(2002, p. 76) note that the number of unofficial immigrants to West Papua are likely to be much higher 
than those that are officially included as transmigrants. 
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this is the experience of anthropologist Arnold Ap, who was committed to the 
restoration of the Papuan culture through preserving its music and traditions (Webster 
2001/2002, p. 525). As Ap became more prominent, the threat he posed to the 
Indonesian regime was deemed to be too great. He was arrested in 1983 and was 
killed the following year while still in custody (see Budiardjo & Liong 1988, pp. 125-
136). The flying of the Papuan flag, the ‘Morning Star’, as both a cultural and a 
nationalist symbol, has also been heavily discouraged, with many clashes between 
Papuans and the Indonesian military arising over its use (see Elmslie 2003, p. 9; 
Rutherford 1999, pp. 39-40; Webster 2001/2002, p. 526).34  
 
From an economic perspective, difficulties have manifested in the purported 
discrimination against Papuans in terms of employment opportunities. Native Papuans 
have become marginalized with the increased numbers of settlers. Indonesians and 
expatriates own many businesses, weakening the position of the native population in 
finding paid work (Elmslie 2002, p. 75; Thompson 2003, p. 46; Wing & King 2005, 
p. 17). In urban settings, where many transmigrants have settled, settlers dominate 
market places and commercial enterprises (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 442). As 
Chauvel (2003, p. 11) explains: 
 
The streets of Jayapura’s central market reflect the economic hierarchy. The shops 
are Indonesian-Chinese and settler owned. Settler traders run the market stalls in 
front of the shops. In front of the stalls sit Papuan traders, mainly highlanders, selling 
small quantities of fruit and vegetables.  
 
Difficulties such as these have also been present in higher societal positions. The 
educated elite have found it difficult to compete with Indonesians, who dominate 
important government positions and some complain about the “intellectual arrogance 
of officials in believing that policy can only be made in Jakarta” (Chauvel 2003, p. 
10). This colonial structure is the cause of much conflict between Papuans and non-
Papuans (Chauvel 2003, p. 11).  
 
                                                
34 Indonesian crackdowns on the use of the flag can be illustrated by the experience of Thomas 
Wanggai. A Papuan activist, he was sentenced to twenty years in jail for holding a ceremony in which 
the West Papuan flag was raised and the unauthorised anthem Hai Tanahku Papua (O Papua, My 
Homeland) was sung (Elmslie 2003, p. 9; Webster 2001/2002, p. 526). Wanggai, like Ap, later died in 
Indonesian custody. 
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The Papuan Resistance 
 
Abuses by the Indonesian government such as those discussed above, as well as direct 
attacks on physical security rights, have led to many forms of resistance on the part of 
the Papuan people. At times this resistance has been violent and has bred more 
violence, generating human rights abuses on both sides of the conflict. Reports of 
some NGOs estimate that up to 100,000 deaths have resulted from the conflict 
throughout the decades of Indonesian rule, the vast majority at the hands of the 
Indonesian military (Budiardjo 2005; ELSHAM 2001b; Rumbiak 2003a, p. viii). 
However, the actual number is impossible to verify. 
 
Responses to the displacement of tribes and lack of self-determination granted to the 
people of the region have been most extreme from the OPM, the major Papuan pro-
independence militia established around 1965. The loose organisational structure of 
OPM makes it very difficult to discern whom among the Papuan people is OPM and 
who is not (Bell, Feith & Hatley 1986, pp. 546-547; Elmslie 2002, pp. 180-181). 
Transmigration and mining operations are often cited as primary reasons for the OPM 
taking up arms (Webster 2001/2002, p. 522). For this reason, it has been active in 
disrupting logging, oil and mining activities (Bell, Feith & Hatley 1986, p. 546). A 
number of instances of kidnapping have also been attributed to the organisation 
(Budiardjo & Liong 1988, pp. 72-73; Elmslie 2003, p. 17).  
 
Human rights violations on both sides of the conflict are numerous. However, 
atrocities at the hands of the Indonesian military are particularly widespread. They 
include instances of mass killings (Amnesty International 1996a, p. 177; Budiardjo & 
Liong 1988, pp. 78-80; Elmslie 2002, p. 141), rape (Kirsch 2002, pp. 65-66; Tebay 
2005, p. 11), torture and arbitrary detention (Budiardjo & Liong 1988, pp. 82-84; 
Chauvel 2003, p. 12) the shooting of children and other horrific acts of violence (see 
Budiardjo & Liong 1988, pp. 77-92; Elmslie 2002, p. 138; Tebay 2005, pp. 9-11). In 
1977, for example, after OPM attacked and blew up an oil pipeline, a campaign was 
undertaken in which local villages, churches and other important cultural sites were 
bombed or otherwise attacked (Webster 2001/2002, p. 522). By some accounts, this 
response caused the deaths of hundreds of people (Elmslie 2002, p. 141).  
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Other atrocities have been committed at the hands of the Papuans. Numerous 
examples of kidnappings and the murder of non-military personal have been linked to 
the OPM (Budiardjo & Liong 1988, pp. 72-73; Elmslie 2003, p. 17). In one case, in 
March 1984, OPM captured a Cessna aircraft in Yuruf, killing the two Indonesian 
passengers on the spot. The Swiss pilot of the aircraft remained with the OPM for 
twelve days before he was eventually released through international mediation efforts 
(Budiardjo & Liong 1988, pp. 72-73). In 2000, Dani tribesmen hacked to death 
Indonesian settlers when rioting broke out after the suppression of a Papuan flag-
raising ceremony by the Indonesian military at Wamena (Elmslie 2003, p. 17).  
 
Contemporary Challenges in West Papua  
 
Along with the tensions that have persisted between the Papuan population and the 
Indonesian military, other challenges and complexities have arisen in recent years. 
The establishment of a number of militia groups in the region is one such challenge. 
This issue has helped to colour the current political environment for human rights 
activists and has accentuated the need for the implementation of human rights 
principles.  
 
The Presence of Militia Groups 
 
Militia groups in West Papua have grown significantly with the democratisation of 
Indonesia. One that is often cited as being of greatest concern is the presence of the 
radical Islamic group Laskar Jihad (see, for example, International Crisis Group 
2002; Schulze 2002; Tebay 2006). Other groups that commentators claim have 
presented obstacles to the adherence of principles of right have been the Satgas Papua 
(Papuan Task Force), a group that is pro-Papuan independence, the Front Pembela 
Merah Putih (Red and White Defenders’ Front) and the Satgas Merah Putih (Red and 
White Task Force) (King 2004, pp. 52-53; Tebay 2006, pp. 20-21). The latter two are 
both strong advocates of Indonesian nationalism and its territorial integrity. A sizable 
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body of evidence suggests that many of these have been supported by the Indonesian 
military.  
 
Documents leaked from a meeting of Indonesian intelligence officials in Jayapura in 
late 2000 indicate Indonesian military and government authorities at the time were 
supportive of a tactic to undermine the separatist movement in West Papua by 
establishing militia groups (Catherine Scott & Tebay 2005, p. 606). Since then, 
connections have been seen through the direct training of militia groups by the 
Indonesian military and their support in the establishment of training camps (Barr 
2002; Kivimäki 2006, pp. 22-23; Monbiot, Rumbiak & Budiardjo 2003; Catherine 
Scott & Tebay 2005, p. 606). In 2003, John Rumbiak claimed that four such camps 
had been established only 40 kilometres from Jayapura (cited in Kivimäki 2006, p. 
22). It has also been reported that both military and police personnel have been active 
in training camps around Sorong (Barr 2002, p. 3).  
 
Laskar Jihad 
 
NGOs and political commentators alike view the increasing presence of militia 
groups, most notably the radical Islamic militia Laskar Jihad, with alarm (Ballard 
2002, p. 469; Barr 2002n.d.; International Crisis Group 2002; Kivimäki 2006; 
Monbiot, Rumbiak & Budiardjo 2003, p. 4; Schulze 2002; Catherine Scott & Tebay 
2005, pp. 606-607; Tapol 2002a; Tebay 2006, pp. 19-20; West Papua Association UK 
2003; Wing & King 2005, pp. 7-8). The group was originally established as a militia 
amid a 1999 conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, Indonesia.35 
Apparent connections with outside organisations who have advocated the use of 
terrorism have provided the organisation with an ideological framework that has 
widened the scope of their activity to other parts of Indonesia (Schulze 2002, pp. 57-
58). Laskar Jihad has freely stated that their aim is to establish Indonesia as a 
theocratic Islamic state (Schulze 2002, p. 59). They have been present in West Papua 
since 2000, when they began arriving on its western side, around Sorong and Fak-fak 
                                                
35 Commentators highlight the casualties of the Ambon conflict – where approximately 9000 lives were 
lost and 400,000 people displaced – in which Laskar Jihad was a major actor, as a source of concern 
for other parts of Indonesia (Schulze 2002, p. 57). 
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(Barr n.d.), and are currently active in Jayapura, Sorong, Fak-fak, Timika, Nabire and 
Manokwari (Tebay 2006, p. 19).  
 
Evidence suggests that Laskar Jihad is prepared to commit violence to achieve their 
ends. Leaflets and VCDs containing provocative material to incite conflict with 
Christian groups have been found to have been distributed by the group (Tebay 2006, 
p. 19). The use of military-grade weaponry in training camps around West Papua 
seems to confirm this (Kivimäki 2006, p. 22). John Rumbiak, a leading human rights 
advocate in West Papua, has commented with regard to the Laskar Jihad:  
 
Their activities are a real threat to stability and religious tolerance in West Papua. 
We, the ELSHAM [Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua], 
confiscated a few items belonging to Laskar Jihad in Sorong including a hand 
grenade, knives and a pistol. Recently, many Arabs have arrived in West Papua. We 
do not know for what purpose these unfamiliar people are there. This presence has 
already alarmed the Papuans (cited in Rees, Ondawame & King 2003, p. 10). 
 
Further fears have been aroused by the groups’ portrayal of West Papua and the 
people who live there. Militia fighters refer to West Papua – where 75 per cent of the 
population are Christian (Monbiot, Rumbiak & Budiardjo 2003, p. 4; Tebay 2006, p. 
2) – as “Pagan” or the “Land with No Religion” (see Flanagan 2003; Tebay 2006, p. 
19). They also view Christians in Papua as “separatists” and the churches as 
“protectors of the separatist movement in West Papua” (International Crisis Group 
2002, p. 11; Tebay 2006, p. 19). This is akin to the Indonesian security forces 
implication that Christian groups are using human rights as a front to hide secessionist 
aspirations (Tebay 2006, p. 19). Although the majority of the migrants in West Papua 
are Christians or moderate Muslims and are, therefore, unlikely to accept these views, 
concerns remain over the intent to destabilise the peaceful relations that currently 
exist between groups of religious believers in West Papua (Kivimäki 2006, p. 27; 
Tebay 2006). 
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Other Militia 
 
In addition to the Laskar Jihad, at least three other major militia groups have been 
established. On the Papuan side, a group called Satgas Papua (Papuan Task Force) 
appeared in 1999. Accounts of Satgas Papua’s operations vary. Effectively, it is a 
‘Presidium’s militia’ and acts as an informal police force (King 2004, p. 52; Kivimäki 
2006, p. 13). Tebay (2006, p. 20) suggests that the militia is widely accepted in Papua 
and act to shield non-violent activities of Papuan leadership. Others, however, are 
critical of a lack of accountability that has, in the past, encouraged abuses of power 
and escalating rivalries with conflicting militia groups, most notably the Satgas 
Merah Putih (Red and White Task Force) (King 2004, pp. 52-53). Reports indicate 
that military training was initially received by the militia.36  However, due to a change 
in policy direction following this time, military backing was revoked (King 2004, p. 
53).  
 
Two nationalist militia groups setup in the years following the establishment of the 
Satgus Papua, were the Satgas Merah Putih and Front Pembela Merah Putih (Red 
and White Defenders’ Front). Both seek to promote the territorial integrity of 
Indonesia, including West Papua in that sovereignty, and have received considerable 
military support (King 2004, pp. 52-53; Kivimäki 2006, pp. 22-23; Catherine Scott & 
Tebay 2005, pp. 606-607; Tapol 2002a; Tebay 2006, p. 20). Members of Satgas 
Merah Putih  are selected, trained and deployed by the Indonesian military to target 
the Papuan resistance movement (Tebay 2006, p. 20), with the former Indonesian 
military commander Mahidin Simbolon being, reportedly, substantially involved 
(West Papua Association UK 2003).    
 
In 2003, the Front Pembela Merah Putih (Red and White Defenders’ Front) was 
created under the command of Eurico Guterres, who had been convicted of crimes 
against humanity by Jakarta’s human rights court for his leadership of militia in East 
Timor (Catherine Scott & Tebay 2005, pp. 606-607).37 Guterres had officially 
requested permission from the police chief, Budi Utomo, to set up the Front Pembela 
                                                
36 Some question the accuracy of these reports (Kivimäki 2006, p. 23).  
37 Guterres was sentenced to ten years in prison but was free in 2003 pending an appeal of the sentence. 
The crimes committed related to “murder, summary execution, enforced disappearance, destruction of 
property, abductions and other inhumane acts” (Tapol 2003f). 
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Merah Putih in Timika. However, opposition from Papuan civil society prevented a 
public declaration of its foundation. Despite this, the militia’s existence is rarely 
questioned and subsequent military involvement with the militia has led some to 
comment that their practical role is to carry out “the military’s ‘dirty work’ and act… 
as agents provocateurs” (Catherine Scott & Tebay 2005, p. 607). 
 
In the modern setting these militia provide supplementary tensions to the pre-existing, 
“traditional” conflict between the Indonesian military and the OPM. While the 
presence of the Laskar Jihad is fundamentally alien to Papuan society, and the 
ideological basis hinges on a perception of conflict between Islam and Christianity in 
the modern international system (Kivimäki 2006, p. 42), the presence of nationalist 
militia more accurately reflects tensions in Papuan-Indonesian relations. Conflicting 
nationalist militia manifest the competing claims of sovereignty over West Papua and, 
although they confront issues of political determination in the territory, they 
simultaneously represent significant threats to other rights. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The historical overview of West Papua given above indicates the nature and depth of 
some of the major issues that inflame perspectives and debates surrounding human 
rights abuses in the Indonesian province. Political, historical and cultural grievances 
from the Suharto era continue to exert influence on the experience of the Papuan 
people and elevate tensions between Papuans and Indonesians in West Papuan society 
(Kivimäki 2006, pp. 40-49). Militia groups in the region have further incited fears and 
have added another complexity to the political claims. Each of these has been 
important to the overall political climate of West Papua and gives the context in 
which human rights NGOs in West Papua contend. Having set this context, enquiries 
will now turn to the major human rights NGOs involved in West Papua and the 
perspectives they hold on the issue of Papuan self-determination. The next chapter 
will expand upon the human rights context and relate it to the thinking of NGOs and 
their human rights activities.  
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Chapter 5 
NGOs in West Papua: Their Roles and Perspectives 
 
In response to the recurrence of human rights abuses, many of NGOs have been 
established to lobby for better conditions. Both locally and internationally, these 
groups have become increasingly involved in the West Papuan situation. At the local 
level, NGOs within Papua have been involved in the investigation and monitoring of 
human rights abuses, advocacy on behalf of victims, campaigning, education and also 
setting up conferences and workshops (Tebay 2005, p. 25). At the international level, 
NGOs work primarily to publicise events and lobby government.  
 
Achieving a system of human rights that is universally respected is a core and 
unifying goal of all human rights NGOs involved in West Papua. Yet, beneath this 
goal, policy debates have a significant impact on the way NGOs approach human 
rights campaigning. Most notably, these involve discussions surrounding 
self-determination in the context of West Papua. The way that this is applied 
practically, as well as having critical implications for the situation faced in West 
Papua, provides a valuable study of the varying degrees to which realism is accounted 
for in the promotion of human rights and a further means of assessing the 
effectiveness of human rights NGOs. 
 
The Presence of Human Rights NGOs in West Papua 
 
Human rights NGOs currently involved in West Papua are diverse and operate on 
both the local and international stages. Each NGO has distinct attributes, which 
influence their outlook in policy debates, such as those surrounding self-
determination. These also influence how they approach active efforts to frame and 
promote the socialisation of human rights. While attention will be given to the varying 
NGO perspectives later in the chapter, the following discussion will first give a 
description of NGO activities prior to Indonesia’s democratic era, before outlining 
some of the more influential NGOs pursuing human rights changes for West Papua.   
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The Influence of Human Rights NGOs, Pre-1998 
 
In the period between the Act of Free Choice in 1969 and the fall of President Suharto 
in 1998, NGO activities promoting human rights in West Papua were limited. While a 
small yet committed circle of NGOs publicised the human rights violations in West 
Papua on the international stage from early in this period, within West Papua itself the 
political environment made it much more difficult to set up effective organisational 
structures. The Indonesian Government was quick, and at times brutal, in shutting 
down groups that were perceived as “opposition” (see Riker 2002). This meant that it 
was a long time before human rights groups could be established widely or operate 
effectively. Consequently, much of the preliminary work on human rights issues was 
undertaken by church-based organisations which had pre-existing infrastructure in the 
country.38 
 
Prior to the late 1990s, when there was a discernable expansion of civil society 
organisations in Papua, a sizable amount of work was undertaken by church-based 
NGOs, often addressing subsistence needs (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 449). 
Protestant and Catholic organisations formed ecumenical networks, such as the All-
Indonesia Christian Health Service and the Indonesian Association of Voluntary 
Health Groups, for the provision of health services. It is estimated that in some 
periods during President Suharto’s rule, church based groups provided up to 50 per 
cent of health care in the region (Eldridge 1995, p. 186). Accordingly, this was a 
subtle yet crucial part of structures supporting human rights in the region. Church 
organisations, together with non-religious NGOs, also formed networks to address 
development in the area. The Irian Jaya Rural Community Development Foundation 
was another prominent organisation that undertook community-based initiatives to 
address wider development problems, often receiving the aid of the Indonesian 
Government (Eldridge 1995, p. 140). 
 
                                                
38 The prominence of churches in the local NGO scene prior to 1998 (as well as afterward) is reflective 
of the place of Christianity in the culture of West Papua. Since the time of Dutch colonists, Christianity 
has had an important influence on West Papuan civil society and on the culture of the country (see 
Bohane 2003). This has given them a prime position in undertaking human rights work in the region 
for many decades. 
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In addition to these, a number of other organisations continued to work during this 
time, despite significant harassment from the Indonesian Government (Amnesty 
International 1996b). Protest actions undertaken by smaller NGOs, such as the Papuan 
Students Alliance and the Forum for Communication of the Younger Generation of 
Irian Jaya, often drew negative attention from Jakarta. In March 1996, for instance, 
four people affiliated with the Forum for Communication of the Younger Generation 
of Irian Jaya were detained and questioned, allegedly for their participation in 
peaceful protest actions in Jakarta (Amnesty International 1996b). A more violent 
protest in Tembagapura in the same month led to charges being laid against 39 
people. Most of whom, according to Amnesty International (1996b), were detained 
purely for their political views. Subsequent statements from officials placed the blame 
at the feet of unspecified local NGOs who were identified as orchestrating the riots. 
Connections between local NGOs and the OPM were also claimed. One senior 
member of the Indonesian military was quoted as warning, “do not be surprised if the 
ABRI [Indonesian Military] decides to question one of the local NGOs” (Amnesty 
International 1996b).39 The actions of the Indonesian Government towards such 
NGOs led many, both inside and outside of West Papua, to tone-down their rhetoric 
opposing government policy (Eldridge, 1995, 228). 
 
While the Suharto regime was in power, it was international NGOs who had the 
resources to undertake a great deal of the advocacy work done on West Papua. 
Powerful NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, although 
not allocating great attention to the West Papuan issue, continued to report on abuses 
and lobby the Indonesian government about the issue. However, the work done by 
these NGOs was dwarfed by that undertaken by the Indonesian Human Rights 
Committee (Tapol) - an England based NGO, whose work also focused on other parts 
of Indonesia and what is now East Timor.  
 
A major difficulty for West Papuan human rights networks, however, was the 
inability for local NGOs to network with their international counterparts. Information 
was difficult to get out of West Papua in the face of hostility from the Indonesian 
Government. Yet, although difficult, this was not impossible. One very important 
                                                
39 The person involved later denied he had made this comment. 
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instance of this occurred in 1995 and illustrates the relationships that can form 
between activists internationally. One evening, a human rights activist within West 
Papua was able to fax hurried information detailing the killings and disappearances of 
37 Papuans (as well as several instances of torture) to Matthew Jamieson, an 
environmental activist in Sydney, Australia (Elmslie 2002, pp. 137-138). This 
information was then transcribed and edited before it was sent onto an Australian 
NGO, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA). The abuses detailed in the 
transcription occurred around the area of Freeport operations and was eventually 
released by ACFOA under the title “Trouble at Freeport” (Australian Council for 
Overseas Aid 1995).    
 
The release of the ACFOA report had a domino effect, leading to the writing of a 
succession of related reports and actions on the part of other groups. As detailed by 
Elmslie (Elmslie 2002, p. 139), the pressure that built in West Papua as a result of this 
report led the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura, Herman Munninghoff, to release a report 
of his own (Munninghoff 1995). In response to this, the Indonesian Human Rights 
Commission and the Australian Government began investigating the claims. In the 
case of the Australian Government, its ambassador, Alan Taylor, travelled to West 
Papua and eventually released a report on the allegations consistent with the 
Munninghoff Report. In detail, the reports of Munninghoff and Taylor substantially 
agreed with the findings in the ACFOA report. The only exception was that neither 
had investigated the role of Freeport in the abuses, instead preferring to concentrate 
on the actions of the Indonesian military. 
 
This series of events is one example of effective work from human rights workers and 
NGOs in a period when Indonesia exerted much pressure to stop human rights 
reporting. Between 1969 and 1998, ongoing mining operations as well as other 
economic activities, transmigration and forced tribal displacement contributed to a 
climate where human rights abuses were common. These were only barely responded 
to by stretched human rights NGOs under pressure from the Indonesian government. 
It was not until the Suharto Government fell in 1998 that any significant hope for 
more effective responses to human rights abuses was offered to the Papuan people. 
The post-Suharto era saw substantial improvements in the ability of NGOs to respond 
to abuses.  
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Domestic NGOs in the Democratic Era 
 
The number of NGOs in West Papua rose significantly after Indonesia’s government 
reform in 1998 (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 449). Increases in the presence of these 
organisations gave encouragement to those hopeful of improved human rights 
conditions. Figures taken from 2002 show there were 140 NGOs active in the region 
(Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 448). These were involved in an extensive range of 
activities that indicate an active civil society (see Blair & Phillips 2003). 
Significantly, these figures do not include ethnic community organisations formed by 
and for various transmigrant communities. Also left unrepresented are many 
professional organisations, as well as church-based organisations, frequently involved 
in work connected with human rights (Blair & Phillips 2003, pp. 104-111; Bonay & 
McGrory 2004, p. 448). According to Bonay and McGrory (2004, p. 448), of these 
140 NGOs, over half (72) are involved in what they describe as “peacebuilding” 
activities, which is directly linked with human rights promotion.  
 
Of the active NGOs, a few can be identified as being particularly influential to the 
promotion of human rights in the modern, democratic era. Four of these local NGOs 
will be given special focus in the research undertaken here. These are the Institute for 
Human Rights Study and Advocacy (ELSHAM), the Forum for Reconciliation of the 
People of Irian Jaya (FORERI), the Office for Justice and Peace (SKP) and the 
Papuan Presidium Council (PDP). A large number of other NGOs also warrant further 
explanation. However, these four NGOs are given slightly greater, although not 
exclusive, focus because of both the particular influence they have exerted on the 
human rights situation in West Papua and the relative accessibility of information 
available on each of them.  
 
Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in Papua (ELSHAM) 
 
ELSHAM has been arguably the most significant West Papuan human rights NGO in 
recent years. It was officially established in 1998 and grew out of a working group 
titled the Irian Working Group for Justice and Peace, of which the Foundation for 
Rural Development (YPMD), the Traditional Consultation Council of Amungme 
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(LEMASA) and the SKP were members (Elmslie 2002, p. 143; Front Line and 
IMPARSIAL n.d., p. 83). ELSHAM have released a number of thorough reports 
detailing the human rights situation in West Papua and were especially active in the 
early years of Indonesia’s democracy under the supervision of the exiled Papuan 
human rights advocate John Rumbiak. It has been regarded by some as “critical” for 
monitoring human rights in the region and has had an important role in building 
contacts with international human rights organisations (Elmslie 2002, pp. 143-144).  
 
Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Society (FORERI) 
 
Originally established in July 1998, FORERI was created in response to several 
violent incidents following raisings of the Papuan Morning Star flag around West 
Papua. Its original focus was to facilitate dialogue between the Indonesian 
Government and the Papuan people by providing a neutral space and acting as a 
mediator in a range of disputes, especially on issues of self-determination and 
independence (Hernawan 2003, p. 3). In February 1999, FORERI’s efforts led to a 
meeting between President B.J. Habibie and the “Team of 100” Papuan civil society 
representatives in Jakarta (see Kivimäki 2006, pp. 39-40).40 These activities also gave 
a forum for the discussion of human rights grievances. Later, however, a perception 
that FORERI was becoming increasingly aligned with the independence movement 
undermined its role as a facilitator of dialogue (King 2004, p. 185).    
 
Office for Justice and Peace (SKP) 
 
SKP, also established in July 1998, was created by the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura 
to promote better human rights conditions in West Papua through a number of means. 
Its activities include documenting and reporting abuses; educating the local 
population about human rights; promoting dialogue between conflicting parities in 
West Papua; and, finally, participating in the larger human rights network in the 
territory (Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 1999). The goal of its work is “to 
draw attention to underlying structures of repression” with a view to identify solutions 
                                                
40 This event is given further attention in chapter six. 
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to societal divisions that it sees as having been bred by human rights abuses (Office 
for Justice and Peace Jayapura 1999). Under the directorship of Theo van den Broek 
and, more recently, J. Budi Hernawan, SKP have released a number of reports on 
human rights conditions in West Papua. These have been supplemented by 
informative annual reports.  It works closely with other human rights NGOs in the 
region such as the Evangelical Christian Church (GKI) Division of Law and Human 
Rights and ELSHAM and currently has branches in Merauke, Sorong, Timika and 
Agats, with its head office remaining in Jayapura.  
 
Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) 
 
The PDP is an organisation made up of a collection of tribal and society leaders, who 
were elected in 2000 at the Second Papuan Congress by a 200 member panel that 
represented “nearly all civil society constituencies” (Kivimäki 2006, p. 32). It is a pro-
independence organisation that, at the time of its establishment in 2000, was widely 
recognised as being the most legitimate vehicle for representing ethnic Papuans (Blair 
& Phillips 2003, p. 105; Kivimäki 2006, p. 32). However, more recently the degree of 
support has been questioned (International Crisis Group, 2006, 7). It also has several 
corporate interests and has been involved in a range of community development 
projects (Blair & Phillips 2003, p. 105). The council was chaired by Theys Eluay until 
his assassination by the Indonesian military in 2001. Tom Beanal, chief of the 
Amungme tribe, then assumed leadership. Although, due to its function, the PDP fails 
to meet the definition of “human rights NGO” as outlined in chapter three, it is 
nevertheless an important party in the West Papuan situation.  
 
Other Local NGOs 
 
The swell of NGOs that occurred around 1998 included a large number of other 
NGOs. Many of these have been of equal importance to the climate of human rights 
advocacy in the modern period as those mentioned above. Other NGOs crucial to the 
field of human rights have been the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of 
Violence (Kontras Papua), the Alliance of Democracy for Papua (ALDP), the 
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Evangelical Christian Church (GKI) Division of Law and Human Rights and the 
Evangelical Tabernacle Church of Indonesia (GKII) (Blair & Phillips 2003, pp. 107-
109; Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 450; Ondawame 2002, p. 21). Like the NGOs 
mentioned previously, most of these were established during Indonesia’s democratic 
era and have been concerned with activities such as “conflict mapping/surveys, 
monitoring and investigation, litigation and legal advocacy, campaigning, workshops, 
and conferences” (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 450). In addition to these, the 
Indonesian Bar Association, the Institute for Research, Analysis and Development of 
Legal Aid (LP3BH), the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI) 
and the Legal Aid Foundation Papua (LBH Papua) exist to provide legal advocacy for 
people charged with subversion or other “political” offences (Bonay & McGrory 
2004, p. 450; Peace Brigades International 2006).  
 
International Human Rights NGOs involved in West Papua 
 
On the international stage, a range of NGOs have been keenly involved in West 
Papua’s human rights situation. Active organisations include West Papua Action, Free 
West Papua, the Australian West Papua Association and New Zealand’s Indonesian 
Human Rights Committee. One NGO, however, is especially worth noting. The 
London-based Tapol41 has been a pivotal actor in the ongoing international human 
rights activism on West Papua since 1973.  
  
Tapol 
 
Throughout the period of Indonesian rule, Tapol has been responsible for a large 
proportion of the work undertaken in lobbying and documentation of human rights 
abuses on the international stage. Today, Tapol is one of the leading international 
NGOs concerned with many Indonesian and former Indonesian territories, 
consistently releasing reports, including its Tapol Bulletin, to highlight human rights 
                                                
41 Formerly known as Tapol: The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, in 2007 the organisation 
changed its name to Tapol: Promoting Human Rights, Peace and Democracy in Indonesia. The word 
“Tapol” means “political prisoner” in Indonesian.  For more information on Tapol refer to their website 
at http://tapol.gn.apc.org (retrieved 5th April, 2007). 
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issues. These territories include West Papua, Aceh and East Timor. In addition to its 
own reporting, in recent times it has also provided some translation services for 
organisations such as ELSHAM and SKP to provide wider exposure for the findings 
of local organisations. Tapol has also lobbied a range of governmental and 
international officials. While those most regularly targeted are the British and 
Indonesian governments, Tapol also actively lobbies the European Union and the UN.   
 
Other International NGOs 
 
Groups specifically focusing on Indonesian human rights have received valuable 
support and greater exposure for their cause via larger NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group. Human Rights 
Watch and International Crisis Group have been particularly active in documenting 
human rights abuses for international audiences in recent years. Along with these, the 
Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human Rights (RFK Memorial), the West 
Papua Advocacy Team (WPAT) and the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network 
(ETAN) have attempted to maintain up-to-date reporting of the human rights 
happenings in West Papua since 2004 in monthly reports42 and have also been active 
in lobbying the US government on the issue.  
 
Adding to the number of international NGOs involved in West Papua are 
organisations affiliated with church and religious groups. Among these, the World 
Council of Churches and Franciscans International have been most prominent (Bonay 
& McGrory 2004, pp. 449-450). These organisations have employed a variety of 
methods to highlight West Papua’s situation and have used many international forums 
in attempting to persuade governments to take actions aimed at alleviating human 
rights abuses. These have been actively involved in the UN lobbying process, 
attempting to use their consultative status at the UN to place West Papua on the 
international agenda (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 450).  
 
                                                
42 Prior to May 2006, the monthly “West Papua Reports” were published by RFK Memorial. WPAT 
assumed responsibility for these in May 2006 and was the sole publisher until October 2007. From 
November 2007, WPAT and ETAN began to co-publish the reports. Many of these reports are 
available from http://etan.org/issues/wpapua/default.htm (retrieved 18th December, 2007).  
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Current Policy Debates amongst NGOs: Self-Determination 
 
Underlying the practical workings of these NGOs are their perspectives and beliefs 
about the nuances of West Papua’s human rights context. Contending opinions have 
bred important debates concerning how human rights advocacy should be approached. 
Debates have especially focused on issues of self-determination and whether the 
human rights abuses in West Papua constitute genocide.43 Of primary interest to this 
research is the way that various opinions on self-determination correspond to debates 
about the degree to which liberal international theory incorporates (or should 
incorporate) realism into its framework. Genocide, although providing an interesting 
dilemma for NGO advocacy, falls outside the scope of this examination. Essentially, 
the activism of West Papuan human rights NGOs is congruent with a liberal 
philosophy – in pursuing human rights norms NGOs reflect the assumption that 
normative concerns have power in the international political realm. However, the way 
                                                
43 Claims that genocide has been committed in West Papua were relatively few until in 2004 when 
significant support began to gather around the viewpoint. This came when Yale Law School released a 
report exploring the application of the genocide to human rights abuses in West Papua (Brundige et al. 
2004). This provided an in-depth discussion on the West Papuan situation and the human rights abuses 
which have occurred in the province. Its findings were damning of Indonesian activities and finally 
concluded:  
 
[T]he historical and contemporary evidence… strongly suggests that the Indonesian 
government has committed proscribed acts with the intent to destroy the West Papuans as 
such, in violation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide and the customary international law prohibition this Convention embodies 
(Brundige et al. 2004, p. 75). 
 
Diverse reactions to the claim of the Yale Report emerged in the years that followed. Three views 
characterise this debate. The first view holds that genocide, as it understood in international law, is 
already occurring in West Papua. Socratez Sofyan Yoman, the President of the Fellowship of 
Baptist Churches of West Papua, has referred to an array of methods used by the Indonesian 
authorities in West Papua as “systematic genocide” (Yoman 2006, p. 1; 5). Included in these 
actions is a host of physical rights abuses, seen as the primary example of the genocide alleged 
(Yoman 2006, p. 1). The Transmigration programme, which he claims sees the “migrants get 
better protection from the Indonesian military and police” and a family planning programme 
limiting families to two children, are also cited as being inadequate for maintaining the Papuan 
population, given the rate of mortality (Yoman 2006, p. 1). The second view claims that, although 
genocide is not occurring in West Papua, there is a high potential that abuses could escalate into 
genocide, due to the intent of the authorities – particularly the security personnel (see Barr 2002, 
pp. 3-4). Among those who have expressed this view, ELSHAM has lamented “[t]he OTSUS 
[Special Autonomy] Law has shown no concern for the interests of the Papuan people and has 
sown the seeds of genocide in Papua” (Amemori 2007). The final view holds the perspective that 
human rights abuses in West Papua, although seen as deeply concerning, cannot be defined as 
genocide. Human rights abuses are instead seen as “crimes against humanity”.  This corresponds 
with Indonesian domestic law Regulation Number 26/2000 which defines the “widespread and 
systematic attacks directed against a civilian population” as a crime against humanity (see 
Ecumenical Council of Churches in Papua 2006, p. 4; van den Broek 2002). 
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in which NGOs make references to self-determination necessarily has political 
ramifications and also reflects the degree of realism that is present in their outlooks.  
 
Perspectives on Self-Determination 
 
Self-determination is possibly the most widely disputed, and critical, human rights 
issue in West Papua. Much of the debate is associated with a more specific 
disagreement over a law passed in 2001 promising greater political autonomy to West 
Papua as a province within Indonesia. The Special Autonomy Law has been criticised 
for not being as favourable to Papuans as it could be and for being implemented 
improperly (King 2004, pp. 85-92; McGibbon 2006, pp. 45-51; Wing & King 2005, 
pp. 46-47). Among the concessions granted in the Special Autonomy Law was a 
substantial reallocation of revenues from natural resources: 80 per cent of national 
revenues from forestry, fishing and ‘general mining’ would return to West Papua, 
while 70 per cent of oil and gas revenues would be returned. This would continue for 
25 years, at which time the allocation would be reduced. Additionally, the law 
pledged to establish a Truth and Reconciliation commission for historical grievances 
and allowed Papua, as a province, to assume greater governmental powers. This 
included the setting up of a Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP) to give greater 
representation to ethnic groups, religions and women.  
 
Before exploring the how and why of this support, it is important to recognise its 
popularity amongst the Papuan population that is aware of the self-determination 
issue.44 A 2006 study revealed that of those surveyed, 60 per cent had no confidence 
that special autonomy would improve living conditions for those in Papua (Elmslie, 
King & Lynch 2007, p. 19; see also Indonesian Human Rights Committee 2006, p.1). 
76 per cent also said special autonomy had not been well implemented and 62 per 
cent indicated “the local government structure was either totally [incapable] or hardly 
capable of implementing the Special Autonomy Law” (Elmslie, King & Lynch 2007, 
p. 19).  
                                                
44 While the current political awareness of the issue is difficult to ascertain, a survey taken by the 
International Foundation for Election Systems (2003, pp. 16-17) in 2002 suggested that only 17 per 
cent of respondent were aware of the Special Autonomy Law. Meanwhile, only 62 per cent were aware 
that there was an aspiration for independence in Papua. 
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Meanwhile, when considering the debate over self-determination in relation to 
independence and special autonomy, Falk’s (2000, p. 100) conceptualisation of self-
determination rights proves valuable. This is because the views of the NGOs in West 
Papua are aligned with support for either second order self-determination, which 
grants autonomy to groups within an existing state, or with third order self-
determination, which grants independence to a part of an existing state. Many support 
the latter view and consider special autonomy as falling short of the ideal of 
independent self-determination (see Ballard 2002, p. 471; Barber 2004; Elmslie, King 
& Lynch 2007, p.19; West Papua Action Update No. 00 1999). Those who are more 
open to the previous concept of self-determination, contend that the dichotomy that 
the push for independence creates between special autonomy and independence can 
be limiting (see Ballard 2002, p. 471; Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2002, p. 
9).  
 
Independence as a means to Self-determination 
 
Numerous NGOs and civil society organisations articulate this rejection of special 
autonomy in favour of independence (see Ballard 2002, p. 471; International Crisis 
Group 2002, p. 7; 2006, p. 7; West Papua Action Update No. 00 1999). Attempts to 
express this position were most widespread early in the post-Suharto era. The 
consultation process that was undertaken during the drafting of the Special Autonomy 
Law saw a host of NGOs, academics and civil society leaders request a new plebiscite 
on the political status of West Papua (see King 2004, p. 85). Just prior to this, during 
President Habibie’s term in government, a “Team of 100” Papuan civil society 
representatives met with the Indonesian leadership in Jakarta and directly asked that 
Papuan sovereignty be recognised by the Government (see Human Rights Watch 
2000b). 
 
During this time, spokespersons of both the PDP and the OPM made this position 
clear. At the Second Papuan Congress, in 2000, these groups rejected the notion of 
special autonomy in several statements (Ballard 2002, p. 471), instead arguing for a 
more stringent view of self-determination as, essentially, their rejection of autonomy 
came from the perceived failure to meet the demands and expectations of nationalism 
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held by many Papuans. Instead, the idea of merdeka, or freedom, was brandished as a 
means of fulfilling the right to self-determination. According to some representatives 
of the OPM, merdeka could only be achieved if Papuans were left alone. Ambros 
Aminin, an OPM regional commander explains:  
 
Four centuries ago, we Papuans enjoyed what is called “freedom”. Then came the 
colonialism era, starting with the colonialism of the British, then the Dutch… and 
now the Indonesians. These caused us to loose [sic] our freedom. We want to destroy 
the Indonesian neo-colonialism. To force Indonesia to return to their home country 
and leave us free from them (quoted in West Papua Action Update No. 00 1999, p. 
2). 
 
Such a view of merdeka strictly limits the interpretation of self-determination rights.45 
Evidently, this would necessitate independence for West Papua.  
 
In West Papua’s current human rights environment, although not going to the 
extremities of the OPM’s argument or methods, many actors and organisations remain 
supportive of independence, seeing it as the only viable means of achieving a positive 
human rights outcome (see Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 453). Merdeka is thus seen by 
many in a similar light as it was by the PDP and OPM during the time of the Second 
Papuan Congress.46 For some, such sentiments are also fuelled by a decreased 
confidence in Indonesia’s will to address the self-determination issue and the 
perceived inability of the Special Autonomy Law to address Papua’s problems.  This 
has led to “enormous degrees of cynicism and mistrust on the part of the West Papuan 
people” (Leadbeater, interviewed by the author, 13th April, 2007). A viewpoint 
favouring independence has also been reinforced by recent attempts by the Indonesian 
Government to partition the territory into multiple provinces (McGibbon 2004, p. 61), 
as well as the memory of historical human rights grievances (Office for Justice and 
Peace Jayapura 2001b).  
    
                                                
45 For some in the OPM, the idea of independence is taken even further. A number reject even the idea 
of independence under the form of modern government and thus reject the idea of an independent 
nation-state of West Papua. Instead, these prefer to emphasise the struggle between traditional tribal 
existence and the modern technologically driven world (West Papua Action Update No.00 1999, p. 2).  
46 While the PDP itself remains an advocate of independence, at least five members have lent their 
support to the concept of special autonomy by participating in the MRP (International Crisis Group 
2006, p. 7). 
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Simultaneously, however, crackdowns on political expression after the adoption of the 
Special Autonomy Law have muted the open advocacy of independence. Often, 
instead of calling for independence outright, many have portrayed ambivalence and 
scepticism towards the notion of special autonomy believing it has done little or 
nothing to progress the cause of self-determination. Instead, they claim that it has 
caused only more problems for the Papuan people (Beanal in an interview transcribed 
in Wing & King 2005, pp. 46-47; Yoman 2006). Socratez Yoman, the President of the 
Fellowship of Baptist Churches of West Papua, for instance, believes “special 
autonomy has not been a solution – it has been a new problem” (Yoman 2006, p. 4). 
He claims “the life, dignity, rights, knowledge, cultural values and democracy of the 
Papuan people are not valued or respected” and has openly called for the UN to 
review the 1969 Act of Free Choice (Yoman 2006, pp. 4-5). Representatives of other 
leading NGOs, such as ELSHAM and LP3BH, have articulated similar points of 
view, submitted requests for a UN review of the Act of Free Choice (Sitokdana 2003; 
Warinussy 2004). While maintaining some distance from calls to independence, 
ELSHAM have expressed their sympathy with groups advocating independence, 
describing the actions of the Indonesian authorities as a suppression of “legitimate 
independence aspirations” (ELSHAM & Tapol 2001).   
 
Internationally, although some NGOs have shown a reluctance to reject the Special 
Autonomy Law, others remain sceptical of the law. Tapol, for instance, has chosen to 
remain relatively silent on the issue of special autonomy (see Tapol 2002a2005d). 
Maire Leadbeater of the New Zealand–based Indonesian Human Rights Committee is 
more critical: “[special] autonomy never really granted the West Papuan people very 
much control over their own political destiny. It certainly did not grant them any 
control over their resources… that was never in the wording” (interviewed by the 
author, 13th April, 2007).  
 
Special Autonomy as a means to Self-determination 
 
In opposition to supporters of independence are those who believe special autonomy 
could be an effective means of attaining not only self-determination, but also an array 
of other rights. If implemented correctly, this would constitute second order self-
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determination. Two perspectives are represented in this position, both of which are 
often held by advocates of autonomy. The first perspective holds proper 
implementation of the Special Autonomy Law will benefit the local Papuan people by 
affecting changes in social and economic conditions in the territory (Office for Justice 
and Peace Jayapura 2001b; Rumbiak 2003b; Tebay 2006, p. 52; van den Broek 2003). 
It is claimed that these changes would facilitate greater dialogue, potentially creating 
space for alternative ideas of merdeka and lessening pressures for independence (van 
den Broek 2000). The second perspective asserts that autonomy is an important step 
toward independence or could be used as means of attaining recognition of aspirations 
to independence (van den Broek 2003).  
 
Special autonomy, as a means of bringing about general improvements in human 
rights conditions and addressing issues of self-determination, finds reasonable support 
amongst Papuan civil society and international human rights advocates (International 
Crisis Group 2006, p. 6; Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2002, p. 9; Rees, 
Ondawame & King 2003, p. 12; RFK Memorial 2004a; Rumbiak & Walton 2004; 
Sumule 2001; Franciscans International, cited in Wing & King 2005, p. 51). Since the 
fall of President Wahid, those supporting the notion have included John Rumbiak, 
former director of ELSHAM (RFK Memorial 2004a; Rumbiak & Walton 2004), the 
National Forum for Human Rights Concerns in Papua (see RFK Memorial 2004a) and 
various religious bodies (see McGibbon 2004, p. 61; Office for Justice and Peace 
Jayapura 2002, p. 9; Tebay 2006, pp. 52-53; Franciscans International cited in Wing 
& King 2005, p. 51). Although these have lent their support to the concept of special 
autonomy, they have also been among the most vocal critics of the Indonesian 
Government’s inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to properly implement the 
programme (see McGibbon 2004, p. 61).  
 
Actors that are hopeful special autonomy will bring about significant benefits in 
living standards and more political influence for Papuans also suggest that this could 
influence how self-determination is conceptualised. Rees, Ondawame and King 
(2003, p. 12) explain,  
 
“Special autonomy” is viewed with suspicion by many Papuans. However, the policy 
does potentially open new possibilities to encourage all aspects of development, 
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including capacity building within Papuan civil society. Jakarta sees the political 
problem in West Papua as a social issue that should be addressed in a social-
economic context and so does not necessarily disagree with this view. 
 
According to this view, concentrating on issues of development and building up civil 
society may help to broaden the idea of self-determination (Giay, cited in Noonan, 
King & Wing 2004, p. 11). If the Papuan people received greater respect, through the 
better provision of subsistence needs and greater political empowerment, less weight 
would be placed on the desire for independence (King, cited in Noonan, King & 
Wing 2004, pp. 11-12). This could be beneficial for all parties involved in conflict in 
the region. 
 
Further analysis of this position is provided by the SKP, which suggests calls for 
independence can be broken-down into three aspirations: 1) a political component; 2) 
a social-cultural component; and 3) a development component (Office for Justice and 
Peace Jayapura 2001b). The political component refers to issues relating to the 1969 
Act of Free Choice and the desire for national independence. The social-cultural 
component refers to the “collective experiences of the Papuan people” in enduring 
human rights violations throughout the period of Indonesia’s rule. Finally, the 
development component refers to the amount of poverty experienced by many in 
Papua. The SKP suggests that although special autonomy does little to address the 
first dimension of the aspiration for independence, by addressing the other two 
dimensions it could contribute to a “real improvement” in the situation (Office for 
Justice and Peace Jayapura 2001b).  
 
Viewing special autonomy in this light effectively provides the basis for an 
alternative conceptualisation of the idea of merdeka. Unlike those who argue merdeka 
represents freedom from Indonesian rule, van den Broek (2000) argues that it should 
more fundamentally be understood as being “free from all forms of suppression and 
oppression”. In adopting this stance, he recognises this freedom as being inherently 
linked to the primary dignity of each human person as articulated in the First Article 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. Van den Broek also suggests that 
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it is only through the realisation of this dignity that other forms of freedom might be 
expressed through the reformation of national political structures. Inevitably, self-
determination will be included in these rights, but its form will only be recognisable 
through a process of dialogue and in the societal circumstances under which it is 
achieved (van den Broek 2000). 
 
The second perspective offered in support of special autonomy is that, instead of 
being a front for further Indonesian domination, the Special Autonomy Law could be 
a possible means to achieving the later goal of independence; autonomy is essentially 
not opposed to independence (Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2002, p. 9). One 
reason for taking this position is to challenge ideas that dichotomise political positions 
into opposing camps of autonomy versus independence. This is seen as a potential 
source of conflict amongst the Papuan people (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 453; 
Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2001b). Others commentating on this position 
have pointed out that the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, and 
specifically the establishment of the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP), could bring 
about a political institution in Papua that could be strengthened gradually to press for 
demands of independence from Jakarta (McGibbon 2004, p. 56). Comments from the 
former Indonesian Home Affairs Minister, Hari Sabarno, reflect Indonesian concern 
over this possibility. A belief that the MRP could “spark national disintegration” 
(quoted in McGibbon 2004, p. 56) seems to indicate that this was one of the reasons 
behind Jakarta’s reluctance to institute the MRP. 
 
Two Strategies for Promoting Human Rights 
 
These contending views of special autonomy and independence essentially have two 
primary effects. They firstly illustrate two alternative visions of self-determination 
rights. Perhaps more importantly, they represent two alternative directions for human 
rights promotion. Those who advocate independence as being the primary means of 
self-determination, conceptually elevate a more radical view of self-determination to a 
level that makes it necessary for the achievement of other human rights. In this sense, 
they express third order self-determination as being a pseudo-basic right, or even a 
basic right, at least within the context of West Papua. Importantly, this position seems 
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to be heavily influenced by experiences of the human rights reality of the situation 
and for this reason gains much support. Yet, while this is the case, the alternative view 
must be considered to be classically realistic in the theoretical sense.  
 
On the other side of the debate, those who believe self-determination can be achieved 
via special autonomy attempt to reframe the right to self-determination to increase its 
political viability. These groups also hold self-determination as an important human 
right. However, because of the political nature of the issue, they also see it as a 
potential point of conflict in the promotion of rights. In doing so, the practical 
advocacy of self-determination as a highly political right, while being connected with 
other rights, is set aside from the advocacy of other basic rights – the rights to 
physical security, subsistence and civil and political liberties. By advocating second 
order self-determination, a greater degree of realism is assumed, reflecting the 
concerns of liberal theorists who acknowledge the importance of retaining some 
realist prudence. As the supporters of this view argue, this does not necessarily negate 
independence as a potential remedy for the human rights situation in West Papua, nor 
lessen the concept of self-determination (Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 
2001b). Instead, the changing political context takes on a more significant role in 
setting the parameters of self-determination rights. Presently, they believe, the 
concept of self-determination must include the idea of special autonomy. However, 
ongoing developments in West Papua’s political environment may allow for an 
evolution of this concept in the future.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Recent years have seen human rights NGOs become increasingly involved in West 
Papua. As much as any other set of actors, these have been required to evaluate the 
human rights situation in its practical and theoretical context. Whilst NGOs endeavour 
to work together in order to exert their influence on the situation, contradictory 
assessments of the human rights environment and the relationships between rights, 
have often lead NGOs to employ strategies that diverge from one another. The 
argument over self-determination is a poignant example of this. On the one hand, 
many influenced by the appalling experience of atrocities against West Papuans argue 
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for a pursuit of the normative ideals associated with liberalism through the right to 
self-determination, while showing little regard for the conditional factors of political 
life. These advocate independence as the only means of attaining the right to self-
determination. Others adopt a more cautious approach, arguing that there are 
alternative forms of self-determination, thereby incorporating a greater consideration 
of realist principles in their pursuit of normative goals.  
 
This chapter has surveyed the diversity of NGOs and NGO approaches to the 
advocacy of human rights in West Papua. Differences in NGO opinions illustrate the 
difficulties in maintaining a unity in advocacy in such an NGO climate and highlight 
the diversity of opinions that are present in West Papuan advocacy circles, especially 
over the issue of self-determination. These discussions have set the stage for a more 
in-depth analysis of the processes of human rights advocacy and socialisation in West 
Papua. Strategies utilised by NGOs to promote human rights principles and the 
effectiveness of their approaches will be examined in chapter six, where much 
attention will be given to the application of the spiral and boomerang models of 
human rights socialisation. 
96 
 
Chapter 6 
Applying Theoretical Models of Human Rights Socialisation 
in West Papua 
 
Democratic rule in Indonesia has brought many changes to the human rights situation 
in West Papua. Each of the four Indonesian Presidents who have assumed power since 
the fall of Suharto – Habibie, Wahid, Sukarnoputri and Yudhoyono – has brought new 
policy initiatives and directions. These political currents, both positive and negative, 
have had a profound effect on how principles of human rights are interpreted and 
respected in West Papua. To analyse the effects of the political currents on human 
rights in West Papua, we can apply the two socialisation models discussed earlier: 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) spiral model and Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
boomerang theory.  
 
Applying Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) spiral model to this changing political 
situation gives considerable insight into the status of human rights in Indonesia’s 
democratic era and the role of NGOs in promoting them. The first part of this chapter 
will track how, in the early years of democratic rule, West Papua progressed through 
the opening phases of the spiral model. Then attention will turn to the increasing 
repression in West Papua since 2001. Explanations for this increased repression will 
be sought by assessing the role of NGOs in West Papua.  
 
With NGO campaigning increasingly turning to the international arena, West Papua  
also offers a valuable case for applying Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang effect, 
which will be examined in the second part of the chapter. Domestic repression of 
NGO groups and other civil society representatives has given new impetus for 
international action concerning West Papua. Despite this, government and 
international officials (who ultimately hold the keys to positive outcomes in the 
boomerang effect) have largely remained ambivalent towards the Papuan human 
rights cause.  
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Application of the Spiral Model 
 
Applying the spiral model to human rights advocacy in West Papua reveals many 
insights about the changing political environment and how developments in the 
relationships between government and civil society have effected the human rights 
situation in Indonesia’s new democratic era. By viewing the situation in this way, the 
events witnessed in the region between the time of President Suharto’s rule and the 
election of President Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2001 appear to correspond with the 
first three phases of the model: “repression and activation of network”, “denial” and 
“tactical concessions” (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999, pp. 22-28). The years of 
repression from President Suharto’s authoritarian regime that represent Phase 1 of the 
model (“repression and activation of network”) came to an end abruptly in 1998, 
when Suharto was deposed from power. In the period that followed, human rights 
socialisation progressed quickly. The rapidity of this change was such that it is 
difficult to ascertain precisely when a period of “denial” (Phase 2) took place 
according to the model’s criteria. However, by the end of 1999, it had become clear 
that an increasingly vocal NGO network was taking shape and that Jakarta was 
beginning to make a number of tactical concessions (Phase 3). Unfortunately for the 
Papuans who experienced these developments, these concessions were unexpectedly 
brief. With the new government of 2001 came a raft of new policy initiatives, many at 
the expense of the human rights achievements of previous years.  
 
Phase 1: Repression and Activation of Network (1962-1998) 
 
Throughout the decades of dictatorial rule under President Suharto, and Sukarno 
before him, human rights abuses were prevalent. As has been discussed in the 
previous chapter, exploitation of natural resources, transmigration policies, tribal 
displacement and societal conflict were all factors that contributed to a climate where 
the principles of human rights appeared to be held in contempt. These, and the 
repression of reporting, indicate that this period represents the first phase in the spiral 
model.  
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Although on a national level a number of pro-human rights initiatives occurred during 
the late-1980s and early-1990s, movements largely failed to have an impact on the 
politics of West Papua until the mid-1990s. Some sporadic accounts of events in West 
Papua did surface during the 1980s. The two most in-depth publications were 
Budiarjo and Liong’s West Papua: The Obliteration of a People (1988), which 
portrayed a variety of human rights abuses within West Papua, and Indonesia’s Secret 
War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya by Robin Osbourne (1985). By 1993, at a 
national level, increasing pressure from activists arguing against the “Asian Values” 
rhetoric of the government and specific cases of abuse saw the establishment of a 
National Commission on Human Rights (Jetschke 1999, pp. 145, 157). However, this 
failed to create substantial momentum in West Papua where activists remained 
isolated. 
 
Severe laws restricting freedom of expression were also very effective in preventing 
reliable human rights reporting (see Amnesty International & RFK Memorial 1999; 
Budiardjo 2001; Human Rights Watch 2007b, pp. 14-15). During the rule of President 
Suharto, the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana - 
KUHP) that was directly inherited from the Dutch, largely failed to account for many 
modern human rights norms. While freedom of expression was (and remains) 
protected under the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (Article 28), articles in the KUHP 
allowed people to be imprisoned for “‘spread[ing] hatred’ or showing contempt for 
the government” (Budiardjo 2001).47  
 
Such harsh laws inhibited the gathering of information on human rights abuses at the 
local level and created difficulties for initiating a larger international campaign. Thus, 
the theoretical observation of Risse and Sikkink’s (1999, p. 22) seems apt to describe 
the situation in West Papua:  
 
[v]ery oppressive governments sometimes do not become subject of international 
campaigns by the advocacy networks, because information gathering requires at least 
some minimal links between the domestic opposition and the transnational networks 
if the latter is to gain access to the norm-violating state. 
                                                
47 Much of the KUHP was re-written in 2005. However, “hate sowing” and “rebellion” continue to be 
punishable by sizable penalties – seven years and 20 years in prison respectively (Human Rights Watch 
2007b, pp. 14-15). 
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On the international scene, the advocacy work that was done around West Papua at 
this time largely fell on deaf ears. Delicate Cold War and regional power balances 
exerted added pressure on governments to retain this outlook and contributed to an 
unwillingness of state-actors to upset Indonesia. This state of limbo was only lifted a 
number of years after the Cold War, when the fall of the Suharto regime ushered in a 
new democratic era in Indonesia. The end of the Cold War not only represented an 
important shift in the international geo-political situation, but promoted processes of 
democratisation and human rights in many parts of the world, including Southeast 
Asia (Eldridge 2002, p. 32; Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 31).  
 
Phase 2: Denial (1998-1999) 
 
The lack of political movement concerning human rights changed dramatically shortly 
after the fall of President Suharto. In the newly democratised Indonesia, more space 
was given to civil society to form associations, as was seen in the large increase in 
NGOs present in West Papua during the terms of Presidents Habibie and Wahid 
(Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 449). Where once human rights monitors had been 
repressed to a great extent, for the first time this new era permitted a relatively open, 
stable and reliable reporting of human rights abuses. The strengthening of domestic 
opposition to human rights abuses created vital momentum for further change. 
 
Initially, this era was anything but peaceful or conducive to respect for the principles 
of human rights. A number of violent incidents occurred in and around areas where 
raisings of the Morning Star flag were attempted or independence rallies held (Tebay 
2006, p. 9). Several took place during July 1998. As discussed in the introduction, on 
the island of Biak security personal shot at a crowd of around 200 people at a flag 
raising, wounding many fatally (Human Rights Watch 2000a; Kivimäki 2006, p. 16; 
Rutherford 1999, pp. 39-40; Tebay 2006, p. 9). Two pro-independence demonstrators 
and one Indonesian intelligence officer were killed in pro-independence 
demonstrations in Jayapura, and 41 more were arrested (Amnesty International 1998). 
At another rally in Sorong, five people suffered severe gunshot wounds and another 
was shot dead (Amnesty International 1998). Manokwari also experienced rioting. 
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The mounting of such protests had been encouraged by the hope that democratisation 
in Indonesia would lead to new freedom of expression in West Papua.  
 
Despite these setbacks, the conflict masked a deeper shift in the human rights field at 
the time. Political changes were energizing efforts to establish NGOs and facilitated a 
move toward “the production and dissemination of information about human rights 
practices” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 22). Such changes are characteristic of the denial 
phase, which Risse and Sikkink (1999, pp. 22-23) predict precedes enhanced efforts 
in lobbying, especially internationally. This renewed impetus led to the formation of 
NGOs such as ELSHAM, SKP and FORERI, as well as the awakening of other local 
civil society groups. Student groups, predominantly campaigning for independence, 
became more organised, modelling themselves on student activists in Jakarta and 
other cities (Human Rights Watch 2000a). This had the effect of enhancing the 
reliability of human rights monitoring and reporting at the local level (Bonay & 
McGrory 2004).  
 
The 1999 meeting between the “Team of 100” civil society leaders and President 
Habibie, was the culmination of initial efforts by NGOs to lobby Jakarta.48 It 
demonstrated both the successes and the limitations of the NGO movement in its 
interactions with Jakarta. While the meeting itself marked an important precedent for 
dialogue between NGOs and the Indonesian Government, the outcomes of this first 
dialogue were less inspiring. For many among the Papuan delegation experiences of 
bloodshed at peaceful protests in the preceding months radicalised their perspective 
on independence (Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2000b). Consequently, when 
the Team of 100 arrived in Jakarta their statement, voiced directly to Habibie and 21 
of his cabinet ministers, was uncompromising. Amongst other points, they stated: 
 
First, we the people of West Papua wish to remove ourselves from the unified state of 
the Republic of Indonesia to realize independence and full sovereignty among the 
other nations in the world. 
 
                                                
48 This was largely achieved through the efforts of FORERI (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004, p. 26).  
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Second, to immediately form a transitional government in West Papua under the 
supervision of the United Nations (UN) democratically, peacefully and responsibly in 
March 1999 at the latest (cited in Human Rights Watch 2000b).  
 
Habibie’s response was dignified yet adamant: 
  
The aspirations you have expressed are important, but founding a country isn't easy; 
let's contemplate those aspirations again…. Go home, and take my greetings to the 
Papuan people (Human Rights Watch 2000b).   
 
While this meeting ultimately ended in failure, the Indonesian President’s agreement 
to meet with Papuan civil society leaders was an important step in dialogue that gave 
an early indication that West Papua was on the brink of moving on to the next phase 
of the spiral model: tactical concessions.49 
 
Phase 3: Tactical Concessions (1999-2001) 
 
Jakarta’s brief phase of denial came to an end with the arrival of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid in late 1999. The change in policy direction by the Indonesian 
Government signified the arrival of the third phase in the socialisation process – 
tactical concessions. Strengthened domestic NGOs that became increasingly active in 
lobbying helped to produce a number of concessions on the part of the Indonesian 
Government. These included changes in the argumentative discourses used, where the 
validity of human rights criticisms were recognised. Significant instrumental 
adaptation was undertaken with this, motivating substantial changes in government 
                                                
49 The period that the Indonesian Government spent “in denial” was extremely short. By the time 
President Wahid came to Power in 1999, Jakarta had already begun to undertake significant 
movements to address human rights issues in West Papua. The speed at which socialisation took place 
in this period was surprising but can be explained as a “norm cascading” effect, where “enough states 
and enough critical states endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behaviour” (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998, p. 902). In this event, states are motivated to avoid directly arguing against the norms 
that are broadly regarded as legitimate in international relations. Risse and Sikkink  (1999, p. 24) 
explain this phenomenon further in relation to the spiral model: 
 
because of changes in “world time” it is possible that denial and backlash is a normative 
phase particular to a period in which new international norms have emerged…. If this is the 
case, we would expect the denial stage to disappear in cases of more fully institutionalised 
norms.  
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policy (see Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp. 12-13). During this time, successes in opening 
dialogue with the Indonesian Government, most notably in the Second Papuan 
Congress, were paralleled by successes in the international sphere, effectively 
building momentum for a multi-layered campaign which applied pressure both locally 
and internationally, from “above” and “below” (Brysk 1993).   
 
The space that was opened up in the early stages of the democratic era led to 
increasing recognition of the human rights problems in West Papua (Ballard 2002, pp. 
473-474; Hernawan 2002, p. 5; Human Rights Watch 2000a; Sumule 2001). 
Reporting by ELSHAM, SKP, LBH Papua, Kontras Papua and others gradually 
gained more respect and provided more reliable examples of abuses occurring on the 
ground (Blair & Phillips 2003, pp. 108-109; Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 
2001a). This was complimented by the work of FORERI, YPMD and church 
organisations to address issues of reconciliation and development (Blair & Phillips 
2003, pp. 108-109; Ondawame 2002, p. 21). In this new setting, human rights abuses 
became increasingly difficult to ignore. 
 
Argumentative discourses employed during this time were not dissimilar to those used 
under the previous administration, though the authenticity of Wahid’s rhetoric was 
enhanced greatly by the policy initiatives he offered in support of it. President B.J. 
Habibie was the first official to recognise the human rights abuses suffered by the 
Papuan people. In 1998, he also apologised for the human rights violations that 
occurred during the Suharto era (see Human Rights Watch 2000a; Kivimäki 2006, p. 
8). However, few actions corroborated this apology and the reality of events in West 
Papua seemed to contrast the spirit of his words. In the months following the meeting 
with Team of 100, laws were adopted restricting the expression of views that favoured 
Papuan independence and instances of harassment of civil society leaders were also 
reported (Hernawan 2002, p. 4).50 A UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was 
also denied access to West Papua when it conducted a mission to Indonesia between 
January 31st and February 12th, 1999 (International Commission of Jurists 2000).   
                                                
50 Law no.MK/01/IV/1999, was announced on the 17th of April 1999 by the Chief of Police in West 
Papua, Brigjend. Pol Hotman Siagian. It banned the setting up of posko Command Posts, which 
showed support of independence. There were also reports that claimed that following the meeting with 
Habibie, “unidentified persons terrorized members of 100 Team [sic] who lived in Jayapura” 
(Hernawan 2002, p. 4). 
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Unlike Habibie, Wahid’s administration accompanied this apologetic rhetoric with 
concrete concessions, indicating some acceptance of the claims of human rights 
critics. Although these concessions may have been purely instrumental, it is important 
to note that the administration no longer denied the validity of human rights claims. 
Clues of this change were given at the time of the presidential election, when the 
Peoples Assembly promised the legal resolution of human rights violations in West 
Papua (see Sumule 2001). These expressions were soon followed by actions on the 
part of government that were both symbolic and significant. 
 
This new approach began with the restoration of the name “Papua” to the province on 
New Years Day, 2000 (Hernawan 2002, p. 5). Wahid also officially recognised the 
Morning Star flag for the first time (von Strokirch 2001, p. 520). Other tactical 
concessions given to the Papuan people later confirmed the new direction. This 
relaxed approach carried into other approaches to politics in West Papua. It gave 
Papuan leaders the ability to meet politically and on a large scale for the establishment 
of the PDP in early 2000 (Hernawan 2002, p. 5). Members of the PDP were able to 
attend the Pacific Island Forum in late 2000, as members of the Nauru delegation 
(International Crisis Group 2001, p. 16).51 Two historic concessions came soon 
afterwards with the convening of the Second Papuan Congress in Jayapura between 
May 29th and June 4th, 2000 and, later, the first offer of Special Autonomy to the 
Papuan people (Catherine Scott & Tebay 2005, p. 605).  
  
The Second Papuan Congress 
 
The Second Papuan Congress was organised by the PDP and was a historic gathering 
of West Papua’s political and civil society figures. With an estimated 3000 people in 
attendance (ELSHAM 2001b),52 it represented a wide range of figures and a diversity 
of political opinions. Attendees included OPM commanders, Papuan leaders from the 
Suharto era who had been living in exile, Government representatives and 
Melanesians from all over Papua (von Strokirch 2001, p. 520). This diversity gave 
                                                
51 This privilege was previously unheard of and has not been given since. 
52 Some estimates are much higher than this figure. According to its own final resolution, the Second 
Papuan People’s Congress (2000) claimed that there were as many as 21,000 attendees.  
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greater authority to symbolic acts made during the Congress and was viewed as a 
definitive gathering of the Papuan leadership.  
 
Jakarta’s support for the congress went much further than previous concessions. 
Instead of merely ensuring the congress would not be disrupted, President Wahid 
agreed to open the congress as well as to provide finance (King 2004, p. 39). 
Although the offer to open the congress personally was later withdrawn, funding was 
granted to the tune of one billion rupiah (US$120,000) (Hernawan 2002, p. 5; King 
2004, p. 39). This gesture, while having many critics in Jakarta, essentially gave the 
Papuan resistance movement – and the PDP – a semi-legitimate outlet to articulate 
their views and aspirations.  
 
Supporters of the congress argued it provided “the highest democratic vehicle of the 
Papuan people” (Resolution of the Second Papuan People's Congress 2000) and acted 
as a means by which aspirations could be expressed. It installed four commissions to 
address key areas of Papuan concern. These were: the rectification of history, 
formulating a political agenda, the consolidation of Papua organizations and the basic 
rights of the Papuan people. From the commissions and the meetings held, the 
Congress passed a number of resolutions. Some of these addressed issues of human 
rights, but as a whole the commissions tended to focus more on independence as a 
political aspiration of the Papuan people. The final resolution of the congress 
denounced “the crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated in West Papua” 
and called for a thorough investigation of all parties involved, both nationally and 
internationally (Resolution of the Second Papuan People's Congress 2000). 
Nevertheless, this was somewhat eclipsed by many resolutions affirming the 
independence of Papua and the right of its people to self-determination.53 
                                                
53 The resolutions adopted by the Second Papuan Congress were as follows:  
 
The Papuan people and nation hereby state, through the intermediary of the Second Papuan 
Congress of 2000: 
 
- The Papuan Nation has been sovereign as a people and state since 1 December 1961, 
- Through the intermediary of the Second Congress, the Papuan Nation rejects the 1962 
New York Agreement which was legally and morally flawed because no representatives 
of the Papuan Nation were involved, 
- Through the intermediary of the Second Congress, the Papuan Nation reject the results of 
Pepera (the ‘Act of Free Choice’} [sic] because it was conducted to the accompaniment 
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Special Autonomy Law 
 
Among the achievements of this era, one can include (albeit contentiously) the 
adoption in late 2001 of the Special Autonomy Bill. Special autonomy pledged 
respect for “equality and diversity in the societal and cultural life of Irian Jaya people” 
(King 2004, p. 81). Although it was adopted while President Sukarnoputri was in 
office, the majority of the consultative work was completed during President Wahid’s 
term. This consultation was comprehensive and included contributions from leading 
academics, activists, NGOs and church representatives.54 As a result of this work, a 
draft bill on special autonomy was prepared for submission to Jakarta.    
 
Unsurprisingly, the draft that was sent to Jakarta was much more radical than the text 
that was eventually passed into law (King 2004, pp. 84-85). Among the differences, 
the Papuan draft advocated that the provincial government be able to “undertake 
guidance, supervision, and control of population growth in Papua Province” (Article 
55, cited in King 2004, p. 84). Thus, the Papuan people would be able to control 
transmigration and immigration. It also proposed that the provincial government 
would have control over the placement of Indonesian military units in West Papua 
(King 2004, p. 84). Both of these were removed from the law adopted in Jakarta.55 
Finally, Article 75, which set out the conditions under which West Papua might be 
given a second act of self-determination, predictably was rejected. It read: 
                                                                                                                                       
of threats, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and amoral [sic] deeds that 
gravely violated humanitarian principles. 
 
The Papuan Nation therefore calls on the United Nations to revoke UN Resolution 2504 adopted 
on 19 November 1969 (Resolution of the Second Papuan People’s Congress 2000). 
54 Forum Kerjasama Lembaga Swadaya (Cooperative Forum of Papuan Non-Governmental 
Organisations), an umbrella NGO set up for the consultation, was especially important in expressing 
the views of many NGOs (King, 2004, 82). 
55 Those affected by it in the province – both radicals and conservative Papuans alike – were outraged 
by the wide disparity between the position of the Papuan bill and that which was eventually adopted by 
Jakarta. While promising in many respects, ‘Special Autonomy’ fell far short of Papuan demands. Tom 
Beanel, the chair of the PDP articulated this disgust and scepticism. In a sharp criticism of the Special 
Autonomy Law he commented: 
 
I think Special Autonomy is not good. So it would be good if they just gave us back the 
original design [of the Papuan draft bill], as we wanted it. I myself already refused Special 
Autonomy from the beginning, but the resolution passed today gave six months from today. 
It’s a chance for the Indonesian government. We will see if they are honest or just playing 
with us. If after nine months we know they are just playing with us we will sit together in a 
national and international dialogue. That’s what we want (interviewed in Wing & King 2005, 
pp.  46-47).  
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After 5 years of enactment of this Law if it is apparent that it cannot be executed 
effectively, the Papuan people through the Papuan Parliament shall ask the MPR 
[People’s Consultative Assembly] of RI [the Republic of Indonesia] to sit in session 
to make a referendum for determining the political attitude of the Papuan people 
(cited in King 2004, p. 85).  
  
Although there is an ongoing debate over the effects of the Special Autonomy Law 
(as is discussed in the previous chapter), and much criticism of how it has been 
handled (see Ballard 2002, p. 471), the degree to which Papuan civil society was 
consulted during the drafting process illustrated Jakarta’s recognition of the need for 
inclusive dialogue with the Papuan people. This was the first time since 1963 that 
Papuans had been consulted in the formulation of policy in this way (Chauvel & 
Bhakti 2004, p. 43). The repeated use of the Special Autonomy Law in subsequent 
human rights debates also shows its rhetorical significance for a number of human 
rights advocates (see, for example, RFK Memorial 2004a; Rumbiak & Walton 2004; 
Sumule 2001). Moreover, although the content of the bill fell far short of the 
aspirations of a vast number of Papuans (International Crisis Group 2002, p. 7), on 
face value, the legal content provided concessions substantially better than those 
bestowed previously. 
 
Considerable work promoting human rights in West Papua in the international sphere 
sought to build on the gains mentioned above. Proponents of human rights received 
encouragements internationally when government concerns over abuses increased 
amidst accumulating tension and threats of violence. Former New Zealand Foreign 
Minister, Phil Goff, offered to act as a mediator between Indonesia and the Papuan 
leadership after he met with Franzalbert Joku, the PDP international representative, in 
late 2000. This was offered as a means resolving issues of self-determination as well 
as broader human rights issues (International Crisis Group 2001, p. 16), but was 
subsequently rejected by Jakarta. A similar offer was made by Vanuatu in 2004. Like 
the previous offer, this did not lead to any breakthroughs, with some commentators 
questioning Vanuatu’s ability to act with impartiality given their previous statements 
regarding West Papuan self-determination (Watson 2005, p. 485).  
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Continuing Human Rights Abuses 
 
Despite the advances in socialisation made during this period, human rights 
conditions remained far from idyllic. Authorities continued to view the act of raising 
the Morning Star flag as a declaration of the aspiration for independence, even though 
the Government had officially recognised the flag in January 2000. This provoked 
many violent confrontations. A series of confrontations over the raising of the 
Morning Star flag in Nabire, between February 28th and March 2nd 2000, left three 
people dead and eighteen injured (Amnesty International 2000, p. 7). Similar 
instances between December 1999 and August 2000 in Timika, Sorong and Merauke, 
left at least five people dead and hundreds injured (Amnesty International 2000).  
 
After resolutions by the Second Papuan Congress declared Papuan independence, 
relations between the Government and Papuan civil society leaders took a turn for the 
worse. On 8th June 2000, Indonesian officials held an intelligence meeting in 
downtown Jayapura that proposed possible Indonesian responses to the Papuan 
demands for independence. The minutes of the meeting, which were subsequently 
leaked to human rights NGOs, detailed a number of initiatives to help remedy 
Indonesia’s problem. Among these a diagram entitled “Papuan Political Conspiracy” 
noted 38 highly influential Papuans and recommended actions to be taken against 
them (Ballard 2002, pp. 468-469). Those identified included OPM commanders, NGO 
and church leaders as well as some people in local government positions. Individuals 
on the list would be dealt-with, it was proposed, by “the generation of a legal 
framework to cover repressive action, and the prosecution of strong sanctions against 
the leaders of the “Papuan Conspiracy”” (Ballard 2002, p. 469). Following the 
intelligence meeting, several members of the PDP were arrested on charges of treason 
(Ballard 2002, p. 469) and, in November the following year, Theys Eluay, the chair of 
the PDP, was assassinated by Indonesian security personnel (ELSHAM 2001b).56   
 
                                                
56 Investigations into the incident by human rights groups found significant evidence incriminating the 
Indonesian military (ELSHAM 2001b). Suspicions of higher level involvement were heightened even 
more when those found guilty of the murder received lenient sentences and were ‘lauded as national 
heroes by a senior Indonesian army officer’ (Tebay 2005, p. 18).  The death was accompanied by riots 
and protests by many Papuans and marked a low point in Papua’s history where not only calls for 
independence were rejected, but also where the hopes for greater freedom and respect for human rights 
took a significant blow. 
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A spate of human rights violations followed the Second Papuan Congress. Clashes in 
Fak-fak, Sorong and Manokwari in the latter part of 2000 resulted in several deaths 
and arrests (Ballard 2002, p. 469), while two infamous cases of human rights abuse 
that occurred around this time also confirmed the fragility of the situation. The first of 
these cases occurred in Wamena on October 6th, where thirteen people were killed 
during police raids on a community centre that flew the Morning Star Flag (ELSHAM 
& Tapol 2001; Tapol 2002a). Rioting and looting of the largely migrant owned shops 
followed and, in this retaliatory violence, thirty-one more people were left dead, most 
of whom were migrants (Brundige et al. 2004, p. 45; Human Rights Watch 2001).57 
On December 1st, the Morning Star Flag was once again officially banned. A week 
later, in Abepura, an upsurge in violence was prompted when around 300 people 
attacked a police station, killing two police officers and a security guard (Amnesty 
International 2004; Chauvel 2003, p. 12; Human Rights Watch 2001). In retaliation, 
the police raided several student dormitories. One person was shot dead in the initial 
raid and approximately one hundred were “arbitrarily detained” (Amnesty 
International 2004). The torture that followed this is well documented (see Amnesty 
International 2004; Chauvel 2003, p. 12; Human Rights Watch 2001). As a result, 
dozens suffered serious injuries, with two people being tortured to death (Amnesty 
International 2004; Human Rights Watch 2001).  
 
By the time President Wahid left office in July 2001, it had become clear that West 
Papua had failed to progress to the next phase of the spiral model, prescriptive status, 
or beyond that to rule-consistent behaviour. While President Wahid’s term saw many 
advances in human rights, even when at times the situation threatened to grow beyond 
the control of Jakarta, complete “self-entrapment” in the rhetoric used in human rights 
debates never eventuated (see Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 28). The empowerment of 
local civil society failed to reach critical mass and, although NGOs were much more 
powerful than they had been previously, their ability to lobby and to socialise rights 
                                                
57 Wamena was also the place of severe human rights violations in April 2003 when the Indonesian 
military commenced an “all-out sweeping” operation to catch the perpetrators of a raid of a weapons 
store in the town (Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2004, pp. 4-5). Several atrocities followed and 
the local Papuan people suffering grievously (see Amnesty International 2004; Office for Justice and 
Peace Jayapura 2004; Tapol 2005c). According to Indonesia’s National Commission for Human 
Rights, KOMNAS HAM, the military tortured 38 people and killed nine people in military raids (see 
Amnesty International 2004; Tapol 2005c). The terror of these operations, prompted as many as 7000 
people to flee into the bush, 42 of whom died of hunger and exhaustion (Amnesty International 2004). 
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did not affect a progression of the spiral. Meanwhile, the advocacy of independence 
by the Second Papuan Congress marked the beginning of a decline in relations 
between Papuan civil society and the Indonesian Government.   
 
Spiral Regression: Failure to reach Prescriptive Status and Rule Consistent 
Behaviour 
 
After President Sukarnoputri gained power in July 2001, many reforms were enacted 
that proved damaging to the human rights situation in West Papua. This quickly 
regressed to the earlier stages of the spiral. Ambiguous rhetoric from Jakarta gave 
way to greater crackdowns against political dissenters and harassment of NGOs in the 
region. The more hawkish approach of Sukarnoputri was affirmed by concrete 
government policies. These moves disempowered critics of Indonesian policies 
toward basic human rights in West Papua as well as advocates of independence. In the 
mind of many Indonesian authorities, the two groups had essentially been reduced to 
one. As a result, being severely limited by government restrictions, local NGOs found 
themselves increasingly isolated from the outside world. 
 
Both during and after the rule of Sukarnoputri, the human rights situation in West 
Papua drew a mixed response from Jakarta. In contrast to the previous government – 
where President Wahid’s insistence of undertaking human rights reforms, even in the 
face of major opposition in Jakarta, seemed to indicate a “true belief” in the value of a 
pro-human rights approach, at least on the part of Wahid himself – Sukarnoputri’s 
rhetoric portrayed a more confusing position. This broke down the consistency of 
argumentative behaviour which preceded her, the continuation of which, according to 
Risse and Sikknik (1999, p. 31), would have been necessary for the realisation of 
prescriptive status.  
 
Statements made at the beginning of Sukarnoputri’s term reflected the ambiguity of 
her position. Shortly after arriving in office she condemned the “inappropriate 
national policies” of the past, reiterating the apologies made by Habibie and Wahid 
(Sukarnoputri cited in Ballard 2002, p. 473). However, statements soon followed 
backing the activities of the military, which have since been implicated in several 
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human rights violations (see Human Rights Watch 2007a). In a speech on December 
29th 2001, she declared to Indonesian military personnel leaving for West Papua:  
 
We are suddenly aware… of the need for force to protect our beloved nation and 
motherland from breaking up... But with the laws of Indonesia as your guide, you can 
do your duty without worrying about being involved in human rights abuses…. Do 
everything without doubts (cited in Ballard 2002, p. 475). 
 
The troubles experienced in West Papua after the Second Papuan Congress also 
increased at this time. The assassination of Theys Eluay, the charismatic leader of the 
PDP, in late 2001 was the beginning of a new round of crackdowns against protestors 
and perceived political dissenters. Several instances of violence at political 
demonstrations occurred in the years following this. Conflicts with protestors in 
Timika and elsewhere killed at least five people in August 2003 (Office for Justice 
and Peace Jayapura 2004, p. 6; Tapol 2003c). There were also high profile arrests of 
Filep Karma and Yusak Pakage for flying the Morning Star Flag in December 2004 
(see Human Rights Watch 2007b; RFK Memorial 2004b).58 On the island of Biak, in 
February 2005, Indonesian military personnel opened fire on a peaceful religious 
gathering that was commemorating the death of Melkianus Awom, an OPM 
commander (RFK Memorial 2005a). In March 2006, violence between security 
personnel and protestors in Timika, Abepura and elsewhere killed several people and 
caused hundreds to flee into the bush (see Chesterfield 2006; Tapol 2006b). Also 
notable during this time was a large military offensive that took place in the Puncak 
Jaya district in October 2004. This displaced over 6000 people, between 35 and 60 of 
whom later died in the bush (Human Rights Watch 2007a; Tapol 2005b; Tebay 2006, 
p. 6).59 At least eight others were shot dead in disputes in the area (Office for Justice 
and Peace Jayapura 2005, p. 7; Tapol 2005a). The violence that occurred in West 
Papua was so intense that Tapol (2004b) claimed over 2000 people were killed in 
conflicts between the military and civilian population between May 2003 and 
November 2004 alone.60 
                                                
58 The two were sentenced to 15 (Filep Karma) and 10 year (Yusak Pakage) terms in prison (Human 
Rights Watch 2007b, p. 3). 
59 Operations in Puncak Jaya are ongoing, but due to restrictions on NGO work in West Papua, reliable 
figures on those killed and displaced are unavailable (see Human Rights Watch 2007a, p. 32).   
60 For a detailed summary of major known human rights abuses between 1998 and 2007, see 
Franciscans International, Justitia et Pax Netherlands, Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura and the 
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Intimidation of NGOs 
 
An apparent increase in human rights abuses during this time (Amemori 2007; van 
den Broek 2002) was paralleled by significant intimidation and harassment of human 
rights NGOs, seriously impeding their work. In early 2004, it was revealed that the 
Indonesian Government had created a national “watch-list” of 20 NGOs (Tapol 
2004a). ELSHAM was one of the NGOs included on the list and had been placed 
there “for issuing statements detrimental to national interests” (Tapol 2004a). More 
tacit intimidation was committed against ELSHAM, Legal Aid, Kontras, SKP and 
other NGOs (Human Rights Watch 2007a). Methods of harassment included death 
threats (against the human rights monitors themselves and their families) and 
“suspicious car accidents”. Other members of NGOs were placed under obvious 
surveillance or threatened by men wielding rifles (Amnesty International 2002a; Barr 
2006, p. 6; Front Line and IMPARSIAL n.d., p. 91; RFK Memorial 2004a). Some 
reported cases where journalists were followed and physically chased out of towns or 
informed that if they report on certain events they would be considered OPM 
sympathisers (RFK Memorial 2004a).  
 
ELSHAM and the PDP are among the organisations most frequently targeted. For 
ELSHAM, this harassment was stepped-up after it investigated a 2002 incident in 
which an unidentified group shot one Indonesian and two US citizens dead outside 
Timika. ELSHAM’s findings, which LBH Papua and Kontras echoed, cast suspicion 
on the army’s Special Forces Command, Kopassus. Along with the defamation 
proceedings that were filed against ELSHAM for their accusations against the 
military (International NGO Coalition for Human Rights International Advocacy 
2004a, pp. 7-8), on December 28th 2002, ELSHAM’s Jakarta office received an 
anonymous telephone call telling staff to “be careful”(Amnesty International 2002a). 
Other similar threats have been made against John Rumbiak and many others for their 
work with ELSHAM (Front Line and IMPARSIAL n.d.). Three people connected 
with ELSHAM were also fired upon while they travelled in a car near the Papua New 
Guinea border (Tapol 2002b). Meanwhile, the leadership of the PDP have also been 
the target of harassment, particularly following the murder of Theys Eluay. In mid-
                                                                                                                                       
Evangelical Christian Church of Papua (2008). According to this report, approximately 242 cases of 
torture were recorded in West Papua during in the nine years since the democratisation of Indonesia.  
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November, 2001, Herman Awom, the moderator of the PDP, received a phone call 
threatening, “Be careful. Get ready to join Theys” (Front Line and IMPARSIAL n.d., 
p. 97).    
 
Efforts to nullify NGOs have gone beyond harassment. There are indications that 
some Indonesian authorities have attempted to undermine the structures of funding in 
some NGOs. Gillian Southey, of the Christian World Service, believes that “the 
Indonesians buy off people and do undermine organisations… that is the reality of 
these situations” (interviewed by the author, 12th April 2007). Uncertainties created by 
these reports are compounded by increasing restrictions on foreign access to West 
Papua, which mean no one is able to investigate the conditions of NGOs in West 
Papua in order to verify which are acting corruptly and which are trustworthy 
(Southey, interviewed by the author, 12th April 2007). As a result, some NGOs have 
incurred substantial cuts in funding. Barr (2006, p. 4) suggests ELSHAM is one of 
these and is substantially hindered from carrying out its previous role of human rights 
monitoring.  
 
Jakarta’s Policy: Partition, Militarism and Repression 
 
Substantive changes in policy direction from Jakarta underlie the negative trends in 
West Papua’s human rights situation. Three major political developments have 
contributed to this decline. A presidential decree bringing about the division of West 
Papua into multiple provinces has had the greatest influence on the domestic political 
landscape. Connected with this, but perhaps more direct in its impact on human rights 
conditions, has been a decision to increase dramatically the number of military 
personnel in the province. A report released by Human Rights Watch in 2007(a) has 
implicated these changes in several cases of rape and murder. Finally, a new policy of 
repression of human rights monitors, beginning in 2004, has greatly inhibited the 
working of human rights networks. Collectively, these have rebuffed hopes of a 
speedy progression in human rights socialisation by creating a large barrier to the use 
of “soft power” by NGOs and a reassertion of the dominance of state-centric power in 
West Papua’s political sphere.  
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In January 2003, a Presidential decree announced the acceleration of a law, originally 
made in 1999 (Law 45/1999), to divide West Papua into three provinces. In an 
apparent reversal of intentions to revise and repeal law 45/1999 after the adoption of 
the Special Autonomy Law (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 2), the decree 
signalled the immediate division of the territory into the provinces “West Irian Jaya” 
and “Irian Jaya”.61  These would later be divided again to create the “Central Irian 
Jaya” province. Many in Papua were left in shock and were “genuinely ignorant of the 
governments plans” to enact the law (McGibbon 2004, p. 55; Office for Justice and 
Peace Jayapura 2004, p. 5). Still others were left with further concerns that the decree 
was a “divisive move to undermine… support for self-determination” (Tapol 2003c). 
The undemocratic nature of the division was highlighted by NGOs throughout 
Indonesia (RFK Memorial 2006a).62 Ultimately, critics pointed to the decrees’ 
incompatibility with Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law that requires any such 
division to be approved by MRP, which was yet to be established (McGibbon 2004, p. 
55).63 
        
Expansions in military personnel have been more directly threatening to the physical 
security of the Papuan people (RFK Memorial 2005b; Tapol 2003d2005b). Following 
protests surrounding the division of West Papua into separate provinces, the 
Government announced the deployment of an extra 2,000 troops to cope with 
tensions.64 This policy was later followed by a decision to establish new battalions of 
troops and a new division of the Army Strategic Reserve Command in Sorong close to 
a base where British Petroleum extracts natural gas (Tebay 2006, p. 11) and an 
announcement that 15,000 extra troops would be sent to West Papua by 2010 (RFK 
Memorial 2005b; Tapol 2005b). The enlargement of forces would see the number of 
troops in West Papua grow to approximately 50,000 (Tapol 2005b; Tebay 2006, p. 
11). Atrocities committed by the military are well known amongst NGOs involved in 
                                                
61 Although the western province was initially name West Irian Jaya, it was later again renamed “West 
Papua” by a government regulation on April 18th, 2007 (Sijabat 2007).   
62 Groups opposed to the division included Indonesian Christian Students Movement, the Association 
of Catholic Students, the Indonesian Christian Women’s Association and the Cooperation Forum of 
Non-Governmental Organisations (RFK Memorial 2006a). 
63 Indonesia’s Constitutional Court later upheld this position and declared the decree to be illegal. 
However, the court stopped short of striking down the establishment of the new province, so the 
division of West Papua remained in place (International Crisis Group 2006, pp. 3-4). 
64 RFK Memorial (2005b) challenged the justification for the deployment, which Indonesia claimed 
was to counter separatists, by highlighting the military’s “own data… [which] claims there are only 
620 separatist fighters in West Papua, 150 of whom are armed”. 
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West Papua. These hold grave fears that this increase will create even greater 
suffering for the Papuan population (see, for example, Amemori 2007; Ecumenical 
Council of Papuan Churches 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007a; RFK Memorial 
2005a).  
 
Along with this, policies denying access to outside monitors have been enacted by 
Jakarta. In September 2004, a committee of government institutions, including the 
intelligence agencies, police, immigration ministry, security ministry and the 
department of foreign affairs, enacted a ban on all journalists in West Papua and Aceh 
(Tapol 2004b; Tapol et al. 2004).65 Staff from the International Crisis Group were 
expelled from West Papua and delegations from Amnesty International and the UN 
High Commission for Refugees were denied subsequent access (Free West Papua 
Campaign 2006, p. 30). Such actions have successfully prevented the collection of 
reliable information and figures on human rights abuses in West Papua in recent years 
(Human Rights Watch 2007a, p. 32). They also put beyond doubt the regression of 
human rights conditions in West Papua. 
 
Explanations for Regression 
 
A number of explanations can account for the dramatic decline in the human rights 
situation in West Papua. Major factors contributing to the regression of the 
socialisation spiral can be broken down into three groups:66 1) situational factors 
pertaining to the political climate that informed the decisions of both sides at the time 
                                                
65 The threats that these developments have posed to the human rights situation, prompted responses 
from many international NGOs, who feared the West Papuan situation could relapse into violence in an 
increasingly repressive political environment. This point of view was summarised by a coalition of 
British based NGOs – Tapol, Catholic Institute for Overseas Development, Catholic Institute for 
International Relations and the Oxford Papuan Rights Campaign (2004) – who sent an open letter to 
Douglas Alexander, the British Minister of State, after the announcement commenting,  
 
[R]estrictions on international agencies and NGOs have resulted in economic hardship, the 
inability of foreigners to act as witnesses and deterrents to violence against civilians, and the 
loss of moral, physical and financial assistance to local organisations.  
 
The government was further urged to lobby Indonesia to lift the bans and allow foreign monitors into 
West Papua.  
66 These provide a valuable analysis for the situation through the use of the spiral model. Other factors 
and conditions clearly contribute to the environment that allowed for the regression of the spiral. These 
include, for instance, the broad international conditions and the economic situation encountered at the 
time.  
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of its regression; 2) factors produced by the Indonesian authorities; and 3) factors 
produced by Papuans and their advocates. Although Indonesia’s role in the 
degradation of the human rights situation must neither be forgotten nor downplayed, 
the discussion here will explore the first and third factors. The most prominent 
situational factor influencing the perceptions of both the Indonesian authorities and 
the Papuan people immediately before the spiral’s decline was the granting of 
independence to East Timor in 1999. On the side of the Papuans and their advocates, 
the nationalist movement in West Papua that gained strength around this time directly 
influenced how human rights could be socialised in West Papua and how government 
and military authorities in Indonesia viewed it.   
 
Situational Conditions: East Timorese Independence    
 
Regression of human rights conditions in West Papua cannot be properly understood 
without first making reference to the international conditions in which they occurred. 
One such condition that made an unmistakable impact in West Papua was the granting 
of independence to East Timor in 1999. The East Timorese situation had many 
similarities to West Papua. Indonesia had invaded East Timor six years after West 
Papua’s Act of Free Choice and had agreed to holding a referendum on independence 
after the fall of President Suharto in 1998 under heavy international pressure. 
Independence for East Timor aggravated the situation considerably by its timing and 
impact on political perceptions (McGibbon 2006, pp. viii, 33). 
 
The timing of East Timorese independence coincided with a particularly unstable 
phase of the spiral model in West Papua. In the period between 1999 and 2000, 
human rights socialisation was progressing steadily in West Papua and stepping into a 
phase of tactical concessions from the Indonesian Government. Despite the sense of 
large gains in socialisation, the spiral model indicates that this is “the most precarious 
phase of the spiral model” (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 25). Phase three can either lead 
to a sustained change in human rights conditions or, Risse and Sikkink (1999, p. 25) 
warn, “[it] can also result in a backlash. If the government responds with unrelenting 
repression of activists, it can temporarily break the upward spiral process”.  
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With the grant of independence for East Timor, political opinions on both sides of the 
Indonesian–West Papuan nationalist divide were galvanised. The precarious third 
phase was made even more unstable as Indonesian officials and Papuan nationalists 
both saw the potential that the experience of the East Timorese could set a wider 
precedent for others in the region (McGibbon 2006, pp. viii, 33). Reactions to this 
potential precedent could not be more distinct. Papuan nationalists, who had the 
support of a significant portion of the population (International Crisis Group 2002, p. 
7; Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2000b), welcomed events and took them as 
an incentive to press on with demands for independence (von Strokirch 2001, p. 520). 
These groups also hoped for the support of the international community, who a year 
earlier had actively supported East Timorese claims to exercise the right to self-
determination (von Strokirch 2001, p. 522). At the same time, the situation pulled 
Indonesia in two directions. The East Timor experience placed ever-greater pressure 
on Jakarta to adopt a ruthless line against nationalists in the country’s problem 
regions, while simultaneously democratisation was pressing the government to show 
greater toleration toward civil society and human rights organisations (Chauvel & 
Bhakti 2004, p. 25). The movement of democracy meant the time was ripe for 
positive human rights change, but the mention of independence could easily 
strengthen the hand of government hardliners, whose position had been solidified by 
the experience in East Timor.  
 
The Independence Movement and the Reduction of Political Space 
 
The persistence of calls for Papuan independence between 1999 and 2000 had a major 
effect on the regression of spiral. By framing desires for independence as the primary 
concern of the Papuan people the nationalist movement prevented wider human rights 
issues from building greater momentum to challenge government practices. Instead, 
political and societal space, which is key to the success of the spiral (Risse & Sikkink 
1999, p. 26), was filled by nationalist demands and so created greater antagonism 
toward the Papuan people from Jakarta. This conflict surfaced at the Second Papuan 
Congress. Articulations made there proved a watershed for the decline in the Papuan 
human rights situation (Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 28). Resolutions of the Second 
Papuan Congress effectively undercut political support for the Wahid administration’s 
117 
 
human rights concessions and fuelled a backlash against the human rights movement 
in West Papua.  
 
NGOs and civil society actors have utilized two distinct strategies in attempts to bring 
about positive human rights change in the region. Nationalist organisations have 
pursued self-determination rights by emphasising independence as a political 
aspiration. The OPM, FORERI and members of the PDP have all influenced events 
by advocating this right and asserting it as the primary concern of the Papuan people 
(Kivimäki 2006, pp. 4-5; Wing & King 2005, pp. 46-47). On the other hand, human 
rights NGOs were more circumspect, seeking to influence the human rights 
environment by focusing predominantly on physical security and subsistence rights. It 
was especially evident during the early years of Indonesia’s democratic era that NGOs 
such as ELSHAM, SKP, Kontras and a host of others were careful to avoid entangling 
themselves in such rhetoric.67 A notable exception to these was GKI, who’s assistant 
general secretary Herman Awom participated in both the Team of 100, the Second 
Papuan Congress and was elected onto the PDP (Human Rights Watch 2000b; King 
2004, p. 34).  
 
A crucial contribution the nationalist movement made to the regression to the spiral 
model was the amount of political space it acquired at the expense of the human rights 
movement. As Risse and Sikkink (1999, p. 26) comment, “human rights claims are 
likely to serve as the main principled idea around which an opposition coalition can 
be formed.... We expect argumentation and deliberation to become important in the 
coalition-processes of the domestic opposition”. However, the nationalist movement 
largely engulfed the space by becoming the main rallying point of opposition. While 
undoubtedly this agenda had much political support from the outset, the more 
momentum it gathered, the more potential for human rights advocacy was “soaked 
up” by claims of self-determination rights and politicised demands for West Papua to 
be free of Indonesia.  
 
For NGOs promoting human rights socialisation, the congress served as a potential 
arena where the redress of human rights abuses could be demanded. Along with the 
                                                
67 These NGOs refrained from commenting directly on the issue of independence during the 
presidencies of Habibie and Wahid.   
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unprecedented amount of space for the discussion and articulation of ideas, it could 
have offered a real temporal space in which human rights could assume the role of “a 
main principled idea around which an opposition can be formed” (Risse & Sikkink 
1999, p. 26). Instead, the strong advocacy of more politicised norms took centre-
stage, supplanting other human rights issues. While the commission on human rights 
did offer some space for discussion, in the congress’s final resolution, political 
aspirations were of far greater prominence and power (see Resolution of the Second 
Papuan People's Congress 2000). By eclipsing human rights concerns for subsistence 
and physical security in this way, the congress hindered these from developing into 
central and independent ideological rallying points for opposition groups. 
 
Calls for independence also deferred political space away from established norms. 
The space created for dialogue at the Team of 100 meeting gives a fitting illustration 
of how this occurred. Dialogue between the two groups was a great step forward for 
the recognition of West Papuan concerns in Jakarta. It offered a valuable base from 
which human rights socialisation could proceed. However, the aspirations for 
independence that were presented by the Papuan delegates directly confronted the 
attitudes and beliefs of the Indonesian government and caused much consternation 
amongst the Indonesian delegates present (Human Rights Watch 2000b). This stance 
was anathema to Jakarta’s unswerving position to defend Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity (Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, pp. 25-26; Hernawan 2002, p. 4). As well as being 
of great economic importance to Indonesia because of its natural resources, 
nationalists saw West Papua as a marker of Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty (as is 
seen in the nationalist slogan “From Sagang [in Aceh] to Merauke [in West Papua]”) 
(Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 25). Habibie, although diplomatic, essentially gave no 
positive response to their requests, indicating the depth of the government’s 
commitment to retain West Papua as Indonesian territory.  
 
Using more established human rights norms as an instrument of dialogue with the 
Indonesian Government during this time is likely to have proved much more fruitful. 
Unlike the independence issue, there is little reason to believe that Jakarta, and 
especially Habibie himself, viewed issues of basic human rights with antipathy. 
Importantly, the President considered any meeting with the Papuan delegates to be 
politically dangerous and had been advised not to participate in them (Human Rights 
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Watch 2000b). Considering this and his subsequent apology to the Papuan people 
(Human Rights Watch 2000a), it is likely that there was a real motivation to address 
issues of human rights in West Papua on the part of his government, even if this 
motivation was ultimately subordinate to concerns of territorial integrity. Given the 
existence of such concerns, claims that Habibie and his cabinet ministers were 
genuinely taken aback by Papuan demands when presented with the Team’s statement 
on independence are perhaps not surprising (see Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 26; 
Human Rights Watch 2000b). 
 
The Second Papuan Congress and the Indonesian Backlash 
 
Claims to independence elicited reactions from Jakarta that give an even clearer 
indication of the negative impact of separatist nationalism on the human rights 
movement. Indonesia’s backlash against the independence movement erupted 
immediately after the Second Papuan Congress and reflected the increasing 
intolerance most politicians in Jakarta had towards it (Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 29). 
The Second Papuan Congress had confirmed the incompatibility of Papuan 
independence with Jakarta’s view and had given hard-line Indonesian nationalists a 
chance to attack Wahid’s conciliatory agenda. Following the congress, members of all 
factions of the Indonesian House of Representatives, the People’s Consultative 
Assembly, were vocal in their criticism of the President’s approach. At the August 
2000 annual session, the assembly denounced the concessions given to Papuans 
allowing the use of “Papua” as a provincial name and the civil liberty of flying the 
Morning Star flag (Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 29). Opponents believed Wahid’s 
approach had failed “to deal with separatist movements which have been threatening 
to the totality of the unitary state of Indonesian” (Commission C of the People's 
Consultative Assembly cited in Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 29). As a result of the 
Papuan events, Wahid was left with few supporters. Threatened with a vote of no 
confidence, he was forced to apologise for his government’s performance (Riker 
2002, p. 200) and was given the task of decisively dealing with the separatist 
movement (Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 29).  
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Subsequent actions not only targeted nationalist NGOs and supporters, but led to the 
further detriment of the human rights situation. Human rights NGOs were perceived 
as co-conspirators in the eyes of Indonesian authorities because of the mixed rhetoric 
that often surrounded claims to self-determination (see Ballard 2002, pp. 468-469; 
Tapol 2001a). The Second Papuan Congress compounded confusion by inserting 
concerns about West Papua’s history of human rights abuses into its final resolution. 
It underlined “the crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated in West Papua 
as a result of the international political conspiracy [Indonesia’s annexation of West 
Papua]” (Resolution of the Second Papuan People's Congress 2000) and demanded 
their rectification as a term of Papuan independence. This practical mixing of natural 
rights and political rights was not a new direction – many within Papuan society had 
become disillusioned with Indonesian rule – but by supporting such a view, the 
Second Papuan Congress helped to blur the line between the nationalist and human 
rights agendas at a time that was critical for human rights socialisation.  
 
As a result, human rights organisations were increasingly viewed with deeply 
engrained distrust, and as exponents of the campaign for independence (Ballard 2002, 
pp. 468-469; Tapol 2001a). The clearest evidence of this was the inclusion of NGOs 
and other civil society actors in the alleged “Papuan Political Conspiracy” (Ballard 
2002, pp. 468-469; Tapol 2001a). While Ballard (2002, p. 468) argues, “the notion 
that these individuals might act in concert is absurd”, what was more important to the 
situation were the real perceptions of the Indonesian authorities, who increasingly 
came to believe that human rights campaigners represented a threat to Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity. Officials paired suspicions of NGO corroboration with the Papuan 
separatist movement with anti-human rights and anti-NGO statements. Chief of Police 
Information Centre, Daud Sihombing, for example claimed in 2003 that “Papuan 
NGOs [are] parasite[s] that merely gnaw at the state instead of contributing to it” 
(International NGO Coalition for Human Rights International Advocacy 2004a, p. 8). 
Early in the following year, government officials indicated that “measures would be 
taken against NGOs, both Indonesian and international, which are deemed to be a 
threat to the country’s national interests” (Tapol 2004a). As evidenced by its inclusion 
on the national watch list, ELSHAM was counted amongst these NGOs.   
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The Boomerang Effect in West Papua  
 
As repression and human rights abuses have increased in West Papua, a turn towards 
international avenues of lobbying has occurred. NGOs have increasingly utilised the 
international sphere to convince governments and the UN to take action in the face of 
stifled domestic opportunities for human rights campaigning. These efforts are 
indicative of a boomerang effect. Hence, international NGOs have undertaken a 
number of initiatives to maintain pressure on the Indonesian Government despite 
major setbacks on the domestic front. With NGO strategies divided between those 
that emphasise physical security and subsistence rights and those that mix these rights 
with an invocation of the right of the Papuan people to self-determination, these 
initiatives provide a valuable opportunity to examine the ramifications of invoking 
political rights in international human rights campaigning. 
 
Recent International Campaigning by NGOs 
 
International human rights campaigning for West Papua has become a critical source 
of leverage for many advocates who find the domestic status quo unacceptable. As 
local human rights campaigning has become more dangerous due to the harassment 
from Indonesian authorities, many human rights advocates have been driven to seek 
alternative means of campaigning. In this way, somewhat counter-intuitively, more 
intensified persecution of activists at the local level has led to a greater intensity of 
campaigning from the NGO movement on the international stage (see Khagram, Riker 
& Sikkink 2002a, p. 19). This has happened, in the words of Biak Dewan Adat, a 
tribal organisation, because many in West Papua believe, 
 
the international community could make a positive contribution by exerting strong 
pressure on the TNI [the Indonesian military], the police, and the militias to halt their 
repressive activities and by providing protection to the indigenous people throughout 
Papua (cited in Kivimäki 2006, p. 59). 
 
Thus, international pressure has been created both directly from local NGOs to 
international institutions and governments and via international NGOs. 
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Human Rights Campaigns Focusing on Basic Human Rights 
 
Highlighting abuses of physical security and subsistence rights on the international 
stage has been a strategy popular among NGOs. Domestic NGOs in West Papua 
continue to be vocal in this regard. Indonesia’s NGO Coalition for Human Rights 
International Advocacy (2004a; 2004b) has made submissions to the UNHRC 
detailing the situation faced in Papua and protesting what, in their view, is “terror” 
endured by human rights defenders in a number of Indonesian hotspots. This has been 
backed up by efforts of individual NGOs, including ELSHAM, LP3BH and the SKP, 
who have also made submissions to the UNHRC (Hernawan 2002; Sitokdana 2003; 
Warinussy 2004).68 In December 2004, a group of 32 local Papuan NGOs, alarmed at 
the deaths that had occurred due to the displacement of the population in the Puncak 
Jaya district, wrote an open letter to “the International Community” asking all people 
concerned with West Papua to contact their governments or members of parliament to 
take actions to “halt the Puncak Jaya operation, remove the military from the area and 
allow it to be reopened to humanitarian groups” (Appeal to the International 
Community Over the Devastating Puncak Jaya Operation and Wider Destabilizing 
Political Developments in West Papua 2004).  
 
Like their domestic counterparts, a number of international NGOs have been active in 
lobbying within the framework of the UNHRC. Amnesty International (see United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 2002), the International NGO Forum on 
Indonesian Development (2005) and the International Federation for the Protection of 
the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Minorities (2006) have all made 
pointed submissions and statements to the Council since the deterioration of the 
human rights situation. Throughout recent years, Franciscans International and the 
World Council of Churches have used their consultative status at the UNHRC to give 
in-depth and ongoing commentaries on the Papuan human rights situation (Bonay & 
McGrory 2004, p. 450). The World Council of Churches has highlighted extra-
                                                
68 ELSHAM, in 2003, lobbied the UNCHR about the human rights crisis that was then facing people in 
Wamena. They also raised concerns over the increasing presence of the Laskar Jihad and the 
Presidential Decree 1/2003 dividing West Papua. LP3BH also raised concerns about the division in 
2004. As well as this, through the UNCHR they urged the Indonesian Government to cease its 
militarisation of West Papua and to accede to a number of international human rights protocols. It 
should be noted that both ELSHAM and LP3BH included requests for a UN review of the Act of Free 
Choice in their submissions (Sitokdana 2003; Warinussy 2004). 
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judicial killings (2002), protested the division of Papua and called for “economic 
justice” in the region (2005). Meanwhile, Franciscans International has utilised its 
position by offering the SKP the opportunity to regularly attend the annual session of 
the UNHRC in Geneva. During these sessions the SKP has been able to make oral 
presentations to the delegates (see Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2007, pp. 15-
16; van den Broek 2002). At times this has “triggered a surprisingly strong reaction 
by the Indonesian permanent mission in Geneva” (Office for Justice and Peace 
Jayapura 2004, p. 7). These groups also made submissions with a large group of other 
church based organisations detailing civil and political rights, as well as economic, 
social and cultural rights ('Joint Written Statement Submitted for Item 9: Question of 
the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World' 
2006). 69 
 
Elsewhere, NGOs have targeted governments directly. Following the ban on foreign 
NGOs and journalists enacted in late 2004, the International Federation of Journalists 
and Human Rights Watch directly criticised the Indonesian Government. The 
International Federation of Journalists (2006) was “concerned” about the view of 
Indonesian Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, that a ban on foreign media, 
churches and NGOs was necessary. In his view, their presence in West Papua “might 
create conflict thereby encouraging Papuans to campaign on issues of human rights”. 
He added, “we feel that our unity and cohesion are being threatened by the presence 
of foreign intrusion” (Roth 2006; Tapol 2006b). It also protested that the restrictions 
were a direct violation of the obligations Indonesia had to human rights under Article 
19 of the recently ratified ICCPR.70 Human Rights Watch, in an open letter sent to 
President Yudhoyono in 2006 (Roth 2006), further observed that the moves 
transgressed Principle 19 of the “widely regarded” Johannesburg Principles on 
National Security, Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information. This states 
“[a]ny restriction on the free flow of information may not be of such a nature as to 
                                                
69 Other signatories to this communication were the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 
Dominicans for Justice and Peace, Forum Asia, International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development 
(INFID), Pax Romana, in cooperation with Central Missionary Board Netherlands, Cordaid, ICCO, 
Justitia et Pax Netherlands, Kerkinactie, SKP Jayapura, SKP Merauke and United Evangelical Mission. 
70 Indonesia ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR in May 2006. Article 19 of the ICCPR states, 
“everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”. 
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thwart the purposes of human rights and humanitarian law” and noted, “such a ban 
harkens back to the previous era of autocracy, not the new democracy that [President 
Yudhoyono] leads”. In addition to these, Tapol has lobbied the British and Indonesian 
governments to reform policy and has highlighted the plight of 400 Papuan refugees, 
whom the Papuan New Guinea Government attempted to forcibly repatriate in 2003 
(Tapol 2003a). 
 
Campaigns to Review the Act of Free Choice 
 
Meanwhile, a myriad of NGOs have taken an additional strategy to advocate rights in 
West Papua by arguing for a UN review of the 1969 Act of Free Choice. A series of 
international solidarity meetings organised by West Papua Action, Tapol and the 
Papuan Peoples Foundation, a Netherlands-based NGO, led to the launching of an 
international campaign in March 2002 calling on the UN Secretary General “to review 
the UN’s conduct in relation to the Act of ‘Free’ Choice” in March 2002 (see Doris 
1997; West Papua Action Special: UN Review 2005). Carmel Budiardjo, who was 
amongst those travelling to New York to present a submission to the UN Secretary 
General, summarised the campaign’s argument: 
 
The UN is responsible for a grave betrayal of the West Papuan people's right to 
self-determination. Its failure to ensure a proper referendum has resulted in decades 
of suffering. The UN should re-open the question and rectify one of the worst 
breaches [of] its commitment and duty to uphold the right of peoples to determine 
their own future (UN Review Campaign Launch 2002). 
 
West Papua Action lists 81 international NGOs that support the campaign. The 
diverse nature of this group indicates a review of the Act of Free Choice enjoys 
substantial support amongst international NGOs. 
 
The international campaign for self-determination is seen as a means to progress the 
broader human rights cause, not just the issue of self-determination, and as a means of 
raising the profile of West Papua amongst powerful actors on the international stage. 
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This view is expressed by Maire Leadbeater, who argues that a UN review of the Act 
of Free Choice is 
 
one of the keys to resolving the situation in West Papua… For all of those countries, 
which were complicit in supporting the Act of Free Choice to go back and review 
their actions, and for the UN to review its actions, would be a way perhaps of 
bringing about change (interviewed by the author, April 13th 2007). 
 
Thus pursuing a review of the Act of Free Choice is perceived as not only an end in 
itself, but also a means of resolving the human rights concerns pervading other 
aspects of Papuan society. 
 
Growth in International Concern 
 
Deteriorating conditions in West Papua, and the international lobbying that has 
accompanied them, has roused the consideration of UN officials and members of 
national parliaments. At the UN, officials have shown increasing unease about 
Indonesia’s refusal to allow outside observers into West Papua. Juan Mendez, a 
special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, was 
quoted in 2006 as saying that in his opinion West Papua is one of the “countries of 
concern where indigenous populations are at risk of extinction” (cited in RFK 
Memorial 2006a). Later that year, he linked concern over the denial of international 
access to West Papua with the need for greater involvement by the UN, suggesting 
that it was “important that we [the UN] look closely at the conflict now and make sure 
it’s not getting out of hand” (cited in RFK Memorial 2006a). A more concrete 
implication of the concern harboured at the UN was the granting of refugee status to 
many Papuans living in PNG in 2004. Doing this recognised that people fled 
Indonesia “because of persecution and their safety was not guaranteed” (RFK 
Memorial 2004c). In May 2006, the regional representative for the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) confirmed that “despite repeated requests, the 
UNHCR has not been given permission by the Government in Jakarta to have access 
to West Papua” (cited in Harries 2007). 
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Disquiet from within some government circles has paralleled this concern. By 2005, 
at least 174 parliamentarians from around the world had written to former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan asking for a review of West Papua’s UN status 
(Faleomavaega 2005). A large proportion of these came from Ireland, with 88 
members of its 166-seat lower-house of representatives writing to UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in 2004, criticising the UN’s role in the 1969 Act of Free Choice 
(Humphreys 2004).71 According to West Papua Action, in recent years, Western 
parliamentarians supportive of a UN review of the Act of Free Choice – from Britain, 
Ireland, Finland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the US and the European Union – 
number around 212 (West Papua Action Special: UN Review 2005).72(Senators  call for  UN Special Rep. on Aceh/Papua ) 
 
State Responses to International Campaigning 
 
Despite positive movement from many sectors of the international community, state 
governments have responded with apprehension to questions of human rights abuses 
and Papuan self-determination. They have shown a reluctance to condemn the actions 
of the Indonesian Government, while asserting Indonesia’s territorial integrity and 
emphasising the option of special autonomy. Foreign Minister Winston Peters 
asserted the New Zealand Government’s position: “the best hope for a peaceful 
solution in Papua relies on full implementation of the Special Autonomy package…. 
We are conscious that there continue to be challenges in the implementation of 
autonomy” (quotation given by Leadbeater, interviewed by the author, April 13th 
                                                
71 They claimed the Act of Free Choice “remains a source of unrest in the territory to this day, as 
underscored by ongoing human rights abuses… and the estimated deaths of 100,000 people since the 
take-over” (Humphreys 2004).  
72 Members of the US Senate and Congress also put their political weight behind similar initiatives. 
These included a letter to Kofi Annan, sent on June 28th 2004, by a group of 20 senators expressing 
their desire that he send a special representative to Aceh and Papua to investigate abuses. Among other 
concerns the senators were distressed that “human rights organisations have endured intimidation and 
threats by government security forces operating with impunity [in Papua]” (Senators call for UN 
Special Rep. on Aceh/Papua 2004). Additionally, Russ Feingold, a senator from Wisconsin, addressed 
a letter to President Yudhoyono asking that the ban on access to West Papua be eased. He claimed that 
“any degree of openness and ability to examine what happened there would be helpful” (cited in RFK 
Memorial 2006a). Eni Faleomavaega, American Samoa’s congressional representative, led the 
opposition in Congress. In 2005, he sponsored a bill asking the US government “to review its 
recognition of Papua as part of Indonesia” (Sijabat 2007). He later issued an appeal directly to the 
Indonesian public detailing the human rights environment in West Papua, in which he called for “an 
end to discrimination against Papuans and urged that they be allowed to determine for themselves their 
own destiny” (RFK Memorial 2006c). Ten members of Congress also wrote to Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard in 2006 urging his Government to grant full refugee status to a group of West 
Papuans who had sailed to Australia in early 2006 (RFK Memorial 2006b). 
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2007). According to Maire Leadbeater, this position is characteristic of many 
Governments internationally, including Britain, Australia and the Netherlands. For 
their relatively important positions, regionally and internationally, the positions of the 
Australia and the USA are particularly deserving of attention. 
 
Australia, as a major actor in the region, has shown a commitment to appease the 
Indonesian Government and has carefully enacted policies that would be beneficial to 
relations between the two countries.73 Government reactions to a refugee incident that 
occurred in early 2006 demonstrated this. In January 2006, a group of 43 Papuan 
asylum seekers crossed the Torres Straight in a 24-metre traditional boat to reach 
Cape York at the northern tip of Australia. They claimed that if they returned to West 
Papua “they would be dead within a couple of weeks” (cited in Tapol 2006a). When 
processed, according to one immigration official, the refugees provided accounts of 
“vicious bashings while in prison and attacks on villages and livestock in retaliation 
for the Papuans agitating for independence”, he added, “some of what has come out of 
the interviews has been absolutely heart-wrenching” (cited in RFK Memorial 2006b). 
Faced with the arrival of such people on their shores, the officials were forced to act 
and granted 42 of the asylum seekers temporary protection visas (see Tapol 2006a).74 
This allowed them to stay in Australia for three years, but provoked anger in Jakarta, 
which recalled its ambassador from Canberra over the situation. ('Papuan Celebrates  Decis ion Paving Way for Visa') 
 
Canberra’s reactions to diplomatic pressure from Indonesia were immediate. In 
discussions of events that followed, Australia’s Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
was conciliatory toward Indonesian interests, stressing, “we [in the Australian 
Government] are trying to explain to [the Indonesian Government]… that this has no 
implication for our recognition of Papua as a full part of the Republic of Indonesia” 
(Indonesian Ulemas Hail President's Political Warning 2006). Toward Papuan 
asylum seekers, he portrayed scepticism: 
 
                                                
73 It should be noted that the policy of the Australian Government does not necessarily reflect the 
opinion of its population. A poll by Newspoll released in April 2006 indicated that 75 per cent of 
Australians support Papuan self-determination or independence (Pacific Magazine 2006). 
74 The 43rd asylum seeker, John Wainggai, the son of the late Thomas Wainggai, was also later granted 
a temporary visa when Australia’s Refugee Review Tribunal overturned the government’s ruling 
denying him an entry visa (‘Papuan Celebrates Decision Paving Way for Visa’ 2006).  
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On the one hand we accept and appreciate our obligations to provide people who are 
fleeing from persecution some kind of safe haven... On the other hand, we don't want 
Australia to be exploited ... for political and propaganda purposes where claims are 
made regardless of [their] credibility ... to generate publicity at the expense of the 
Indonesians (Fed: Aust won't be Landing Base for Bogus Papuan Claims: Downer 
2006) 
 
Although it could not revoke the visas already allocated to the Papuan refugees, the 
Australian Government immediately attempted to tighten border security laws. These 
would have seen all boat-arrivals sent to detainment facilities offshore and denied 
access to Australia’s Refugee Review Tribunal (Skehan 2006). However, attempts to 
introduce these new laws were harshly criticised by the UNHCR regional 
representative Neill Wright and were eventually defeated in the Australian Senate 
(Pacific Magazine 2006). It remains to be seen what outlook the recently elected 
Australian Labour Government will take toward West Papua. 
 
Accommodation toward Indonesian concerns in the region has been the stance offered 
by the US Government. This apparent prioritisation of the military relationship with 
Jakarta over other concerns was clarified on 22nd November 2005 when US Secretary 
of State, Condoleezza Rice, exercised a “national security waiver” to “evade 
Congressional restrictions on the provision of assistance to the Indonesian military” 
(RFK Memorial 2005b). This saw the resumption of an International Military and 
Education Training programme with the Indonesians as well as a resumption of 
weapons sales to the country. Varying degrees of restrictions on military assistance 
had been in place since the 1991 massacre of demonstrators in Santa Cruz cemetery in 
East Timor and had been further strengthened following the implication of the 
Indonesian military involvement in the deaths of two American teachers at Timika in 
2002 (RFK Memorial 2004d; Tapol 2007). Only half a year after the exercise of the 
national security waiver, in May 2006, a new Pentagon programme was announced 
which increased US funding of Indonesian military programmes by US$19 million 
(Tapol 2007).   
 
In defending its actions, the Bush administration reaffirmed Indonesia’s approach to 
questions of Papuan separatism while also attempting to reassure its critics over 
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human rights concerns. When presented with criticism from Congressman 
Faleomavaega, who argued that the US should provide backing for the UN to revisit 
the Act of Free Choice, Condoleezza Rice reiterated that the US Government 
considers Papua to be a part of Indonesian territory (Del. Faleomavaega calls 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice's Attention to the Problems in West Papua New 
Guinea 2006; RFK Memorial 2006a). She also stated US officials “tell Indonesia all 
the time [of] the need for sensitivity to and protection of minorities within Indonesia 
and for significant autonomy for those populations”, later adding “the issue is not off 
of our radar screen, even though we may not agree on the same solution [as those who 
support a revisitation of the Act of Free Choice]” (cited in RFK Memorial 2006a).  
 
Despite the refusal of key states in the international system to concede on the issue of 
Papuan self-determination, a few governments have remained staunch supporters of a 
review of the Act of Free Choice. To this end, Nauru and Vanuatu both issued appeals 
to the General Assembly concerning West Papua in 2000. Nauru called on the UN 
General Assembly to support a “new and democratically run referendum on the 
question of independence from Indonesia” (Clodumar 2000).  Vanuatu claimed “the 
truth surrounding the so-called act of free choice must be exposed to the Melanesian 
sisters and brothers of West Papua and to the rest of the international community” 
(Carlot 2000). In 2004, Vanuatu went further, calling for “the establishment of a 
Special Commission of Enquiry to review the UN’s conduct in relation to the 1969 
Act”, for “a fact finding mission to examine the situation in West Papua” and the “re-
inscription of West Papua on the List of Non-Self-Governing Territories” 
(Maautamate 2004).  These calls, however, have not elicited many positive responses 
from other governments and, therefore, remain isolated.  
 
The unresponsiveness of most governments at the UN and, more critically, of 
Indonesian authorities, indicates international advocacy has not succeeded in bringing 
about noticeable or sustained human rights change in West Papua in the past five 
years. Notable support has come from parliamentarians, some UN officials and even 
sympathetic governments in the Pacific. However, the failure of these to gather 
momentum with policymakers leads to questions of why the boomerang effect has not 
succeeded in changing the situation. It also suggests a need to evaluate critically the 
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place of self-determination rights in the international advocacy undertaken by West 
Papua’s human rights movement.  
 
Explanations for the Failure of the Boomerang Effect 
 
Comparably to the effects that NGO campaigning had on the progression of the spiral 
model, participation by NGOs in the campaign to review the Act of Free Choice 
appears to have hindered the true realisation of a boomerang effect on the 
international stage.75 Framing the campaign in a way that emphasises the right to self-
determination has created many obstacles for the effective progression of the 
boomerang effect. These obstacles stem from both the effects of the right on other 
international norms and its intrinsic qualities. The relatively more benign use of 
“basic human rights” may avoid these problems.  
 
Self-determination as a Frame for the “West Papua Campaign”  
 
Without the ability to capitalise on any substantial established norms on self-
determination, leverage amongst international actors has been difficult to produce. 
Frames that invoke entrenched principles of human rights give greater leverage for 
activists to achieve a boomerang effect because international norms have “special 
authority as issue frames and justifications for actions in international society because 
they are established by groups of states, rather than asserted by a single state and 
reducible to its ideology or preferences” (Thomas 2002, p. 72). Arguments against the 
Act of Free Choice have instead frequently referred to the legal requirements 
specified in the 1962 New York Agreement (see Doris 1997; West Papua Action 
Special: UN Review 2005). Although there is little doubt that this has much authority 
in the eyes of state actors, it nevertheless falls short of the universality and 
justificatory power associated with key legislation, such as the ICCPR or the 
ICESCR.  
                                                
75 Once again, as was the case with the spiral model, it should be emphasised that a plurality of factors 
contribute to the continuing human rights environment in West Papua. This assessment of the 
boomerang effect necessarily focuses predominantly on the international campaigns of human rights 
NGOs.  
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Instead of providing a concrete international norm from which to challenge state 
activity, the testing of the traditional international norm of state sovereignty by 
advocacy of Papuan self-determination has created a number of difficulties. Keck and 
Sikkink (1998, p. 203) observe: “States have few incentives to cooperate on these 
issues, and because many of the network campaigns challenge traditional notions of 
state sovereignty, we might expect states to cooperate to block network activities”. In 
the case of West Papua, aside from the evident eagerness of state governments to 
appease the concerns of the Indonesian Government,76 there was also an implicit 
reluctance to confront the norm of state sovereignty. Commenting about the West 
Papuan situation, Alexander Downer illustrated this reluctance and gave reasons for it 
in late 2000. He commented:  
 
This is not a time in history when we should be starting to redraw the colonial 
boundaries… and to redraw those boundaries now would cause enormous instability. 
I believe many, many people would lose their lives in a situation like that (cited in 
von Strokirch 2001, p. 522).  
 
On another occasion he expressed the view that “the fragmentation of Indonesia will 
lead to a bloodbath… and then people will be coming to me and saying what was I 
going to do about it” (cited in Hyland 2000). Downer’s stance on West Papua 
portrayed a distinctly realist position and a belief that normatively a stance of no 
action on self-determination was the most appropriate option due to the violence that 
would proceed from challenging state sovereignty. Disincentives to support NGO 
campaigns on the Act of Free Choice could equally apply to the positions of other 
governments.  
 
The characteristics of this issue create additional problems for promoting a review of 
the Act of Free Choice. This explains further the lack of movement from state 
governments at the international level. “Issue characteristics”, Keck and Sikkink 
(1998, p. 27) explain, can be pivotal for the promotion of international campaigns. 
Frames that utilise two types of issues will be the most efficacious: “issues involving 
bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear 
                                                
76 Indonesia’s population size, at approximately 235 million people and as the fourth largest in the 
world  (Central Intelligence Agency 2007), enhances power regionally and globally to influence the 
policy of governments 
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causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and… issues involving legal equality 
of opportunity”. Campaigns emphasising violations of natural rights in West Papua 
have regularly referred to each of these issues.77 Comparatively, framing international 
campaigns in terms of the Papuan people’s right to self-determination utilizes claims 
about the legal equality of opportunity on an international level, yet it only indirectly 
relates to the bodily harm incurred by many Papuans since the Act. The implication 
that follows from this is that by its nature as a human rights issue, the claim of 
self-determination is likely to be less emotive than other claims and less effective as a 
result.  
 
One may also infer in the West Papuan case that the “causal chain” of culpability for 
violations of self-determination rights has become increasing long as time elapses 
since the 1969 Act of Free Choice.78 Due to this effect, there is even greater difficulty 
in attributing direct blame to any single party present in current world politics, as well 
as the difficulty in gathering momentum to review an event that occurred many 
decades previous. In applying Keck and Sikkink’s model, this phenomenon has 
created a further barrier to building momentum for the campaign to review the Act of 
Free Choice. 
 
Problematic Implications of the Campaign 
 
Promoting an agenda for the revision of the Act of Free Choice has the added 
consequence of undermining the position of domestic advocates in West Papua. 
Because in particularly desperate situations, according to the Boomerang theory, local 
NGOs require international assistance to further the human rights cause (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998, pp. 12-13), invocation of the right to self-determination by one sector 
of the human rights network affiliates other members with the cause. Extra-national 
connections bring suspicions that NGOs are supportive of secession or progressing a 
                                                
77 Reports of murder, rape and threats to community subsistence are common (Human Rights Watch 
2007a). There are also many studies that compare the harsh sentencing given to political activists (up 
15 years) with the lenient sentences handed down to security forces found guilty of murder or rape (as 
little two years) (Human Rights Watch 2007b, p. 3;  Tapol 2003b). 
78 Causal chains are considered more powerful when responsibility for a particularly action is readily 
attributable to a person or group and not blurred by, for instance, a military chain of command (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998, pp. 27-28). 
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Western political agenda (Fisher 1997, p.454). Domestic human rights NGOs are in 
danger of being associated with the advocacy of especially controversial views that 
are not of their core agenda. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Indonesian elite are aware of the position of foreign NGOs and 
accordingly harbour very negative views of international NGOs. In 2003, security 
officials were heard claiming foreign human rights NGOs, particularly from Australia, 
were actively supporting Papuan separatism (McGibbon 2004, p. 57). One military 
spokesperson expressed the negative perception some authorities have toward foreign 
“meddlers”:    
 
A number of foreigners are suspected of being involved in stirring up the situation 
[with secessionists]. We have seen a lot of foreigners creating the preconditions [for 
secession] in Papua disguising themselves as journalists and NGO activists…. [F]or 
Papua there are countries that are secretly providing support to separatists there. This 
is dangerous and must be prevented from early on (quoted in McGibbon 2004, p. 57).  
 
The threat of being implicated in such separatism poses a very real danger for local 
human rights NGOs. Several NGOs, particularly those holding a moderate view of 
self-determination, have argued for prudence in the situation. Initially, ELSHAM led 
this call at the local level. Just before President Sukarnoputri took office in 2001, they 
urged political activists to be “astute and careful in making decisions that can 
endanger Papuan lives” and also suggested the Papuan people should “avoid any 
provocation” of the situation (ELSHAM 2001a). More recently, some local religious 
leaders have noted the danger posed from international activism. GKI synod chairman 
Herman Saud and the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura, Leo Ladjar, to whom the SKP is 
accountable, have advised the Papuan people to act with some restraint with regard to 
calls for independence (ANTARA 2005). At the international level, a coalition of 
NGOs, some of which are affiliated with the GKI and the SKP, have presented an 
alternative set of petitions to the call for a review of the Act of Free Choice at the UN. 
These NGOs have called on the UN to support Indonesia’s efforts in implementing 
the Special Autonomy Law, to help Indonesia to combat “human rights violations, 
impunity and rampant corruption” and to urge the Indonesian government to ratify 
134 
 
key international human rights covenants (Faith-Based Network on West Papua 2005, 
p. 4). 
 
Practical Solutions for West Papua: Recognising Sovereignty in Advocacy  
 
The experiences of the Papuan people and the advocates who take up their human 
rights cause give sharper definition to the ways that the ideas of sovereignty and 
human rights advocacy come into conflict in modern international relations. 
Resoundingly, events show that Indonesia’s sovereignty in West Papua, whatever the 
state of its legitimacy, is a political reality that is not easily overturned – neither by 
the means of internal struggle nor through lobbying the international community. 
From the realities seen in the application of the spiral and boomerang models, two 
critical needs are evident. First, the intractability of government and military 
repression points toward a need to find a means of de-escalating the situation with the 
Government of Indonesia. Second, internationally, new spaces for debates and 
dialogue concerning human rights in West Papua must be cultivated, especially within 
governments. Achieving these goals requires a reframing of human rights rhetoric in a 
way that will contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict in West Papua through 
counteracting threats to the national interests of Indonesia and other countries. 
 
Domestic NGOs and civil society actors could contribute to a de-escalation of the 
situation by taking steps that lessen the level of threat the Indonesian Government 
perceives. As this threat primarily comes from challenges to Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity (Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, p. 25), ceasing calls for Papuan secession, or calls 
that can be interpreted as supportive of this, may allay Indonesian fears. To echo the 
observation made by Jim Elmslie (2002, p. 144), “it [is] one thing to call for an 
investigation into those people being tortured to death; and quite another to call for an 
independent West Papua”. Indeed, after crackdowns began on many NGO activities 
following the Second Papuan Congress, this has been a position taken by a number of 
human rights NGOs within West Papua.79 Such NGOs have framed the domestic 
                                                
79 However, other actors, such as prominent members of the PDP remain vocal in their calls for a 
review of West Papua’s status within Indonesia.  
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human rights campaign primarily in terms of the rights to physical security, 
subsistence as well as civil and political liberties to avoid provocation of the situation. 
 
A more conciliatory approach is also needed at the international level. This need is 
perhaps more explicit than at the domestic level because, unlike domestic calls for 
Papuan self-determination, the international campaign for a review of the Act of Free 
Choice has gained a large amount of support from human rights NGOs (see West 
Papua Action Special: UN Review 2005). Dissociating human rights NGOs from this 
campaign may foster greater international political space and lessen enmity with the 
Indonesian Government. As at the domestic level, efforts to reframe international 
campaign over West Papua could better distinguish between non-political and 
political rights to reduce negative political consequences. The mechanisms by which 
this could occur reflect the suggestions of “realistic liberalism”.  
 
Many have already begun to employ an approach explicitly rejecting violence and 
advocating dialogue as an alternative to more divisive methods of human rights 
campaigning at the domestic level. This has been a way that many Papuan leaders and 
NGOs have responded to efforts to counter their role in West Papua. Initially, a push 
for greater dialogue grew out of the establishment of the Indonesian democracy, but it 
has remained entrenched in the language of many Papuan NGOs throughout recent 
years (Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 40; Faith-Based Network on West Papua 2005; 
Catherine Scott & Tebay 2005; Tebay 2006). The recognition of this need culminated 
in several NGOs and civil societal groups convening a conference, “Papua: Land of 
Peace”, at Jayapura in October 2002, where all forms of violence in West Papua were 
denounced.80 The Indonesian Government was called upon to reduce its military 
                                                
80The Papua: Land of Peace initiative had its origins in mid-1999, when the cause of reconciliation was 
taken up by students in the Yapen Waropen regency of West Papua (see Bonay & McGrory 2004, p. 
451; Tebay 2006, p.35). Later that year, Papuan and non-Papuan ethnic community leaders from the 
area came together to discuss, draft and sign a peace communiqué. With the initiative gathering 
momentum amongst civil society leaders, soon afterward, Marthen Tanawane, the tribal leader in Serui, 
declared the Yapen Waropen district a “zone of peace” (Tebay 2006, p. 35). The zone of peace 
initiative was extended to include all of West Papua when the newly established Peace Task Force, 
along with many others, organised a conference on peace on October 15th and 16th, 2002 (Hernawan 
2003, p. 4).  
 
The “Zone of Peace” Conference achieved a major success in gaining widespread support for a pacific 
solution to the conflict in West Papua from community leaders, including the PDP (Tebay 2006, p. 35). 
Also present and supportive of the idea were members of local government and police representatives. 
Only the Indonesian Military declined an invitation to participate in the initiative (Summary of 
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presence in the region. Meanwhile, international support has helped to propel the 
campaign by attempting to open up political space for the campaign in international 
settings. (Summary of ELSH AM Repor t into the Augus t, 2002 Timika Shoot ings ) 
 
These observations indicate how the human rights campaign has been framed at both 
the domestic and international levels has had a major impact on how the human rights 
agenda has been received by government. Negative reactions stemming from, or at 
least exacerbated by, insufficient consideration of realist principles in campaign 
frames, especially those concerning state sovereignty, indicates the need for greater 
levels of realism within NGO approaches to the advocacy that can be considered to be 
broadly liberal.     
  
Conclusion 
 
Applying socialisation to human rights campaigning in West Papua demonstrates the 
need for greater attention to realist political principles in NGO work. The two models 
used focused on two distinct, yet related, spheres of human rights campaigning. 
Domestic campaigning was examined through the spiral model and international 
campaigning was examined through the boomerang model. Although the two models 
confirmed a diversity of strategies amongst NGOs in both spheres, as seen in chapter 
five, results for each revealed the need for greater attention to the principles of 
sovereignty and national interests in human rights campaigning.  
                                                                                                                                       
ELSHAM Report into the August, 2002 Timika Shootings 2002). However, the widespread support 
from the Papuan side was a great step forward in the promotion of dialogue.  
 
Substantial proposals were set forth by the conference when it defined how West Papua could be 
classified as a “Land of Peace”. Hernawan (2003, p. 4) summarised these proposals explaining, 
 
This [Land of Peace] conference defined the zone of peace in three component(s) (1) a 
situation whereby the Land of Papua and its people feel free from physical and psychological 
conflicts, (2) all policies have to adopt [sic] to the social and cultural conditions in Papua, and 
(3) it has to be formulated in a law. Moreover, the conference proposed the establishment of a 
Peace Commission which would be responsible for promoting peace in the province.     
 
These proposals show the psychological, cultural and structural considerations that must accompany 
the Papuan-Indonesian dialogue. Such considerations also correspond with the “key elements” offered 
by van den Broek (2000) over the need for reconciliation and its inherent relationship with human 
rights. Advocates of this approach to dialogue hope that it can offer a tangible beginning for a dialogue 
to promote reconciliation and peace building, in the words of van den Broek (2000) “to restore respect 
for HUMAN DIGNITY, as expressed in Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration” (Emphasis in the 
original).  
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Events in West Papua also indicated how NGOs may achieve this. The analysis 
corroborated many of the suggestions in theoretical literature. Apprehension in 
approaching the question of self-determination rights on the part of governments 
reinforced the desirability of an approach that maintains a distinction between rights 
that are more political in nature and rights that are less so. Advocating politically 
sensitive rights in either the domestic or the international sphere may exacerbate the 
human rights situation and give disincentives to governments to address human rights 
issues. Associated with these findings, in both domestic and international political 
spheres, governments more readily endorse rights that were more basic, such as the 
rights to physical security and subsistence.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
This research sought to critically explore the influence that human rights promotion 
has on the adherence to principles of human rights. Fundamental to the approach 
taken was the proposition that any power NGOs may possess to influence political 
decision-making could have both positive and negative consequences (Fisher 1997). 
This compromise has been an approach largely absent in the current literature on 
human rights advocacy and socialisation, which has tended to focus on the positive 
potential and contributions of NGOs in the modern international human rights regime 
(see, for example, Clark, Friedman & Hochstetler 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 
2002b; Thakur 1997; van Tuijl 1999). Therefore, to examine more closely the 
consequences of NGO activity in the area of human rights, NGO efforts to promote 
human rights in the Indonesian province of West Papua were evaluated.      
 
Summary of Research Undertaken 
 
At the outset of this thesis, a discussion of theoretical perspectives sought to explain 
the influence of human rights in international relations. Core to this discussion was 
the specific focus on realism and liberalism. This gave a more precise understanding 
of the most prominent influences and constraints encountered in the promotion of 
human rights. Approaching the enquiry from this angle also revealed the common 
ground between two distinct schools of political thought. Finding commonalities and 
complementarities between the two traditions proved particularly informative to the 
conceptualisation of practical human rights principles. From these commonalities, it 
was suggested that human rights principles could be categorised along political and 
normative dimensions. This categorisation hypothesised that those principles that 
were less politically sensitive and more normatively basic – for example, the rights to 
subsistence and physical security (see Shue 1996) – would be more conducive to 
human rights advocacy than those that were more politically sensitive and less basic – 
the right to self-determination was given as an example of this.  
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Growing out of the discussion offered in chapter two, which in part clarified the 
possible place of human rights principles in the international landscape, chapter three 
described the concrete mechanisms by which these possibilities could be achieved. To 
this end, it explored the processes and strategies through which human rights NGOs 
attempt to influence political decision-making to bring about change. These 
discussions showed that processes of socialisation are central to the role of NGOs in 
the promotion of human rights (see Keck & Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 
2002a; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). Two models of socialisation – the spiral and 
boomerang models – were introduced to explain these processes (see Keck & Sikkink 
1998; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999). Together these formed the basis for the analysis 
of NGO influence in West Papua later in the work. Significantly, some believe NGOs 
are able to directly contribute to the monitoring and enforcement of norms through 
these processes (see Donnelly 1986, p. 610; Riker 2002, p. 189; Thakur 1997). 
Enhancing the discussion and subsequent analysis of NGO practices, NGO framing 
strategies were also introduced in this chapter. In doing so, deeper insight was given 
into how NGOs and other advocates attempt to improve the impact of lobbying for 
specific audiences and, accordingly, progress human rights socialisation (see Joachim 
2003; Keck & Sikkink 1998, pp. 2-3; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002a, pp. 12-13).  
 
In order to adequately apply these models of NGO influence to the case of West 
Papua, a picture was built of West Papua’s political context and the NGOs that have 
been active in the region. This was the purpose of chapters four and five. A brief 
historical outline of the political conditions showed the challenges facing political 
activists in the province. The historical grievances left from the Indonesian takeover 
of West Papua during the 1960s, as well as a host of policies that followed, served to 
harden the resolve of many Papuans to seek independence (see Kivimäki 2006, pp. 
43-52). Exacerbating these tensions, the presence of armed groups in the region, 
including the Indonesian military, armed Papuan separatists and several militia 
groups, have further endangered human rights conditions (see International Crisis 
Group 2002, pp. 9-11; Tebay 2006, pp. 19-20). However, NGOs have also been a 
notable component of this situation and have brought another dimension to political 
events. 
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Important distinctions in NGO outlooks were outlined in chapter five. It showed that 
when confronted with such an adverse political environment, NGOs, both internally 
and externally, have held a variety of positions concerning how to best encourage 
greater adherence to human rights principles. The investigation into these focused on 
the most prominent policy debate in the region – over the issue of Papuan self-
determination. Two distinct positions regarding self-determination were identifiable 
amongst NGOs. Several championed the position that human rights were only 
achievable in West Papua by granting it full independence from Indonesia (see Tom 
Beanal in an interview transcribed in Wing & King 2005, pp. 46-47; Yoman 2006). 
As a consequence, these individuals and groups usually viewed efforts to grant special 
autonomy to West Papua with distinct cynicism (see Yoman 2006, pp. 4-5). 
Alternatively, others took a position that did not hold self-determination as a synonym 
for independence (see Office for Justice and Peace Jayapura 2001b). Rather, these 
groups pushed for the fuller implementation of special autonomy and called for 
dialogue between Jakarta and the Papuan people on issues of self-determination and 
human rights (see McGibbon 2004; RFK Memorial 2004a, p. 61; Rumbiak & Walton 
2004).  
 
Chapter six revealed how these two outlooks were key to directing the broader policy 
direction of NGOs and examined NGO contributions to the adherence to human rights 
in West Papua through the application of the spiral and boomerang models. 
Significantly, the application of these models pointed to a number of reasons for the 
failure of human rights promotion in the region. Notwithstanding the clear culpability 
of governmental and military authorities for a regression to more dismal human rights 
conditions, the pairing of human rights concerns with nationalist aspirations severely 
undermined dialogue that had potential to alleviate the situation (see Chauvel & 
Bhakti 2004; Human Rights Watch 2000b). Although many human rights NGOs 
distanced themselves from the secessionist position, others offered it at least tacit 
support as momentum to pair human rights concerns with independence aspirations 
increased through the Team of 100 and the Second Papuan Congress (Chauvel & 
Bhakti 2004, pp. 28-29; Human Rights Watch 2000b). Failure in the nationalist 
approach to human rights was most clearly seen in West Papua when nationalist 
challenges helped to undercut the political position of the President Abdurrahman 
141 
 
Wahid in his pursuit for human rights dialogue with the Papuan people (see Chauvel 
& Bhakti 2004, p. 29). 
 
At the international level, the relationship between human rights campaigning and 
government responses was less clear. While a greater turn toward international 
avenues of campaigning became apparent after the rise of President Sukarnoputri in 
2001, indicating the occurrence of a boomerang effect, reasons for the subsequent 
failure of NGOs to gather significant momentum amongst governments cannot be 
easily demonstrated. Despite this, comments from many governments showing a 
reluctance to acknowledge challenges to Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua 
suggest that a campaign among a broad cross-section of international NGOs for the 
UN to review the 1969 Act of Free Choice may have been obstructive to the 
international human rights campaign (see, for example,  Indonesian Ulemas Hail 
President's Political Warning 2006; RFK Memorial 2006a). This further indicates 
that framing human rights campaigns in a way that does not invoke questions of self-
determination may be far more conducive to convincing foreign governments to 
pressure Indonesia on their human rights record in the province.    
 
At both the domestic and international levels, failed attempts to overturn the “reality” 
of Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua have been driven by NGOs that link the 
achievement of improvements in the human rights situation with the attainment of 
Papuan self-determination in the form of independence. Instead of bringing about 
positive change, these attempts have been distinctly negative at times and have 
contributed to a climate of antagonism with the Indonesian Government. They have 
been used as a justification for a level of repression reminiscent of the time of 
Suharto’s rule as well as severe restrictions to international access to West Papua. An 
obvious practical warning to human rights NGOs advocating self-determination rights 
is that this advocacy should be used carefully. The findings further suggest that using 
alternative frames for human rights advocacy, primarily those based on physical 
security and subsistence, may be a much more fruitful strategy for the promotion of 
human rights.  
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Theoretical Implications 
 
Expanding the relevance of the observations offered for the advocacy of human rights 
in West Papua to other regions in the world requires a return to the theoretical models 
and debates underlying the research. In this return, the concept of framing remains 
pivotal to the wider theoretical implications of the research. Within the two models 
discussed, variations can be seen in their approaches to the topic of framing. Each 
show deficiency in their account of framing that diminishes their descriptive and 
prescriptive powers. In order to address these deficiencies, observations of events in 
West Papua are drawn upon to suggest a better way of accounting for framing. Due to 
the differences between the models, each are again approached separately. Together 
these suggest a need to adopt sharper distinctions between human rights principles 
that make up campaign frames. 
 
Framing in the Spiral Model: The Need for Political Distinctions  
 
The spiral model’s approach to human rights socialisation parsimoniously treats 
“human rights” as a single set of principles, without acknowledging the wide diversity 
of principles that exist within that schema. Consequently, as a strategy of influence in 
the socialisation process, framing is given little attention. As seen in the West Papuan 
case, this diminishes the ability of the model to give effective prescriptions to human 
rights advocates.  
 
At the same time, however, Risse and Sikkink’s discussion of the model emphasises 
processes of instrumental rationality and moral argumentation as mechanisms through 
which governments interact with the advocacy networks (Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp. 
12-14). These two processes correspond with the realist (instrumental rationality) and 
the normative (moral argumentation) dimensions of human rights advocacy and 
suggest where ideas of framing might be more clearly defined. While there are both 
normative and political dimensions present, the results of the case study, which most 
clearly indicates the problems of advocating political rights at the expense of non-
political rights, lend themselves to a discussion of these in terms of their political 
nature.  
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In earlier chapters, it was suggested that there is need for distinction between the 
belief in certain human rights norms and the way that they are pursued in practice. 
The liberalism of an NGO approach commonly espouses the innate nature of human 
rights (see Donnelly 1989; Shue 1996). Almost paradoxically, many liberal thinkers 
also recognise that the practical realities of the political world must be given thorough 
consideration (see, for example, Kant 1970, p. 96; Mill 1861, p. 54). It therefore holds 
that, in the practical pursuit of rights, those rights that are perhaps more fundamental 
and less controversial in nature should be emphasised over others. This division 
between rights that are more political and those that are less is more fruitful than other 
categorisations because it accounts for the differentiation between the belief in and the 
pursuit of rights. By framing human rights campaigns to account for this distinction, 
socialisation of one set of rights may be less bound by the ideas associated with 
another, thus making socialisation easier. It also implies that the advocacy of highly 
politicised rights – especially extreme conceptions of self-determination rights – 
should be done carefully.  
 
Maladaptive framing seen during the Second Papuan Congress confirms the need to 
divide political and non-political rights in advocacy and shows the value of such a 
distinction in the spiral model. The problem of a uniform conception of human rights, 
as presented in the spiral model, was seen in the negative experiences in West Papua. 
Many problems in this case arose through the bundling of political rights with non-
political rights and were most clearly seen around the time of the Second Papuan 
Congress in 2000. Distinguishing between rights that are non-political (rights to 
physical security and subsistence) and political (rights to civil and political liberties 
and self-determination) within the model would therefore help to overcome the 
political difficulties encountered in human rights socialisation.  
 
Mechanisms of instrumental and argumentative adaptation further clarify the place of 
framing in the spiral model. Instrumental adaption, which occurs early in the model 
and is the process of strategically arguing in favour of human rights to obtain political 
advantages (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 12), is more conducive to conciliatory actions 
over human rights that are less threatening than political rights. In such circumstances, 
Risse and Sikkink (1999, p. 12) argue, governments show activities “compatible with 
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rational choice arguments about human beings as expected utility maximizers”. The 
presence of a utility maximising principle implies that the pursuit of rights that are 
less damaging to the political positions of transgressing governments – rights that are 
less politically sensitive – would lend themselves to advocacy in the earlier phases of 
the spiral.  
 
Argumentative discourses, which more regularly occur in the later phases of the 
model, emphasise a true discussion over the normative value of the arguments and are 
characterised by moral consciousness-raising, argumentation and persuasion (see 
Risse 1999, p. 533; Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 13). Unlike instrumental adaptation, 
argumentative discourses seek to assess the fundamental nature of human rights 
claims and so could lend themselves to the advocacy of a wider range of rights, 
including, perhaps, political rights. Similarly, because argumentative discourses focus 
on finding the moral and rational truth within the human rights debate, they are more 
normative in nature (Risse 1999, p. 535).  
 
Importantly, therefore, framing conforms to and expands upon what is already 
contained in the spiral model. The clear theoretical implication of the case study is 
that, at the earlier phases of the spiral, non-political rights frames should be 
emphasised. Later, there may be greater potential for more political frames as the 
norm violating government reaches the tactical concessions and prescriptive status 
phases of the spiral and increasingly uses argumentative rationality (see Risse & 
Sikkink 1999, p. 32). At this time a wider range of rights may begin to attain political 
traction; the change of mechanisms of socialisation through the spiral may influence 
the resonance that different frames have with influential actors (see Joachim 2003, p. 
251). Thus, the spiral model may be easily expanded to include the notion of framing. 
Instead of presenting a largely uniform conception of human rights, this clarifies the 
place of frames within the spiral model and creates a more diverse conception of 
human rights that, in turn, significantly improves the prescriptive value of the theory 
for the actors that promote the processes of socialisation. 
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The Boomerang Model and the Normative Value of Frames 
 
A second theoretical implication underlined in the results of the case study is the 
existence of a normative hierarchy of human rights. As is suggested in the boomerang 
model, the effectiveness of frames in human rights campaigns is not only determined 
by the degree to which they are political in nature but is also dependent on their 
inherent normative value. This suggestion is seen in Keck and Sikkink’s assertion that 
physical security rights are more amenable to human rights campaigning than are 
other rights: “torture and disappearance have been more tractable than some other 
human rights issues” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, p. 26). Statements made by governments 
concerning West Papua seem to confirm the place of physical security rights in the 
boomerang model.  
 
Rhetoric defending of the rights of the Papuan people against terror committed by the 
authorities has often accompanied the apathy many governments have displayed 
toward challenges to Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua. This point was 
illustrated by the reactions of the Australian and the US governments that followed 
reports of large human rights violations in and around Wasior in 2001.81 Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said in response to events that “Australia and the 
international community would be outraged if there were to be a reversion to the type 
of human rights violations in Irian Jaya which took place in East Timor in the past” 
(International Crisis Group 2001, p. 16). The US also distanced itself from the 
violence by declaring that its support for the territorial integrity of Indonesia “did not 
mean support for harsh military crackdowns in places like Aceh or Irian Jaya” 
(International Crisis Group 2001, p. 16). Utterances warning Indonesia of the 
unacceptability of abuses indicates sympathy towards concerns about physical 
security (see RFK Memorial 2006a). This contrasts with the aversion most 
governments have toward the mention of self-determination rights as seen in the 
reluctance of the international community to act on calls to review the Act of Free 
Choice.   
                                                
81 According to the International Crisis Group (2002, pp. 16-17), at least 27 people were killed between 
March and June 2001 when violence broke out around the site of logging operations in Wasior (nine of 
these were paramilitary police (Brimob) personnel or workers in the logging industry, and eighteen 
were Papuans). In addition to these deaths, 26 other Papuans went missing and 150 were arrested 
(International Crisis Group 2002, pp. 16-17, see also Amnesty International, 2002a; Tapol 2001b).      
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While the place of physical security rights in the boomerang model was confirmed by 
the West Papuan experience, the potential place of frames based on subsistence rights 
remains somewhat inconclusive. Keck and Sikkink are largely silent on this issue. 
Their discussion of NGO framing is limited because the boomerang model itself does 
not primarily model the processes of human rights socialisation. While it does, in part, 
seek to explain the socialisation of human rights, the theory is also designed for 
environmental campaigns and the international network on violence against women 
(Keck & Sikkink 1998). As this limits the specific attention given to human rights, 
issues of subsistence are not afforded the attention that may be expected from the 
fundamental place that is widely accredited to them within the human rights field 
(Baehr & Castermans-Holleman 2004, p. 9; Matthews & Pratt 1985, p. 160; Shue 
1996, p. 23).  
 
In the West Papuan case, foreign governments have been less forthright in 
commenting on the fulfilment of subsistence rights. Despite continuing NGO 
lobbying, little substantive movement was made on the issue of Papuan subsistence 
needs between 2001 and 2006, beyond support for the concessions made through the 
Special Autonomy Law in 2001 (M Munn 2008, person. comm., 14th January). The 
relative silence of governments on the issue presents a challenge to the suggestion that 
subsistence rights could be exploited as a human rights frame as effectively as could 
physical security rights.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that action has been completely 
absent in the area of Papuan subsistence rights. Poor living conditions have generated 
attention from the World Bank, which raised many concerns over subsistence issues 
in a 2005 report on West Papua. It found that,  
 
[F]orty percent of Papuans still live below the poverty line, more than double the 
national average. One third of Papua’s children do not go to school. Nine out of ten 
villages do not have basic health services with a health centre, doctor or midwife 
(World Bank 2005, p. 1).  
 
These findings were highlighted by the RFK Memorial (2005b) and Tapol (2005e). 
More recently, such attention has propelled some movement from governments in the 
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area of development aid. In 2007, for example, the New Zealand Government 
announced a NZ$1.5 million aid package for development in the region (see Australia 
West Papua Association Sydney 2007).   
 
Due to the limited scope of the study undertaken here, it is difficult to ascertain any 
link between NGO lobbying on the issue of subsistence rights and the actions of 
governments or intergovernmental organisations. Whether subsistence rights are an 
effective frame for human rights promotion within the framework of the boomerang 
model remains a largely unanswered question. However, some implications 
concerning the place of subsistence rights in the boomerang model can be 
hypothesised from the Papuan experience. One such implication is that subsistence 
needs represent an issue of lobbying that can be largely apolitical – the technical 
economic approach of World Bank reporting shows that this is an option in advocacy. 
By generating more international investment and attention to afflicted regions, 
lobbying on issues of subsistence has the potential to influence the pressure that 
governments place on local authorities to properly implement development 
guidelines. In this way, pressure “from above” could connect with other human rights 
concerns. 
 
Clarifying the theoretical implications of the case study leads to a new understanding 
of the relevance of human rights frames in their political and normative dimensions. 
Through accentuating the presence of these dimensions in the models, the descriptive 
and prescriptive relevance of the models has also been furthered. By expanding on 
these findings, a further set of implications for the wider human rights discourse in 
international relations needs consideration. These relate to the scope and limitations of 
human rights principles within the realist and liberal theoretical traditions.   
 
Human Rights Advocacy and the Hierarchy of Rights 
 
Findings relevant to the socialisation models lead us toward more basic questions 
surrounding theoretical debates over the place of human rights principles in modern 
international relations. It is the essentialness of the political and normative dimensions 
of framing, as seen in West Papua, which highlights the existence of a practical 
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hierarchy of human rights in the politics of advocacy. As is reflective of the 
theoretical implications made for socialisation models, findings for the practical 
hierarchy of rights largely implicate the need to account for realist concerns in 
international politics, while still allowing room for the normative value of human 
rights frames. 
 
It was argued at the outset of this research that a form of realistic liberalism might be 
the most effective means of pursuing the adherence to human rights principles in 
modern international relations. The case study that followed showed what direction 
“realistic liberalism” may take for human rights advocacy. Although, when taken at 
face value, the experiences in West Papua appear to favour a realist interpretation of 
international relations, both the realist and the liberal traditions substantially share 
prescriptions about the form human rights frames should take in international 
advocacy. Through attending to these commonalities, as seen in the West Papuan 
case, a form of realistic liberalism can be seen which is based upon a hierarchy of 
rights outlined in chapter two. 
 
When speaking of the two dimensions of human rights framing discussed above, the 
realist and liberal perspectives diverge in the credence they give to either dimension. 
This divergence informs each tradition’s approach to human rights frames. The realist 
tradition perceives human rights principles as being subservient to pressures of power 
politics (see Morgenthau 1979, pp. 6-7). When approaching advocacy frames, this 
perception can be presented in terms of the limits associated with the political 
dimension of each frame. That is to say, realism will paint the power of human rights 
frames in a negative fashion, in terms of their political limitations. Each would be 
ranked in terms of these limitations. Liberalism, on the other hand, pronounces the 
importance of the normative dimensions of international politics, which could include 
human rights principles (see Mapel & Nardin 1992, p. 309). With this in mind, a 
liberal approach to human rights frames could be identified by a positive emphasis on 
the inherent normative value of each frame.   
 
Experiences in West Papua give varying support to these positions. Processes of 
human rights advocacy and the subsequent failure of the advocacy of self-
determination rights undoubtedly confirm the importance of a realist position but, at 
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the same time, is in conformity with the arguments espoused by liberal theorists. 
Realists would view the use of self-determination as an advocacy frame as highly 
ineffective because it is likely to be contrary to questions of power and national 
interests. Meanwhile, for liberals, self-determination has less normative value because 
it is not a basic right and is less important as a consequence (see Shue 1996). Hence, 
the reduced normative value of the right to self-determination suggests that it would 
also be the least likely to succeed in human rights promotion. For this reason, the 
move toward the advocacy of the right to self-determination in West Papua could be 
viewed as highly damaging, even from a liberal point of view. Indeed, what is 
important to recognise in the case study, is that the use of self-determination as a 
human rights campaign frame runs contrary to the prescriptions of both the realist and 
liberal traditions. As a consequence, while the failure of human rights advocacy in 
West Papua confirms the value of a sceptical realist outlook, the positive liberal 
notion that human rights principles can influence the world of political 
decision-making cannot be dismissed by the findings of the case study.  
 
The compatibility and common ground between liberalism and realism is thus 
reaffirmed by events, and was most apparent through the actions of Papuan activists. 
Opportunities afforded to human rights advocates in West Papua – such as the 1999 
meeting between the “Team of 100” Papuan civil society representatives and the 
political positive initiatives of President Abdurrahman Wahid which culminated in the 
Second Papuan Congress – showed the potential for positive dialogue between human 
rights advocates and Jakarta. The opportunities were likely to be influenced by the 
motivations of some Indonesian authorities to resolve normative concerns over human 
rights issues (see Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, pp. 26-27; Human Rights Watch 2000b). 
This outlook of the Indonesian authorities apparently confirmed a degree of 
confidence in the value of the normative principles – only the human rights principles 
considered by Indonesia excluded extreme conceptions of the right to self-
determination. In this way, Presidents Habibie and Wahid affirmed a liberal position 
(see Chauvel & Bhakti 2004, pp. 26-27; Human Rights Watch 2000b). However, 
these opportunities were lost when activists moved away from this shared liberal 
worldview. In a sense then, it was the rejection of this shared liberalism on the part of 
Papuan activists that partially ushered in a decline in human rights conditions. When a 
shared view of liberalism was rejected in favour of the advocacy of self-
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determination, the warnings associated with realism came to the fore. Indonesian 
power was previously reasserted when the liberalism of activists moved away from 
basic human rights and moved towards a non-basic political right – the right to self-
determination.  
 
This illustration of the compatibility between the realist and liberal outlooks toward 
human rights advocacy brings together the two dimensions of the hierarchy of rights 
discussed in chapter two. In this way, evidence is given supporting a hierarchy of 
human rights principles that could be used for the purposes of human rights 
promotion. As suggested in earlier chapters, this hierarchy ranges between two 
extremes of an advocacy spectrum. At one extreme, those rights that are most basic 
and least political (physical security and subsistence rights) are the most amenable to 
human rights advocacy. NGOs should most frequently use these as human rights 
frames in situations of oppression. At the other extreme of the spectrum, rights that 
are not basic and are more political should be least used as human rights frames in 
NGO advocacy. In between these two extremes sit the rights to civil and political 
liberties. These are both basic and political. As such, they should be used in framing 
only very carefully – though perhaps more frequently than self-determination rights. 
Using this hierarchy as a principle for human rights promotion acts as a guide for how 
realistic liberalism may be practically achieved in human rights activism.  
 
Areas of Future Research 
 
While this research critically assessed two models of socialisation and, in doing so, 
sought to ascertain the benefits and drawbacks of NGO strategies, its limited scope 
gives rise to areas where related research could be undertaken. One issue that is in 
need of further attention, especially within the context of socialisation models, is the 
practical ramifications that the place of civil and political liberties has on the 
hierarchy of rights. Because the case undertaken here focused on the issue of self-
determination rights, which was the most easily assessable issue of human rights 
promotion in West Papua, little scope remained for an in depth evaluation of the place 
of political and civil liberties. Finding and studying other case studies where threats to 
the rights to civil and political liberties are not associated with aspirations toward 
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independence would help to assess practical place. This may help to clarify the 
complex place of the rights to civil and political liberties within the hierarchy 
proposed here. 
 
Another area for potential research is suggested by the commentary given above on 
the areas where models of socialisation could be improved. This is especially true of 
the insufficient attention given to subsistence rights in the boomerang model. While 
this research assessed the advocacy of basic rights against the advocacy of non-basic 
political rights, its limited scope did not allow for a detailed examination of the role of 
subsistence rights in the socialisation models. As the boomerang model gives a brief 
description of the importance that the framing of physical security rights can have in 
the boomerang effect, there seems to be scope also for research into the place of 
subsistence rights in the model. 
 
Finally, widening the enquiries made into the role of NGOs in West Papua to other 
parts of the world will enhance the relevance of its findings and may provide more 
specific and accurate recommendations for human rights advocates. Clearly, the use 
of a single case study limits the insight that may be drawn from the research. Equally 
however, the findings of the case study indicate that there is a need for further critical 
research into the specific influence of NGOs on human rights socialisation. 
Replicating and extending this research to study the ramifications that failed human 
rights campaigns have on the practical achievement on human rights in other places 
would be of great value to the knowledge of socialisation processes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Lessons that can be deduced from the research undertaken in this thesis span both the 
theoretical and the practical. Nevertheless, the final word must be saved for what 
NGOs can learn in order to help uphold human dignity and avoid abuses of that 
dignity. This goal surely lies at the heart of the human rights field.  
 
Perhaps the most evident and critical of the research’s implications is the need to 
build frames more carefully to fit the situations in which NGOs find themselves. Self-
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determination, as the most extremely politicised human rights principle used in this 
thesis, is an obvious candidate for the type of right that should often be avoided in 
human rights advocacy. Unfortunately, this may often place NGOs in the somewhat 
uncomfortable position of avoiding debates over self-determination rights. It may 
even mean that for political purposes, through their silence to debates over self-
determination, NGOs tacitly acknowledge state sovereignty in situations where its 
legitimacy is dubious at best. Overriding this discomfort and the challenging 
criticisms that such a position may incur, however, is the benefit of avoiding possible 
escalations in human rights abuses. Thus, while incorporating a hierarchy of rights 
into NGO practices is not without problems, the potential benefits are great. 
 
Having given evidence to support the hierarchy of rights for NGOs, it is not difficult 
to envisage specific situations where it may be used. Lessons may be deduced for 
such diverse situations as those faced in Kosovo,82 Chechnya, Tibet, as well as in 
Aceh, on the western side of the Indonesian archipelago. Findings from this research 
corroborate the outlook that it may be better to avoid polemical debates over 
independence and self-determination in favour of focusing on basic rights. Framing 
human rights in terms of the independence aspirations of its people could be 
significantly detrimental for the broad state of human rights in crisis zones around the 
world, just as it was in West Papua. Focusing efforts on violations of basic, non-
political rights could prove much more beneficial for the people who suffer human 
rights abuses.   
 
                                                
82 Kosovo, which indicated its intent to declare independence from Serbia in late 2007, serves as a 
pressing example of how these findings on self-determination could be applied. During the time that 
the Kosovo administration has been in talks over its status within Serbia, human rights abuses have 
been commonplace. Harassment and attacks against minority Serb, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
communities frequently occurred (Troszczynska-van Genderen 2007). However, as was highlighted by 
Human Rights Watch after the failure of the Kosovo–Serb talks (Troszczynska-van Genderen 2007), 
often these human rights issues were left unaddressed as self-determination issues dominated political 
attention. 
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